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Editor's Note

Chameleon Conservatives

One of the more unfortunate political developments in contemporary Western cultures is the steady erosion of a conservative intellectual tradition, a gradual but persistent collapse of a core set of principles that formed a rational alternative to collectivism, egalitarianism, and multiculturalism. As a cultural force, no other intellectual movement had as much to gain yet has accomplished so little and squandered so much over frivolous political matters.

Modern "conservatism" has evolved over several decades—from a maverick insurgency against the encroachment of welfare state liberalism to a "compassionate" political substitute for progressive policies—drifting steadily leftward while abandoning its fundamental tenets for the sake of political pragmatism. When one looks back over several decades it becomes evident that conservatism has changed significantly. What was once "conservative" is now rendered unacceptably "reactionary" and considered beyond-the-pale. Although it is tempting to ask *how* this happened, and revisit the past, we believe it is time to move on. It is simply too late to put Humpty Dumpty back together again. Here's why.

The ascendancy of "political correctness" within the political culture has effectively altered the national dialogue by stifling any serious opposition to either egalitarianism or multiculturalism. Conservatives have simply become indistinguishable from progressives on issues of race and ethnicity, which raise the significance of group *differences* and human *inequalities* in national affairs. In fact, as is pointed out in the pages that follow, the last genuine statesman that unequivocally stood up and voiced rational concerns over the menace of multiculturalism was Enoch Powell. In the spirit of a principled public servant, Powell risked his political career for the well-being of his constituents and fellow countryman rather than remain a silent witness to the cultural transformation of his national heritage. Arguably, no other modern public official comparable to Powell's intellectual and political stature—including Churchill—has jeopardized a safe political career for the greater welfare of his nation's cultural survival.

What exactly has the modern "conservative" movement accomplished over the years? Some may argue that the political gains conventionally attributed to the Reagan and Thatcher administrations represent solid victories, such as the privatization of some governmental operations or the defeat of communism and eventual demise of the Soviet Union. Such arguments ring hollow upon further scrutiny; just how less intrusive, regulatory or burdensome are Western democracies today than say twenty-five or fifty years ago? How much

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of the collapse of the Soviet Union is attributable to the pressures of superior Western defense forces or internal decay from within a crumbling national economic and political system? As champions of "free enterprise" and the market place, why has the public sector remained so permanently large?

Robert Conquest recently pointed out that the triumph of Bolshevism was not merely a result of totalitarian limits on individual liberty but more notably a brutal legacy of widespread coercion forged out of empirical fallacies and the containment of dissident views: a subtle uniformity of opinion imposed by a fear of challenging the regime's politically correct orthodoxy. As Conquest notes,

> The horrors of our time have been very remarkable. The Soviet writer Vassily Grossman had some of the essentials when he wrote that "the extreme violence of the totalitarian systems proved able to crush the human spirit throughout whole continents." It wasn't merely killing people, it was crushing their independent thought. And that, of course, is not simply lying, it is forcing you to believe and assert what you don't believe. Not just lying to you, but forcing the lie deep into your soul. And that, I think, was one of the main points of the ideologies.[1]

In paradoxical fashion, similar conditions prevail as a political trend among Western nations despite a tradition steeped in "free expression" and a "toleration" of "dissident views" and "independent reflection."

For critics who reject the political currents of unrestricted immigration levels, chronic population diversity, radical egalitarianism, and the catastrophic spread of multiculturalism, the consequences are similar to those found under totalitarian rule—whether a newspaper columnist who loses his job for expressing his opinions or a distinguished social scientist who cannot find a major publisher for a manuscript that reflects not only a decade of path-breaking research, but widespread acclaim for meticulous accuracy by colleagues and editors alike. The conditions are such that the bar of standards for rejecting either an egalitarian or multicultural perspective becomes higher and higher to clear because of the taboos of political correctness.

For years American attitudes reflected a smugness that despite record-level demographic population and cultural shifts from within, as well as developments abroad, life goes on: there are profits to reap, malls to shop, concerts to attend, resorts to visit, and lattes to consume. The recent terrorist attack on American landmarks provoked a flood of commentary from each end of the ideological spectrum, but once again looming critical matters are missing from political radar: as a nation, is the United States becoming *too diverse*? Is it a good idea for a nation to become all things to all people? Is the increased balkanization of the United States a desirable goal? Should foreign policy objectives include the forced amalgamation of multiethnic societies? Is it really warranted for the citizenry of a nation to be indistinguishable from a foreign populace? To raise such questions, one must accept the underlying premise as a *valid* concern.

Nearly everyone, from the nation's managerial elite to the average citizen, continues to scratch their heads wondering in bewilderment: how could such a devastating and sophisticated terrorist strike happen? In a familiar refrain, we discover that "times have

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changed" and our "nation faces new challenges"—both from without and from within. The primary reason is that it is increasingly difficult to define, in terms of nationality or citizenry, just what constitutes being an American. The process of assimilation has become one of annexation by colonialism.

Conservatives once unequivocally opposed egalitarian social policies, from preferential treatment and forced school desegregation to the bloated excesses of Head Start, welfare, and the relentless expansion of the public sector. Likewise conservatives routinely supported *limited* constitutional rule, freedom of association, individual achievement and a vibrant meritocracy. Now "conservatives" merely emphasize their *similarities* rather than *dissimilarities* with progressives.

In looking to the future, we seek: a renewal of nationalistic sentiments; a perspective forged by the lessons of history and refined by bold rather than blunt distinctions; a genuine respect for ethnic and cultural variation, which recognizes what Sir Francis Galton once identified as differences in *racial character*; an outlook that firmly appreciates the role of heredity in shaping human nature, and fully rejects cultural uniformity and biological equality. We seek a future in which national cultures and population gene pools flourish and reach advanced levels of bio-social enrichment well beyond their current potential in the absence of multicultural hegemonies; a future grounded upon traditional Western cultural values of liberty, limited constitutional self-governance, and meritocratic achievement. We offer the journal before you as a forum for the examination of these and similar ideas.

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Conquest, "Lessons from the Twentieth Century, " *Vital Speeches* 66, no. 17 (June 15, 2000), p. 540.

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WELCOMING REMARKS

FOR OUR CHILDREN'S CHILDREN

WILLIAM H. REGNERY, II

The following is the text of opening remarks to a small gathering of conservatives at the St. Petes Beach Conference held from December 10-12, 1999.

In 1950 an ex-communist turned anarcho-libertarian named Frank Choderov wrote an essay titled "For Our Children's Children." Using the Intercollegiate Society of Socialists as his model Choderov proposed establishing a right wing counterpart. The ISS was founded in the early part of the century by Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb in England and sought to infect the best university students with collectivist notions. By the half-century mark its successes were legion. Choderov's vision was fleshed out as the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists and launched in 1953.

ISI, albeit with a different name, survives today as a robust if little known organization which operates on the paleocon side of the establishment Right. It considers its mission more cultural than economic, is informed in manners by Kirk rather than Kristol, and in economics looks to Roepke rather than Friedman. Regrettably, after its first fifty years ISI cannot claim the same results as its collectivist antecedent. But this said, Choderov's goal expressed a sentiment for his cultural posterity that should both animate our deliberations and sketch a time line.

In antiquity a change of the magnitude that we're living through is summarized by James C. Russell in his book *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*. He maintains that the Peloponnesian Wars and then the conquests of Alexander "appear to have irreversibly disrupted the harmonious ethos of the Classical world and destabilized the entire Mediterranean region." Russell lays out the following chain of events:

> From whatever point of view Alexander's campaigns are judged...their consequences were profound and irrevocable. After Alexander the historical profile of the world was radically changed...[while his] empire was basically the old Persian Empire plus Greece...the demographic center...lay in Asia [but] its driving force was clearly European and its conscious aim was to promote the Greek way of life. The number of Greek settlers was, in absolute terms insignificant...but as agents for the spread of Hellenism they proved sufficient. [But] despite [these] intentions the ultimate result was not cultural conformity but... cultural confusion, and the loss of cultural identity by native and immigrant alike...native Greek culture was gradually transformed and "de-Hellenized."[1]

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A nation absorbs what it conquers and a culture becomes what it colonizes.

The two world wars interleaved by worldwide economic chaos are eerily analogous to the internecine carnage of the Peloponnesian conflicts.

While any number of commentators have fixed the epicenter of the damage to the first half of the Terrible Twentieth B. G. Brander does as good a job at any sketching the destruction in his book *Staring into Chaos*:

> The shock of the cataclysmic conflict to Western culture was devastating... Never had a single war desolated a civilization so severely...Values and virtues built and nurtured over centuries were questioned, challenged and overthrown...the morale of the West had suffered irreparable damage.... The Roaring Twenties collapsed [and] a century of economic growth was thrown into reverse and no sooner was the Great Depression lifting than Europe teetered on the brink of World War II... At the war's end... much of Europe lay in ruins...[and] people of the West felt less certain than ever about their progress.... All around the world doubts were raised about the civilization's claim to moral leadership... great empires crumbled.... Europe had lost the ability to govern... And Western society's once-supreme confidence in progress without end was sinking into a mire of doubt and confusion. [2]

And into this void from an estranged intelligensia rose a shadow elite that recognized that "control over the means of communication" rather than "ownership of the means of production" was key to controlling a society. This elite is an adversarial one that in the words of Unibomber victim David Gelernter "loathes the nation it rules." [3] And while he means the United States, the geography increasingly covers the Anglo-Saxon countries and to a lesser extent continental Europe.

The invention of the global corporation since World War II provided the elite with an ideal economic Mixmaster that obliterates racial, cultural and economic distinctions much as Alexander's forces did 2,500 years before.

Listen to Jurgen Schrempp, born in Germany but now citizen of the world. In an interview published in *Forbes* of January 11, 1999, this CEO of Daimler Chrysler noted:

> just as we businessmen have had a dialogue with politicians on a national basis, we need now a dialogue with politicians on an international basis. First of all we have to do this on a transatlantic basis. Once we get this right, then we can do it on a global basis. At the end of the day we will have a transatlantic union—and then let's take it further, eventually building a world union. No barriers anymore. International companies. Internationally accepted corporate governance. Access to all markets, with management coming from all parts of the world. Daimler Chrysler can be a catalyst in moving in that direction. [4]

And of course the most efficient business environment would be a one-world nation, one government that would incorporate what are now local, state and federal jurisdictions, one language, one currency, and one set of standards.

A final consolidation would be a racial amalgamation that Michael Lind of *Harper's* Magazine [writing in *The New York Times Magazine*] celebrates:

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> Senator Theodore G. Bilbo of Mississippi... like other racists of his era believed that the inevitable result of dismantling segregation would be the amalgamation of races through intermarriage. He was right since the U. S. Supreme Court... struck down the last anti-miscegenation laws... marriage across racial lines has grown at a remarkable rate.[5]

Animal spirits, too, play a role in corporate globalism. Capitalism might be called war by another means and the military arrangement of the organization and martial language that is often employed speak to this point. Robert E. Lee observed that "it is well that war is so terrible or we should get too fond of it." In the modern business setting these successors to Alaric can range the whole world over and hardly raise a sweat.

As the shock troops of the internationalists, the global corporation is encouraged and aided by a domestic support team that includes: the media, both major political parties, the professional class, the establishment Protestant denominations, the civil service, and the academy. Even the military is throwing its lot in with this crowd as General Wesley Clark, late Supreme Allied Commander of the heroic Balkan campaign, indicated when he remarked:

> There is no place in modern Europe for ethnically pure states. That's a 19th Century idea, and we are trying to transition into the 21st Century, and we are going to do it with multi-ethnic states.[6]

As the general's comment suggests, the motivation of the elites is inspired more by ideology than economics or adventure. However, while different, these goals are complementary and their parallel progression should not lead to the kind, mutual antagonism that occurred in an earlier age between the landed aristocracy and the rising commercial class. There is no chink in the facade of self-interest that invites a wedge. And, generation by generation, our kind will be winnowed out. One of the few accurate comments issuing from the Clinton White House was Hillary Clinton's remark that "it takes a village to raise a child" and our off spring are being reared by the global village.

The West was grievously wounded by the genetic and psychic consequences of forty years of torment—two back-to-back world civil wars which were hinged by economic strife. *In extremis* we turned to a rogue culture that now in the person of the president of the United States, William J. Clinton, celebrates the end of European denominated United States. And the corporatists take their cue from these new Mandarins.

Our science and technology have swept the world and, like the Greeks before us, the pupils deem the teacher redundant and a embarrassing reminder of their debtor status. And, in apparent sympathy with this universal opprobrium, Europeans—who make up only 10 percent of the world's population—ratchet down their numbers by contributing only 5 percent to the birth rate. Finally, as if to hasten our demise, national borders are thrown open and aliens are encouraged to colonize ancient kingdoms. *The Wall Street Journal* of November 5, 1999 put an economic spin on diversity, in the lead editorial calling for "...a more expansive immigration policy, one that doesn't limit the inflow of Indian graduates in computer science." The prickly Tom Fleming declared in a 1999 *Chronicles* column, "White folks of America, know this: your world is gone."[7]

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The communist experiment in Russia and China pressed psyche and flesh into a Marxist mold that was to produce a "new economic man." But like scrap parts from a machine out of control the only result was millions upon millions of broken bodies. The globalists' vision of a "new social man" will not change the world of the "sun peoples" but it will scrub the people they "loathe" from the planet. The Soviets had no trouble sacrificing the bourgeoisie to their vision, and our present masters have just upped the ante to include an entire race.

I am going into my sixtieth year and have reluctantly come to the conclusion that reshuffling the deck will not improve our chances for winning. We need to start a new game but realize that, as Jefferson said, "the generation which commences a revolution rarely completes it."

Put this notion into historical perspective and it's hardly unique. If we were living five hundred years ago and speaking English, we'd be planning a Calvinist settlement in the New World. Or even as late as the mid nineteenth century we could have set our sights on New Zealand. So while this objective might be less than novel there are no more open lands. Thus what we seek is *sovereign redistribution*. Here, some recent examples of peaceful separation: Slovenia, Montenegro, the Baltic states, Belarus, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bylorussia and Ukraine. Most were created with little or no bloodshed and have become viable nation-states.

It's an understandable conceit that politicians have for their handiwork to insist that countries are immutable. But consider Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1993 observation that, "There are just eight states which both existed in 1914 and have not had their form of government changed by violence since." And the notion of the dismemberment of super states owes its contemporary articulation to none other than George Kennan, the author of the "containment policy" that did so much to thrust the US into world affairs. In his book *Around the Cragged Hill* Kennan proposed breaking up the US and other "monster countries" such as Brazil, China, and India. But before we hoist him on our shoulders, we should remember that he specifically disavows drawing borders on "ethnic or racial distinctions." This said, Kennan broke ranks with the establishment and gave a patina of respectability to the ultimate form of devolution. Another and more tangible expression of this possibility surfaced in the pages of *Commentary*. In the November 1999 issue Ron Unz, former primary opponent of California Governor Pete Wilson, forecast:

> as Americans of European ancestry fall increasingly into minority status during the first half of the new century...two alternate futures present themselves-which might be labeled the new American melting pot and the coming of white nationalism.... America's continued viability as a nation may well depend upon which of these paths we choose.[8]

And in contemporary American there is anecdotal evidence that not all is right in the Emerald City. America Online conducted a poll on Southern Nationalism in May 1997. America Online encouraged its subscribers to answer the following question: If representatives from southern states did propose secession to Congress, what do you think Congress should do? 21% "let them go," 11% answered "not sure" and 68% "de-

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feat the measure." My definition of "radical federalism" has a way to go but it has the support or neutrality of 30% of a slice of arguably well educated computer types. In 1997 *The New York Times* reported:

> In a smaller-scale rerun of an exodus from the central cities to the suburbs a generation ago, many whites are leaving the metropolitan areas...for more far flung areas in states like Colorado, Utah, Missouri, Idaho, Kansas, Texas, Montana and Nevada.[9]

In a column in *Southern Partisan* Joe Sobran concludes:

> If peaceful secession were a live option, many Americans would favor it today. But for now, the question is effectively closed.[10]

And on both counts I would add it should be our mission to increase those who favor a reconfigured continent and to pry open the question of self-determination to popular will.

From an economic view, small countries work. *The Wall Street Journal* comments, "Economists say it is increasingly clear that no nation is too small to prosper."[11]

Estonia, Iceland, Singapore, Malta, and Slovenia are a few examples of viable micro nation-states none of which has more than three million people or occupies more land than greater Los Angeles.

But George Kennan sees great difficulty in reconfiguring the United States.

> It is indeed hard to imagine any such changes (national breakups), bound as they would be to tread painfully on a great many entrenched political interests, having their origin, or even finding any response, in the present American political establishment.[12]

Yes and yes, but then history does not necessarily move in a straight line nor is it determined by a preordained dialectic. The very fissures that we find troublesome work against the power of those who created them. I do not think that the "new social man" has been perfected or will be. Human beings will always tend to divide along racial, cultural, and social lines. So if we would like our own bit of turf to call a national home, why not the Mexican and Central Americans? The native Hawaiians are calling for a return to sovereign status of an island or two. In the last referendum the Quebecois lacked only a few votes to claim their independence. The deplorable state of the American Indian homelands under federal jurisdiction speaks to the need for a new arrangement. There is a loud and active movement to change Puerto Rico's status from U. S. commonwealth to free state. Blacks once asked for forty acres and a mule—would they be happy with their own country and Israel's generous foreign aid allotment? How about an Orthodox Jewish homeland? And once beyond these groupings of consanguinity there are powerful economic and religious interests. For instance the Massachusetts Bay Colony might be reconstituted and repopulated with devout Christians who want to live in a state that will not interfere with the public observance of their religion and will not tolerate abortions. Or how about resurrecting New Harmony, filled with committed pacifists and socialists?

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I am for the United States ceding territory to prime number states drawn from the existing North American population that are indivisible by reason of race, religion, or mutual interests and want to form a more perfect union than that in which they now live. These sovereign entities at their discretion could form a confederacy of equals to facilitate trade and secure their borders. And to this end there is no better checklist around which to develop a game plan than that suggested by one of the animators of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Klaus:

1. "Reformers must have a clear vision of their goal."

2. "Reformers must have a pragmatic strategy to achieve their goal."

3. "Reformers must engage in a 'permanent campaign' to persuade and mobilize the public to support change."[13]

In closing I charge the participants of this conference with the sacred task of beginning to secure for our children's children a proper home.

ENDNOTES

1. James Russell, *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

2. Bruce G. Brander, *Staring Into Chaos: Explorations in the Decline of Western Civilization*, Dallas: Spence Publishing, 1998.

3. David Gelernter, "How the Intellectuals Took Over (And What to Do About It)," *Commentary*, March 1997, p. 33.

4. *Forbes*, January 11, 1999.

5. Michael Lind, *New York Times Magazine*, "The Beige And The Black," August 16, 1998, p. 38.

6. *Sam Francis Newsletter*, July 1999.

7. *Chronicles*, December 1999.

8. Ron Unz, "California and the End of White America," *Commentary*, November 1999, p. 17.

9. *New York Times*, "Many Whites Leave Suburbs for Rural Areas," October 19, 1997.

10. *Southern Partisan*, 1st quarter 1996.

11. *Wall Street Journal*, February 25, 1999.

12. George F. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill*, W. W. Norton, 1993, p. 151.

13. Quoted in *Wall Street Journal* op-ed article.

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Rivers of Blood

Enoch Powell

This article reproduces the full text of Enoch Powell's famous speech to the Annual General Meeting of the West Midlands Area Conservative Political Centre, Birmingham, England, April 20, 1968. Spelling and punctuation are as in the original.

The supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils. In seeking to do so, it encounters obstacles which are deeply rooted in human na ture. One is that by the very order of things such evils are not demonstrable until they have occurred: At each stage in their onset there is room for doubt and for dispute whether they be real or imaginary. By the same token, they attract little attention in comparison with current troubles, which are both indisputable and pressing: whence the besetting temptation of all politics to concern itself with the immediate present at the expense of the future. Above all, people are disposed to mistake predicting troubles for causing troubles and even for desiring troubles: 'if only', they love to think, 'if only people wouldn't talk about it, it probably wouldn't happen'. Perhaps this habit goes back to the primitive belief that the word and the thing, the name and the object, are identical. At all events, the discussion of future grave but, with effort now, avoidable evils is the most unpopular and at the same time the most necessary occupation for the politician. Those who knowingly shirk it, deserve, and not infrequently receive, the curses of those who come after.

A week or two ago I fell into conversation with a constituent, a middle-aged, quite ordinary working man employed in one of our nationalized industries. After a sentence or two about the weather, he suddenly said: 'If I had the money to go, I wouldn't stay in this country.' I made some deprecatory reply, to the effect that even this Government wouldn't last for ever; but he took no notice, and continued: 'I have three children, all of them have been through grammar school and two of them married now, with family. I shan't be satisfied till I have seen them settled overseas. In this country in fifteen or twenty years' time the black man will have the whip hand over the white man.'

I can already hear the chorus of execration. How dare I say such a horrible thing? How dare I stir up trouble and inflame feelings by repeating such a conversation? The answer is that I do not have the right not to do so. Here is a decent, ordinary fellow Englishman, who in broad daylight in my own town says to me, his Member of Parliament, that this country will not be worth living in for his children. I simply do not have the right to shrug my shoulders and think about something else. What he is saying, thousands and hundreds of thousands are saying and thinking—not throughout Great Britain, perhaps, but in the areas that are already undergoing the total transformation to which there is no parallel in a thousand years of English history.

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In fifteen or twenty years, on present trends, there will be in this country 3.5 million Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants. That is not my figure. That is the official figure given to Parliament by the spokesman of the Registrar General's office. There is no comparable official figure for the year 2000, but it must be in the region of 5-7 million, approximately one-tenth of the whole population, and approaching that of Greater London. Of course, it will not be evenly distributed from Margate to Aberystwyth and from Penzance to Aberdeen. Whole areas, towns and parts of towns across England will be occupied by different sections of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population.

As time goes on, the proportion of this total who are immigrant descendants, those born in England, who arrived here by exactly the same route as the rest of us, will rapidly increase. Already by 1985 the native-born would constitute the majority. It is this fact above all which creates the extreme urgency of action now, of just that kind of action which is hardest for politicians to take, action where the difficulties lie in the present but the evils to be prevented or minimized lie several parliaments ahead.

The natural and rational first question with a nation confronted by such a prospect is to ask: 'How can its dimensions be reduced?' Granted it be not wholly preventable, can it be limited, bearing in mind that numbers are of the essence: the significance and consequences of an alien element introduced into a country or population are profoundly different according to whether that element is 1 per cent or 10 per cent. The answers to the simple and rational question are equally simple and rational: by stopping or virtually stopping, further inflow, and by promoting the maximum outflow. Both answers are part of the official policy of the Conservative Party.

It almost passes belief that at this moment twenty or thirty additional immigrant children are arriving from overseas in Wolverhampton alone every week—and that means fifteen or twenty additional families of a decade or two hence. Those whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad. We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre. So insane are we that we actually permit unmarried persons to immigrate for the purpose of founding a family with spouses and fiancées whom they have never seen. Let no one suppose that the flow of dependants will automatically tail off. On the contrary, even at the present admission rate of only 5,000 a year by voucher, there is sufficient for a further 325,000 dependants per annum ad infinitum, without taking into account the huge reservoir of existing relations in this country—and I am making no allowance at all for fraudulent entry. In these circumstances nothing will suffice but that the total inflow for settlement should be reduced at once to negligible proportions, and that the necessary legislative and administrative measures be taken without delay. I stress the words 'for settlement'. This has nothing to do with the entry of Commonwealth citizens, any more than of aliens, into this country, for the purposes of study or of improving their qualifications, like (for instance) the Commonwealth doctors who, to the advantage of their own countries, have enabled our hospital service to be expanded faster than would otherwise have been possible. These are not, and never have been, immigrants.

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I turn to re-emigration. If all immigration ended tomorrow, the rate of growth of the immigrant and immigrant-descended population would be substantially reduced, but the prospective size of this element in the population would still leave the basic character of the national danger unaffected. This can only be tackled while a considerable proportion of the total still comprises persons who entered this country during the last ten years or so. Hence the urgency of implementing now the second element of the Conservative Party's policy: the encouragement of re-emigration. Nobody can make an estimate of the numbers which, with generous grants and assistance, would choose either to return to their countries of origin or to go to other countries anxious to receive the manpower and the skills they represent. Nobody knows, because no such policy has yet been attempted. I can only say that, even at present, immigrants in my own constituency from time to time come to me, asking if I can find them assistance to return home. If such a policy were adopted and pursued with the determination which the gravity of the alternative justifies, the resultant outflow could appreciably alter the prospects for the future.

It can be no part of any policy that existing family should be kept divided; but there are two directions in which families can be reunited, and if our former and present immigration laws have brought about the division of families, albeit voluntary or semi-voluntarily, we ought to be prepared to arrange for them to be reunited in their countries of origin. In short, suspension of immigration and encouragement of re-emigration hang together, logically and humanly, as two aspects of the same approach.

The third element of the Conservative Party's policy is that all who are in this country as citizens should be equal before the law and that there shall be no discrimination or difference made between them by public authority. As Mr. Heath has put it, we will have no 'first-class citizens' and 'second-class citizens'. This does not mean that the immigrant and his descendants should be elevated into a privileged or special class or that the citizen should be denied his right to discriminate in the management of his own affairs between one fellow citizen and another or that he should be subjected to inquisition as to his reasons and motives for behaving in one lawful manner rather than another.

There could be no grosser misconception of the realities than is entertained by those who vociferously demand legislation as they call it 'against discrimination', whether they be leader-writers of the same kidney and sometimes on the same newspapers which year after year in the 1930s tried to blind this country to the rising peril which confronted it, or archbishops who live in palaces, faring delicately with the bedclothes pulled right over their heads. They have got it exactly and diametrically wrong. The discrimination and the deprivation, the sense of alarm and resentment, lies not with the immigrant population but with those among whom they have come and are still coming. This is why to enact legislation of the kind before Parliament at this moment is to risk throwing a match on to the gunpowder. The kindest thing that can be said about those who propose and support it is they know not what they do.

Nothing is more misleading than comparison between the Commonwealth immigrant in Britain and the American Negro. The Negro population of the United States,

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which was already in existence before the United States became a nation, started literally as slaves and were later given the franchise and other rights of citizenship, to the exercise of which they have only gradually and still incompletely come. The Commonwealth immigrant came to Britain as a full citizen, to a country which knows no discrimination between one citizen and another, and he entered instantly into the possession of the rights of every citizen, from the vote to free treatment under the National Health Service. Whatever drawbacks attended the immigrants—and they were drawbacks which did not, and do not, make admission into Britain by hook or by crook appear less than desirable—arose not from the law or from public policy or from administration but from those personal circumstances and accidents which cause, and always will cause, the fortunes and experience of one man to be different for another's.

But while to the immigrant entry to this country was admission to privileges and opportunities eagerly sought, the impact upon the existing population was very different. For reasons which they could not comprehend, and in pursuance of a decision by default, on which they were never consulted, they found themselves made strangers in their own country. They found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighbourhoods changed beyond recognition, their plans and prospects for the future defeated; at work they found that employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker; they began to hear, as time went by, more and more voices which told them that they were now the unwanted. On top of this, they now learn that a one-way privilege is to be established by Act of Parliament: a law, which cannot, and is not intended, to operate to protect them or redress their grievances, is to be enacted to give the stranger, the disgruntled and the *agent provocateur* the power to pillory them for their private actions.

In the hundreds upon hundreds of letters I received when I last spoke on this subject two or three months ago, there was one striking feature which was largely new and which I find ominous. All Members of Parliament are used to the typical anonymous correspondent; but what surprised and alarmed me was the high proportion of ordinary, decent, sensible people, writing a rational and often well-educated letter, who believed that they had to omit their address because it was dangerous to have committed themselves to paper to a Member of Parliament agreeing with the views I had expressed, and that they would risk either penalties or reprisals if they were known to have done so. The sense of being a persecuted minority which is growing among ordinary English people in the areas of the country which are affected is something that those without direct experience can hardly imagine. I am going to allow just one of those hundreds of people to speak for me. She did give her name and address, which I have detached from the letter which I am about to read. She was writing from Northumberland about something which is happening at this moment in my own constituency:

> Eight years ago in a respectable street in Wolverhampton a house was sold to a Negro. Now only one white (a woman old-age pensioner) lives there. This is her story. She lost her husband and both her sons in the war. So she turned her seven-roomed house, her only asset, into a boarding house. She worked

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> hard and did well, paid off her mortgage and began to put something by for her old age. Then the immigrants moved in. With growing fear, she saw one house after another taken over. The quiet streets became a place of noise and confusion. Regretfully, her white tenants moved out. The day after the last one left, she was awakened at 7 a.m. by two Negroes who wanted to use her phone to contact their employer. When she refused, as she would have refused any stranger at such an hour, she was abused and feared she would have been attacked but for the chain on her door. Immigrant families have tried to rent rooms in her house, but she always refused. Her little store of money went, and after paying her rates, she had less than £2 per week. She went to apply for a rate reduction and was seen by a young girl, who on hearing she had a seven-roomed house, suggested she should let part of it. When she said the only people she could get were Negroes, the girl said 'racial prejudice won't get you anywhere in this country'. So she went home.
>
> The telephone is her lifeline. Her family pay the bill, and help her out as best they can. Immigrants have offered to buy her house—at a price which the prospective landlord would be able to recover from his tenants in weeks, or at most in a few months. She is becoming afraid to go out. Windows are broken. She finds excreta pushed through her letterbox. When she goes to the shops, she is followed by children, charming, wide-grinning piccaninnies. They cannot speak English, but one word they know. "Racialist', they chant. When the new Race Relations Bill is passed, this woman is convinced she will go to prison. And is she so wrong? I begin to wonder.

The other dangerous delusion from which those who are wilfully or otherwise blind to realities suffer, is summed up in the word 'integration'. To be integrated into a population means to become for all practical purposes indistinguishable from its other members. Now, at all times, where there are marked physical differences, especially of colour, integration is difficult though, over a period, not impossible. There are among the Commonwealth immigrants have come to live here in the last fifteen years or so, many thousands whose wish and purpose is to be integrated and whose every thought and endeavour is bent in that direction. But to imagine that such a thing enters the heads of a great and growing majority of immigrants and their descendants is a ludicrous misconception, and a dangerous one to boot.

We are on the verge here of a change. Hitherto it has been force of circumstance and of background which has rendered the very idea of integration inaccessible to the greater part of the immigrant population—that they never conceived or intended such a thing, and that their numbers and physical concentration meant the pressures towards integration which normally bear upon any small minority did not operate. Now we are seeing the growth of positive forces acting against integration, of vested interests in the preservation and sharpening of racial and religious differences, with a view to the exercise of actual domination, first over fellow immigrants and then over the rest of the population. The cloud no bigger than a man's hand, that can so rapidly overcast the sky, has been visible recently in Wolverhampton and has shown signs of spreading quickly. The words I am about

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to use, verbatim as they appeared in the local press on 17 February, are not mine, but those of a Labour Member of Parliament who is a Minister in the present Government.

> The Sikh communities' campaign to maintain customs inappropriate in Britain is much to be regretted. Working in Britain, particularly in the public services, they should be prepared to accept the terms and conditions of their employment. To claim special communal rights (or should one say rites?) leads to a dangerous fragmentation within society. This communalism is a canker. Whether practised by one colour or another it is to be strongly condemned.

All credit to John Stonehouse for having had the insight to perceive that, and the courage to say it. For these dangerous and divisive elements the legislation proposed in the Race Relations Bill is the very pabulum they need to flourish. Here is the means of showing that the immigrant communities can organize to consolidate their members, to agitate and campaign against their fellow citizens, and to overawe and dominate the rest with the legal weapons which the ignorant and the ill-informed have provided. As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood'. That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American proportions long before the end of the century. Only resolute and urgent action will avert it even now. Whether there will be the public will to demand and obtain that action, I do not know. All I know is that to see, and not to speak, would be the great betrayal.

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Enoch Powell and the British Legacy of Political Correctness

Sacrificing a Statesman before the Altar of Multiculturalism

Chris Brand

Synopsis

The gifted and esteemed, if unsmiling and much abused British politician, Enoch Powell,* fell from grace in 1968. Powell's mistake was to have alluded to the possible perils of the mass coloured immigration into Britain which was by then well under way. Powell was instantly sacked from the Conservative Shadow Cabinet (where he had been Defence spokesman) and then left to languish on the Westminster backbenches—finally becoming an Ulster Unionist MP. With this put-down by the Heath government vanished for a generation any serious possibility of public realism in Britain about race or nationhood. Even the quite successful Scottish National Party currently professes multiculturalism and in 1999 reproved its leader when he queried Nato's bombing of Serbia (which had tried to control the Albanians within its borders). Today, it is not just academics and journalists but drinking men and grandmothers in Britain who know that "you mustn't mention the darkies." By intimidation, Britain's political class has preserved the fiction that race is not a problem.

Such enforced piety is sometimes claimed to have been a success. Britain's roughly 93% white population has certainly tolerated rather well the 7% of British citizens who now hail from the New Commonwealth. Yet, this year, Britain experienced its worst race riots since the 1950s—with over 200 police injured by young Pakistanis in nights of street battles in Oldham, Leeds, Burnley, Bradford, and Stoke-on-Trent. Globalized capitalism and its convenient religion of Political Correctness are likely to be answered by ever-rising levels of white racial consciousness and the rejection of multicultural illusions. In the past two years, scores of violent incidents between Glaswegians and London's 4,000 Muslim "asylum seekers" sent up from London have provided a test of how keen the Scots are on multiculturalism.

Was Enoch Powell correct in his forebodings that multiculturalism would not succeed? Contrary to the wishful thinking of Britain's chattering classes (themselves largely unaffected by coloured immigrants competing for their own jobs or nearby living space) the jury is still out. The murderous ethnic polarization which erupted in multicultural Sarajevo could also hap-

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pen in Macedonia and even the UK's south Pennines. Fortunately, dangerous multiculturalism may prove corrigible if it meets a monoculturalism that is at once nationalist and classically liberal—the kind of dynamic compromise that Enoch Powell would have wished.

We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre. … There could be no grosser misconception of the realities than is entertained by those who vociferously demand legislation (as they call it) "against discrimination," whether they be leader writers of the same kidney and sometimes on the same newspapers as those who—year after year in the 1930s—tried to blind this country to the rising peril which confronted it, or archbishops who live in palaces, faring delicately with the bedclothes pulled right up over their heads.

—Rt. Hon. Enoch Powell (1912-1998), "Rivers of Blood" speech, April 4, 1968.

[I]n this age of cultural dunces, identikit professional politicians and spin doctors enforcing the party line, Enoch Powell stood out vividly as a man of eloquence and integrity, inspired by a messianic sense of history and of Britain's place in it. Soldier, scholar and romantic reactionary, he was the 100-degree-proof to whom, in contrast, modern politicians are decaffeinated mineral water.

—[London] editorial, *Evening Standard*, February 9, 1998.

[Political correctness] is the most intolerant system of thought to dominate the British Isles since the Reformation.

—Peter Hitchens, *The Abolition of Britain: From Lady Chatterley to Tony Blair*, London : Quartet, 1999.

Under the brutal reign of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communists imposed one of the first codes of "Political Correctness" (PC) prior to the Great Leap Forward and long before the Cultural Revolution. The Communist Party faithful were to avoid mentioning inconvenient truths about China's devastated economy, not to mention by the 1950s its millions of martyrs to ideology.[1] Yet it was not long before PC caught on in England, a country whose higher social classes are famed for their love of good manners and their reluctance to give direct offence about virtually anything.

England had been forged as a modern nation state in the sixteenth century when King Henry VIII invented (and made himself Governor of) the 'moderate' Church of England—compromising between Catholicism and Protestantism and thus avoiding civil war, but nevertheless keeping abjurers firmly out of public office. In the second half of the twentieth century, this national religion collapsed thanks to Darwinism, the loss of

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the British Empire, the welfare state, and the failure of the Church to embrace sexual liberation (except for encouraging lesbians to be its priests). England's political class then adopted a new religion and *politesse* that would silence the vulgar and assist the multicultural Britain and the world-wide *Pax Americana* and Anglo-Saxon empire that were evidently in the making.

The excesses of PC on American campuses would much later provide more by way of regular news and humour—weirdly helping PC to appear frivolous and unthreatening. America also originated the superficially kindly sport of positive discrimination: a.k.a. affirmative action—a new form of taxation on larger employers, obliging them to hire, promote, and cover for workers they would rather do without. Yet the hard-core PC practice of having white men sacked from public office for 'insensitive' speech originated in England. Such draconian dispensations would prove increasingly necessary to prevent critical reflection about England's new demographic arrangement (itself also a world first): White workers were to be kept on welfare[2] where, from their council accommodation, they and their single-parenting daughters would vote socialist; and they would be replaced in the workforce with uneducated coloured immigrants who would also vote socialist from their ghettos.

An Early Casualty of "Political Correctness"

PC's first high-ranking victim had starred as a Prize Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Subsequently, he became the youngest-ever British professor of Greek (at Sydney University) before his wartime service as the youngest-ever brigadier in the British Army (in India). In UK politics of the early 1960s, as Minister of Health, John Enoch Powell began the processes of unlocking and half-emptying England's mental hospitals while introducing cheap Caribbean labour to serve those patients who remained.

The gaunt "Enoch"—as he would become known nationally both to London dockers and on the BBC's flagship weekly radio programme, "Any Questions"—had tight lips, a massive jaw, a high forehead and an Edwardian moustache. In the late 1960s, he held a position at the top table of Edward Heath's Conservative Shadow Cabinet. In 1968, Powell turned his analytic mind to the growing concerns of his constituents in Wolverhampton (north of Birmingham) with "wide-grinning piccaninnies" chanting "Racialist!" Powell mused that non-integration coupled with "positive discrimination" were recipes for trouble, and that mass coloured immigration might even turn "bloody."[3] For his thoughts, he was promptly denounced by the *Times*[4] and swiftly sacked. Powell was already a thorn in Heath's flesh because of his pre-Thatcherite monetarism and insistence on fiscal probity; so his "racism" was intolerable. The technocratic Heath wanted to show that the Conservatives had learned some lessons from their 1964 and 1966 poll defeats—the Tories' first electoral reverses since 1945. Thus Heath (who would never again speak to Powell) rid himself at once of an over-bright and doubtless overbearing opponent. Subsequently, Powell came to abhor Conservative concessions of sovereignty to Brussels. Thus he found himself a constituency in Northern Ireland backed by the Ulster Unionists who wanted to resist IRA terror while holding

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ultramontagne attitudes about Catholics and sexual permissiveness—attitudes that distanced them from post-1968 Britain and made them pariahs at the Palace of Westminster.

When Enoch Powell died in 1998, aged 85, his death was announced on Britain's more popular TV channels by coloured newscasters.[5] Within a few days of his death, an under-cover inquiry showing racist preferences on the part of London taxi-drivers for White passengers elicited anguished protestations from the accused drivers themselves. Notoriously, this group held classically racist and authoritarian attitudes (for which "String-'em-up" sentiments they were much lampooned); but here were the drivers protesting that they would never *dream* of passing by a potential fare who was coloured. (Some of the cab drivers' best friends were black, supposedly!) The next year, the Government-sponsored Macpherson Report[6] would condemn London's Metropolitan Police as "institutionally" and "unconsciously" racist. Following the report's swift acceptance by the Blair government, the police were obliged to lower their rates of stop-and-search profiling of black youths—resulting over the next two years of "depolicing" in a 60% increase in London street crime. Throughout Britain, by this time, all big employers maintained informal quotas for minority employment—hoping thereby to placate the Government-funded Campaign for Racial Equality.[7]

By 1998, coloured immigrants—composed primarily of blacks, Indians and Pakistanis—made up about 7% of Britain's and 30% of London's population. Fully 14% of mothers giving birth had been immigrants themselves. Still more remarkably, the generation following Powell's "Rivers of Blood" speech had encountered no serious public policy developments with regard to immigration. New immigration had certainly been reined in[8] -- even by the Labour Party. Politicians had been shocked by the race riots in England of the late 1950s, had been given reminders by the skirmishes between blacks and police around 1980, wished to quash Powellism. However, the freedom to bring into Britain blood relatives and prospective marital partners had been maintained, and these allowances proved quite sufficient to yield the steady increase of "New Commonwealth" (i.e. coloured but not East Asian) immigration that Powell had anticipated. In particular, many immigrant parents continued to arrange (i.e. dictate) their daughters' marriages. In the absence of any sensible policy for selecting new migrants, Eastern European gypsies, Iraqis, Kurds, Afghanis, Albanians, Ceylonese Tamils, and eventually mainland Chinese headed in droves for Britain as "asylum seekers" or just as illegal immigrants. (Fifty-eight Chinese were found suffocated to death in a single incident at the south-coast port of Dover in 2001 after a Dutch lorry driver had turned off ventilation to keep any chattering among his charges from being overheard by immigration officials.)

The problems identified by Powell had thus both multiplied and remained largely unaddressed. The chief response to them, in fact, was the continuing propaganda campaign in the media to urge British whites to applaud "diversity," accept multiculturalism and to refrain from "racism." Minorities had replaced the old working class in efforts by playwrights and advertisers to spice up their work and attract attention by showing superficial sympathy for the underdog. Yet Britain's campaign to stress the delights of multiculturalism cut little ice with the less successful immigrants themselves. This

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year, it transpired that—quite apart from the well-established American phenomenon of blacks and whites living largely apart from one another—British cities such as Bradford and Leicester had actually become ghetto-ized so as to separate Indian Hindus from Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.

In this policy vacuum, accompanied by growing *de facto* apartheid, English voters had never been given a say in the inner-city transformation of major populated areas into ghettos where a policeman can be semi-decapitated with impunity—his death celebrated openly by machete-wielding young blacks and their local politicians. In particular, the Conservative Party had resolved that it would rid itself of much of its Toryism (support for the monarchy, the country's aristocracy and the Church of England) and instead adopt neo-conservative capitalism. Realizing nineteenth-century economic liberalism might seem hard-hearted on its own, the Party resolved to accept a large measure of humanitarian idealism and welfarism—even though the Labour Party soon responded by stealing the Conservatives' "tough-on-crime," pro-Nato, and pro-European Union clothes. In particular, Conservatives resolved to assert that they would never be conspicuously outdone in racial tolerance; and they struggled hard to adopt black parliamentary candidates even though such selections lost them previously ultra-safe Conservative seats.[9] Altogether, a transformation of Britain that was desired by leftists seeking new votes, businessmen seeking cheap labor, and rightists seeking to break strikers occurred without either intelligent discussion or positive democratic assent. The Conservative Party declined to develop its natural role as an English nationalist Party. It believed it could rise above such "vulgarity"—and persisted in this belief even when, from 1997 to 2000, it held no parliamentary seats at all in Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland.[10]

Powell and British Immigration Policy in Perspective

That questions about immigration and integration should have been left to "extremist" groups like the British National Party[11] is less surprising when the enormity of Powell's put-down is considered. Here are the things which Powell *never* did, either in 1969 or subsequently—even though he was invariably accused by the left of having links to the "far-right."

First, Powell did not identify the particular problems posed by Britain's different racial/ethnic groups. He never picked out the higher criminality and promiscuity or the lower intelligence and literacy of the average black; he did not say that Pakistanis clitoridectomized and locked up their daughters and wanted to kill Hindus; he did not say that Asian people generally have a considerable propensity for killing—as the Chinese themselves acknowledge when they insist that the crimes of Stalin and Hitler together were far exceeded by those of Japan's Emperor Hirohito. Nor could Powell even bring himself to reflect critically that an important feature of English society, at least after 1066, was its relative neglect of biology. Departing in their secure island home from the revolutionary idea that had allowed the German tribes to challenge the Roman Empire,[12] the English—with encouragement from their Norman French rulers after 1066—were disinclined to admit blood as a determinant of nationality.[13] It was their un-

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friendly treatment of the American colonies—presumed to need the same authoritarian rule as did India—that resulted in Britain's first and greatest disaster, America's declaration of independence in 1776. Later, sneakingly admiring a revolutionary, king-killing, and mass-murderous France (despite the efforts of England's fighting men during the Napoleonic Wars), English politicians let their country be sucked into the disastrous 1914-18 war against their north German cousins.[14] Britain had eventually to be rescued by the Americans after many of its finest young men had been madly sacrificed in the trenches of the Somme and Ypres—where officers were expected to "lead from the front." Enoch Powell lacked the familiarity with social science that would have allowed him to point out how English "empiricism" and simplistic veneration of environmental factors lay behind England's dismal experiments with socialism—including the loss of India[15] in 1947, and eventually the winding down of the English grammar school system following Labour's election victories of 1964 and 1974. That Chinese men like gambling, that Indian girls are good at sex, and that Englishmen like their "space" may be obvious to any check-out girl at Tesco's; but such actual proposals about racial and national differences were not even *mentioned* by Enoch Powell. Thus, precisely because he was sacked for far less, they could not be mentioned by any public figure after his sacking.

Second, despite his reputation for logical and thorough thinking, and for immense hard work on parliamentary and governmental documents, Powell made no attempt to explore the empirical questions of whether cultural and racial diversity have any general advantages or disadvantages. By 1968, the world was plainly living in "an American century" and America was a multiracial country—at least by British standards. Yet Powell did not begin to consider whether multiracialism was really a problem; and, if so, whether it had not been largely overcome in the USA by an enthusiastic monoculturalism which had swept whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Amerindians along for much of the twentieth century into free enterprise, individualism, democracy, gun ownership, anti-Darwinism, and TV-viewing. Politely, Powell did not propose that immigrants to the UK (or, indeed, the natives) should have to meet exacting criteria of integration before being allowed to vote or hold government office. He did not consider how the tyrannical ideologies of Rome (both pre-Christian and Christian), Moscow (tsarist and Communist) and Peking (Qing and Maoist) had held disparate racial groups together—whereas multicultural Austro-Hungary, despite its short-lived civilized glories, had been an ongoing joke among realists[16] until its delightful but unworkable empire triggered World War I and promptly vanished. Again, Powell's restraint had a simple consequence: once he was sacked for less, such topics could not be properly discussed.

Third, Powell put forward no practical or even hopeful scheme either for limiting undesirable immigration of dependents or for encouraging the *re*-migration of immigrants who failed to find gainful employment in Britain. Apparently reluctant to use the psychologist's concept of general intelligence (i.e. IQ), Powell advocated no standards of his own for deciding who should have either work permits or full citizenship. Whereas liberal, and indeed PC Canada and Germany would develop elaborate systems for determining which potential immigrants to accept (with points awarded for

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degrees, Ph.D.s, knowledge of German, computer skills, etc.), Britain was to languish with a quite undiscriminating set of restrictions on *all* immigration[17]—allowing only "asylum seekers" much chance of success, so seeking asylum became the rage. Whereas peaceful and successful Switzerland monitored applicants for many years before granting citizenship, Powell did not even suggest obliging migrant labourers to take holidays back in their home countries so as to maintain their connections. For a generation, Britain could not discuss such practicalities since Powell had been sacked for far less.

Fourth, though Powell received over 100,000 letters of encouragement following his 1968 speech and could easily have rallied millions of supporters, he made no effort at all to organize public protest outside Parliament. A true English nationalist, without a trace of fascism in his bones, he saw Parliament as the proper forum for the discussion and resolution of great issues. Powell knew and loved India and was fluent in two of its languages; and he had spoken through passionate tears in the House of Commons against the injustices and murders meted out by the British colonial authorities to the inmates of the major internment camp in Kenya for Mau Mau rebels of the 1950s. Powell did not even seek to write a book or to have social scientists research questions about race. "Racism," if that is what Powell propounded, never had a less troublesome champion, or one less deserving of being turned into a pariah.[18] So others noted his fate.

Nevertheless, the terrors that awaited those who thought of discussing Powell's anxieties were hardly those of the Spanish Inquisition or the French Jacobins. All that happened to English outspeakers was that they lost promotion chances, conference invitations, or their girlfriends. They suffered only the non-life-threatening odium that had attended atheism in the eighteenth century—when Scotland's most distinguished philosopher, David Hume, was denied a chair thanks at once to mobs led by ministers of religion and to cowardly academics. Few went to prison for "racism" in multicultural Britain—and many who did were mainly black sufferers from paranoid psychoses who made ordinary political extremists look parliamentary. So why did only a few fringe supporters of the "far right" make much effort to protest against coloured immigration to Britain? There are four main reasons.

First, the tolerance and good manners of England's higher-class and rural people are legendary. The essential feature of a stereotypical Englishman is that he regards his home (preferably a country seat, though more commonly today a suburban semi-detached with a garden) as his castle. It is against this backdrop that his vaunted individualism, idiosyncrasy, and quietly imaginative sexual psychopathy are found. Fortified by his possessions, and with his wife and family installed in them, the classical Englishman was able to face city life and its necessary civilities with good grace—his club and preferred harlot provided a refuge on evenings when he was unable to return to get the whip out in the shires. The natural tranquillity, love of privacy, and non-abrasiveness of the upper-class English are much remarked by foreigners—not least by Germans who often find their own countrymen too aggressive in everyday affairs (e.g. in insisting that pedestrians obey traffic lights, that cyclists keep to designated paths, and that condominium dwellers should not have pets or babies). English acceptance of others and their own unobtrusive perversions was doubtless helped by England's having one

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of the lower rates of neuroticism in the whole of Europe—perhaps a result of the country having suffered no invasion (apart from Scottish pinpricks) after 1066.[19] Never doubting his own superiority after two centuries of successful empire, the better-class Englishman of 1969 felt largely unthreatened by the new immigrants. He was thus readily impressed by PC's core proposition that none should give offence on the subject of race. Likewise, he had tolerated Roman Catholicism after 1829—enabling Britain's extensive use of Irish manual labour.[20]

Second, in the 1980s, British Conservatives largely decided that they were really nineteenth-century Liberals and that capitalism and free trade would continue as great success stories. This novel view—for a party which had in its past backed nationalistic agricultural protectionism—provided both a rationale and a method for standing up to trade unionism. Thus it was readily seized upon once Ted Heath's managerial methods had failed. In particular, New Commonwealth immigration provided the labour force that made it practical to challenge union power. Yet, in their inspiring new anti-statism (furnished by Mrs. Thatcher), the Conservatives let go of what were by then the major state institutions—the schools, the hospitals, and local government—and virtually invited the left to do with them what it would. The left, though in disarray about socialist economics, quickly seized the playground it was offered and turned Britain's remaining socializing agencies (given the demise of religion) to its advantage. Even the armed forces and police could be suborned into new roles of invading a long-standing ally (Serbia) and cracking down on "racism." The left used its natural control of local authorities—by then massively subsidized from Whitehall, so local voters always chose high spending—to forge a new lower order. This was made up of "minorities" (including women) so as to compensate for traditional working class whites being embourgeoisified into buying their council houses and holidaying in Spain. Such was the scale of the Conservative surrender of voters in the vast state sector of the economy that, by 2001, only 7% of UK academics said they would vote Tory. [This summer, Edinburgh University—which sacked me in 1997 as being too controversial—hosted a conference of the International Society for the Study of Individual Differences (ISSID, founded by race realist Hans Eysenck) only on condition that there should be no papers dealing with race: such stars of modern differential psychology as Tom Bouchard, Arthur Jensen, Richard Lynn, Phil Rushton, and Glayde Whitney were not encouraged to attend and even had the unprecedented experience of seeing their papers rejected by the Society.] Unopposed by the center-right, institutional anti-racism has well and truly arrived in Britain and it terrorizes all those many modern academics who have wives, children, motor cars, and second mortgages to consider. PC is a new trade unionism from which Britain will somehow have to make a new escape.

Third, as the "liberal"-left seized the universities, it became possible to produce government reports which ignored genetic possibilities and "showed" the problems of minorities to be environmental. Thus Her Majesty's Government commissioned from the University of Cambridge a subtle account of immigrant children's educational problems which, while rejecting left-wing accusations that IQ scores were mere racist labels, supposed that black children would catch up with whites as Pakistani children were

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perhaps doing.[21] In fact, Pakistani children invariably had a big language handicap on arrival in Britain; by contrast, basic English was not a problem for West Indian immigrants. Yet the important Cambridge report met no significant public opposition. Likewise, Britain's criminologists—by the 1980s more left-wing than sociologists—could be relied upon both to minimize the problem of black criminality (accounting for 40% of crime and 60% of violent crime in London) and to attribute it to "socio-economic factors."[22] When the Director General of the BBC complained this year that his staff were "hideously white," not a single person of stature stepped forward in public to question how many New Commonwealth migrants ever applied for £80,000p.a. jobs with the Corporation, or what percentage had the basic qualifications of high intelligence, general knowledge, and command of English that audiences expect of broadcasters who live off compulsory licence fees.

Fourth, PC provided a new religion that was adapted to the times. It offered the traditional religious thesis that men are all one—all somehow equal in the eye of God. With the help of anthropological relativism and Parisian deconstructivism, it sought to deny, or at least forget what is to most modern economists and other social scientists the painful reality of race differences. At the same time, PC offered to journalists a fall-back account of the world. Under this, any embarrassing observed differences could be trendily interpreted as the result of racism. Especially invoked were "institutional" and "unconscious" racism: these were deemed to be as prevalent as had been elitism and snobbery in the days when Britain enjoyed the fun of class competition. Rather as the Church of England had once brought together under one roof the squire and his farm labourers in a display of achievable harmony, so PC pervaded every soap opera and news broadcast—often preventing audiences from learning the race of the many blacks accused of serious crimes. Whites themselves became alert to the possibilities of blaming their fates on "racism": for example, an increasingly common pursuit was for Englishmen living in Wales and Scotland to complain of "racism"; and jokes about the Welsh on the BBC became taboo. No one could "discriminate" any more. No employer, at least, was free to choose. Like early Christianity, PC had no centralised leadership; but it could be adopted by Prime Minister Blair just as Christianity had been taken over and made into a success by Emperor Constantine. Tony Blair arranged for the Labour Party to have an unprecedented one hundred female MPs ("Blair's Babes," as they were called) and Britain's first "Asian" Cabinet Minister.[23] By 2000, the ever-willing media had taken upon themselves the task of encouraging inter-racial marriage even though sexual liaisons between whites and blacks actually remained rare and though no one had explained how general miscegenation could be expected to maintain the West's production of classical composers, political philosophers, comedians, and top scientists. By this time, PC was, like traditional religions, unquestionable—except sometimes by high priests hailing from its own protected minority groups.[24]

Alternatives to the Multicultural Morass

What can be done about the new religion which is at once so tyrannical and so derogatory to white males as to be itself sexist and racist? PC already suppresses

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unwanted publications by terrorizing publishers (like Wiley, which turned down a book by race theorist Arthur Jensen and withdrew another by me), and President Chirac of France currently plans to ban Internet publication of "race hate" material. PC already criminalizes intentions (making "racially motivated" violence more severely punishable than other types) and speech (e.g. racial slurs shouted at soccer matches); and it is on the verge of criminalizing thought.[25] Furthermore, PC's main racist thrust has become quite clear in the past decade—most recently in the youth-oriented action film "The Fast and the Furious" which extols the excitements enjoyed by black street racers and their hip-hop–worshipping white girlfriends in Los Angeles. PC expects the boring white race to fade away—at least, once Whites have paid the bill for their supposed historical record of elitism, eugenicism, imperialism, slavery, and the Holocaust. Nevertheless, these blatant flaws in PC dogma have been insufficient to attract the kind of condemnation with which Western liberals and democrats once made so free when arguing against monarchy, aristocracy, fascism, and, sometimes, communism. Only a handful of Internet sites offer steady condemnation of PC; and when the UK Conservative leader, William Hague, reminded the British public ever-so-faintly this year[26] that people might "wake up to find themselves in a foreign land," he found himself condemned by virtually every national newspaper and by all Britain's main political parties, including half of his own. Will Brits and other Westerners just have to accept a few centuries of PC—the world's new church militant?

First, it needs saying that nationalism and racism are not going to die out around the world, however they might be suppressed by neo-socialists in the West who have traded in their Marxism for multiculturalism so as to continue their attack on the West's institutions.[27] The peoples of mainland China, the Indian subcontinent, and the Muslim world (to mention just a few) have explosively high estimations of the superiority of their own cultures—estimations which seem only to be fuelled by their lack of economic success. America's unprecedented military superiority may preserve multicultural illusions for a while, but the West's rivals know that terror works —having notably forced Russia to pull out of Afghanistan and Britain to hand over Ulster to undemocratic "power sharing." Using the many migrants now situated in the West, other countries' fanatics will be able to pursue terror campaigns against their host countries as well as against each other. Those Westerners who think that the Chinese and the Muslims have lots of convenient border squabbles with each other should remember the sudden Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 which led to World War II: both the Chinese Communists and the Muslims have considerable shared antipathy to Buddhists, Taoists, and Hindus—as also to the "imperialist" West. Even if the Western political class is incapable of learning the limits of multiculturalism from the genocide in Rwanda / Burundi, from the break-ups of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, or from the impossibility of racial harmony in Israel / Palestine, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, and probably South Africa, it will eventually be impressed by mayhem in its own midst.

Second, another problem for PC will arise if the West's economy falters. The rise of PC has been linked to a remarkable decade of prosperity for the fairly-free-trading English-speaking peoples. Yet history gives no reason to expect ongoing rises in afflu-

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ence since boom and bust cycles tend to follow reciprocal patterns; and continuing improvement seems especially unlikely since America and Britain have wrecked their state schools and—thanks to contraception, feminism and egalitarianism in education—have been failing to breed from their higher-IQ stock. If an economic downturn should occur, these countries will attract nothing of the loyalty that their former working men once gave them in the trenches of Flanders and jungles of Vietnam. Rather, whole cities will be in ferment as the occupying races fight to promote their own ethnic interests while staking a claim for their portions of the West's heritage. Whites who believed in PC will find themselves rapidly disillusioned in the event of an economic downturn—as happened in Oldham, Lancashire, this year after mill closures of the 1990s made many Pakistanis redundant, which led to racial ghetto-ization and finally rioting.

Third, still another problem for PC will be its internal incoherence. Just as Christians could never quite agree as to whether their religion was monotheistic (or allowed a four-in-one godhead—including the Virgin Mary) or believed in "justification by faith" (as opposed to the many "works" preferred by the Catholic Church), so PC enthusiasts have grave divisions. Notably, feminists abhor typical Aboriginal,[28] African, Muslim[29] and Indian attitudes to women; homosexuals know that they are little esteemed by Africans —with the exception of the mighty Zimbabwean policeman-fancying homosexual ex-president, Canaan Banana; and handicapped activists know that parents everywhere will move heaven and earth to avoid having to look after disabled infants[30]—only relenting in this when vast outlays on "special education" are available from the state. PC will also be subject to the kind of change that distanced the American Irish from American blacks. In Britain, Hindus will probably be the first to dissociate themselves from the anti-Englishness of black and Pakistani leaders. Even the key historical pact between the Jews and the blacks would break down if more blacks threw their lot in with Islam or Jewry decided to stop using its massive control of the media to give whites a hard time.

Whether intellectuals and scientists will ever contribute much to overthrowing PC is a moot point. To date, the best efforts of psychologists like the late Hans Eysenck and Canada's Phil Rushton have met with media disdain and *de facto* suppression; and not even the work of the silver-haired London clubman, Richard Lynn, is now acceptable to mainstream publishers.[31] The position of PC with regard to facts is interesting. In recent years, PC has moved beyond denying that human races differ deep-seatedly in intelligence to denying that race is a useful concept at all. Refutations of such PC positions arrive weekly as new reports indicate average IQ levels under 80 for blacks in South Africa[32] and drug companies and America's National Institute of Health report medicines having differential efficacy for blacks and whites;[33] but PC remains weirdly intact even when scholars from Communist China report the main human races as having different biology and evolutionary histories[34] or when DNA criteria show higher-caste Hindus to be more similar to Europeans than to the Dravidian peoples displaced historically to southern India by waves of migrating Caucasians.[35]

It has to be considered that factual claims are actually not central to PC, for all that enthusiasts may like to joust occasionally with hereditarians of the London School. It could be that PC is essentially *a moral dogma* in which case biological differences should

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simply not be *mentioned* until they can be remedied. And therefore PC is simply not open to falsification. If so, PC has chosen a wise path. It was only when Christianity became over-confident about its geocentric cosmology and the separate and recent historical origin of the human species that it fell foul of science and spun into apparently irreversible decline.[36] It has to be considered that PC might even be able to ride through massive developments in eugenics and genetic engineering—mouthing its mantra that all biological causation is somehow 'an interaction effect' between proteins and social conditions. PC's more shrewd supporters will soon realize the egalitarian potential of neo-eugenics if pursued under strict state control from leftists, so they will be eager to avoid any outright conflict with science and medicine. So long as psychologists and geneticists remained terrorized into avoiding straight talk in public about race, they might thus be allowed by PC to continue their work.

Altogether more troublesome for PC would be a revival of the family. The West's massive progress in the twentieth century towards peace, health, affluence, sexual liberation, a clean environment, and scientific truth left one huge problem in its wake: that of broken families, unfathered children, and adults living increasingly alone. Crime in particular is linked to divorce, especially when IQ is low; and the twentieth century saw its new permissiveness prove disastrous for low-IQ and black people. Today, the one aspect of Asian life that an average Westerner might specially envy would be the cohesiveness of family life; and Western politicians will very likely turn to reviving, strengthening, and extending the family when they realize that the attempts to solve human social problems by both statism and individualism have left much to be desired.

Just which version of family life to encourage will need much discussion. Christians will presumably continue to prefer the largely monogamous family arrangements that were once officially central to higher class life-- even if many poorer people were effectively excluded and led their lives as ill-paid servants, sailors, wet nurses, and prostitutes. Fortunately, today there are happy diversions for those not willing or able to marry; whether individuals pursue "careers" or "alternative lifestyles" that fulfill hedonistic desires. But many improvements are surely possible—and necessary as people live longer and need more of the support that only a partner or partners of a lifetime can provide. In particular, if white people cannot be once more grouped into families, they will increasingly suck in third-world servant labour and thus risk obliterating their culture amidst awesome racial disharmony.

Almost certainly, some version of polygamy will have to be tolerated so as to deal with the two current problems of children being cut off by divorce or paternal imprisonment from their biological fathers. Yet once Christian monogamy is considered as only *one* possible lifestyle, many other options will come up for discussion. These will include the re-creation of extended families involving perhaps a dozen working adults, all providing each other support and keeping long-term commitments to the family's children and elderly. If the state were to subsidize such part-voluntary, part-genetic *neo-families*[37] and assist them to make cheap but binding contracts, it would be able to unload on them some of the responsibilities for education, health, and welfare that are currently shouldered so tyrannously and

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inefficiently by the state. At the same time, such new forms of community would provide intrinsic satisfaction and fulfilment to many.[38]

Any such developments would seriously threaten PC. Any rebuilding of family life in the West would commonly involve people conspicuously choosing to share their lives with people who would often be similar to them, whether psychologically, genetically or both. PC may pose an attractive enough form of "good manners" while people are living increasingly isolated lives jumbled together in tower blocks, but it will be seen as a nonsense when people are increasingly shaping their lives around neo-kith and kin brought into contact with each other by the Internet and teleconferencing when not meeting in the flesh, but inevitably moving towards the acquisition of properties that will provide perfectly traditional "family seats." Thus can the German and English traditions be put together—in neo-families that will take biology as their bedrock yet expeditiously assemble other members to assist with responsibilities.

Accompanied by the positive development of new familial arrangements, the liberation of Westerners from a single institution of marriage will be a major undertaking; and it would fall naturally to nationalists to encourage such developments—making for a continuation of a nation's genes, choices, and traditions as family life invariably must. It is hard to see PC keeping pace with a world of thriving neo-families which would naturally insist that their own conversations were entirely private and not the business of "antiracist" or kindred snoopers. Moreover, nationalist politicians, seeing increasing proof that people thrive on freedom and responsibility, would surely extend offers of freedom in other areas too—notably allowing more customer choice in state schooling, in recreational drug use, and in the type of medical insurance people take out. The nationalist will remedy the ghetto-ization into which multiculturalism collapses by simply insisting that a certain percentage of neo-family members should have above-average knowledge of the country and its constitution and language—though some degree of familiarity with other cultures could also be required. By this relatively painless process, a sensible yet not stifling integration would be firmly encouraged, one that would instill a true appreciation of *cultural differences* rather than accept the *cultural suicide* of amalgamation. Already, California has shown the way forward: there, contrary to the propaganda of white multiculturalists, most Hispanic parents welcome attempts to have their children taught standard English at state schools.

Thus might a freedom-oriented nationalism (perhaps *National Liberalism*) increasingly come to provide the main alternative to the dangerous dogmas of PC. Hopefully it will not need yet more rioting in the streets before people opposed to neo-socialism realize what needs to be done. Enoch Powell himself, though he had two daughters from his late marriage in 1952, did not think much in biological terms. Undoubtedly that was one reason he could not provide a strong lead for Britain to address its racial problems. Probably this was why it proved so easy to suppress him and any realism about the multicultural follies being foisted on the West. At least, it is worth trying to undo his mistake.

Apart from his disinclination to talk biology, Powell set a fine example of how to combine nationalism with classical liberalism. He was an early advocate of divorce,

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homosexual liberation, and abolition of the death penalty, and he did not oppose abortion until he was forced to use Ulster as his political base. The seemingly aloof expert on Herodotus left instructions with the Chaplain of Trinity College, Cambridge, to reveal after his death that at least one of the romantic affairs of his life had been homosexual[39]—a further demonstration of how badly Powell had fitted the "fascist/authoritarian" mould that his enemies had shaped for him. Sadly, Powell's enemies have had their way for thirty-three years—ironically realizing the truth of Powell's own remark that "all political careers end in failure." Today, it is time for England to solve the problem that Powell left—to fashion a classically liberal monoculture, firmly grounded in liberty, of which all Englishmen and their guests in their neo-families' villas can be proud.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge my debts to my wife Shiou-yun Fang and to John Derbyshire's articles "Lessons from an Asian Yugoslavia: Beware the Multiculti Society" and "The Island Race Riots: The English Have Created Their Very Own Race Problem from Scratch." John Derbyshire's articles were published in *National Review*, March 13, 2001 and May 31, 2001 respectively. The present article also drew on the useful articles about Enoch Powell at the following websites:

UK Freedom Party,
http://www.bartleby.com/65/po/Powell-E.html
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3aeedee02929.htm,
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m0FQP/4415_127/53857642/print.jhtml
http://www.derbydeadpool.co.uk/deadpool1998/obituaries/enoch%20powell.htm and
http://b.cartage.org.lb/web/bio/bio/P/PowellEnoch/1.html.
The last of these URLs carries a fine picture of Powell.

Chris Brand, 58, is the academic psychologist who was sacked in 1997 by Edinburgh University after a year of controversy concerning a book he had written about intelligence. ***The g Factor: General Intelligence and Its Implications*** *was withdrawn by its American publisher, Wiley (New York), when Brand told journalists he agreed with what the "anti-racist" left had for a decade called "scientific racism." Brand's website is* http://www.crispian.demon.co.uk.

ENDNOTES

1. As early as 1957, the pioneering Chinese sociologist, Fei Xiaotong, had noted that "To doubt the superiority of collectivization is incorrect." He hoped that no one would seize "on one or two of my sentences to argue that I am being negative." Yet his concern for correctness and positivity had not gone far enough. Within a few months he was stripped of all his honorific posts, was labeled a "rightist" and forbidden to teach, publish, or conduct research on Chinese society (J. D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, New York: Norton, 2nd edition, 1999). The

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degree of coercion is well documented in Jean-Louis Margolin's "China: A Long March into Night," in *The Black Book of Communism* (eds) by S. Courtois, N. Werth, et al. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999), "The so-called brainwashing described by a number of Western observers was precisely that. There was nothing subtle about it; it was simply the rather brutal imposition of a heavy-handed ideology with a simplistic answer for everything. The essential point was to ensure that prisoners had no chance of individual expression" (p. 503).

2. In 1945, 5% of the UK's population received welfare. By 1998, the figure had grown to 30%.

3. Because of its reference to Virgil's prediction of war, during which Rome's River Tiber would foam with blood, Powell's warning became known as the "Rivers of Blood" speech. What Enoch had said was: "As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding: like the Roman, I seem to see the River Tiber foaming with much blood. That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come." Enoch later told his biographer-to-be, Simon Heffer, that he had only at the last moment decided to translate the Latin *Et Thybrim multo spumantem sanguine cerno* for his Wolverhampton audience. If he had not made this gift to the tabloid press, Powell would almost certainly have been able to champion race realism for rather longer among British political heavyweights.

4. The *Times* ran an editorial titled "An Evil Speech."

5. London's left-wing *Guardian* newspaper recorded in its February 11, 1998 Diary: "On Sunday, news of the death of Enoch Powell was broken on London Weekend Television by Trevor Phillips black and on BBC1 by Moira Stuart coloured. As for the *Guardian* report, this carried the by-lines of Vivek Chaudhary and Vikram Dodd. No doubt Mr Powell himself would have relished the irony as much as the rest of us." By this time, black people—though only 2% of Britain's population—were vastly over-represented in advertising, films, and the media, and not for the legitimate reasons that led them to provide some 10% of many soccer and athletic teams.

6. Responding to a long unsolved killing of a black youth in London, Britain's Labour Government of 1997 commissioned a report by a retired Scottish judge, Sir William Macpherson of Cluny. The media suspicion was that the police had conspired to enable four white youths to get away with murder following a street altercation. The report concluded that London's police were at least unconsciously or institutionally "racist" and liked giving blacks a hard time by the use of "stop and search" procedures. For a blow-by-blow account of this victory for PC, see *William McDougall NewsLetters*, Spring 1999 *et seq.*, beginning at http://www.crispian.demon.co.uk/McDNLArch7.htm.

7. Amusingly, that zealous body itself felt no obligation to employ representative numbers of *whites*. In 2001, 70% of the CRE's staff came from ethnic minorities.

8. The main change was to restrict the right of British passport holders to reside in Britain. British passports had been dispensed widely around the world during Britain's days of empire.

9. The Conservatives gave one such failed black candidate a peerage so as to express their faith in him—a confidence which he reciprocated cruelly in 2001 by publicly denouncing "racism" within the Party.

10. The Conservatives narrowly regained one Scottish seat in the 2001 General Election.

11. The BNP was traditionally thought to be low-IQ and to nurture anti-Semitism and flagrantly socialist economics. However, it is lately said to have been "modernized," is led by a Cambridge graduate, and fields spokesmen whose affability and reasonableness make a pleasing accompaniment to their robust denunciations of political correctness.

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12. The Romans never fully appreciated the importance of genetics and often tried to make do with adoptive successors to the imperial purple.

13. English and Scottish law do not even attribute motherhood according to genetic principles: rather, a child's legal mother is the woman in whose womb the foetus grew.

14. In England, the original Celtic population had been largely replaced with Anglo-Saxons, Jutes, and Danish Vikings during the Dark Ages. After 1066, French rule was a thin veneer and had its effects chiefly at the very top of society—and within two centuries the Norman conquerors were speaking English.

15. The social-environmentalism of the English led first to a lack of sympathy for the genetically based Hindu caste system and secondly to the bizarre idea that India could become a multicultural democracy. In fact, partition and a million deaths resulted from fighting between Muslims and Hindus as soon as a Labour Government granted Indian independence in 1947.

16. Bismark was the best-known such realist; but another was Edinburgh University's distinguished Professor of Anatomy, Robert Knox, who tirelessly analysed the European scene with an eye to racial considerations and deplored race mixing as unworkable (e.g. *The Races of Man: A Fragment* [London: Renshaw], 1850).

17. Only since Prime Minister Tony Blair won his second General Election victory has there been talk of introducing a Green Card system—and that talk was initiated by confident Labour ministers with the world at their feet, and not by the nervous Conservatives, long cowed by what had happened to Enoch Powell.

18. The left-wing Labour Leader, Michael Foot, always maintained that Powell was not a racist; and Powell was in fact very popular with his Pakistani constituents because of his fluency in Urdu.

19. Emeritus Professor Richard Lynn has shown that the losing nations of World War II have higher levels of anxiety / neuroticism; but the direction of cause and effect is strictly unknown.

20. The USA likewise took in Irishmen to undertake dirty, difficult, and dangerous work of which blacks were not capable. (By contrast, America's black slaves were reserved for the arduous but uncomplicated duties of the plantations.) In America, as in Britain, immigrant Irish long provided solid support for the political left—which was why Britain's Labour Government of 1949 gave the vote to the one million citizens of E'ire who were then living in Britain for employment purposes.

21. For a summary of and riposte to the psychology in the Swann Report, see C. R. Brand, "What Can State Schools Do to Help Black Children?"*Personality & Individual Differences* 8 (1987), pp. 453-455.

22. In fact, low-income Indian and Pakistani immigrants presented no comparable problem of lawlessness.

23. Though Keith Vaz had eventually to resign following numerous allegations of petty corruption.

24. For example, the only regularly published exposure of black criminality in London came from the black journalist, Darcus Howe, in his weekly column in the *New Statesman*. Howe frequently drew attention to the "Yardie" gangs that were pushing east London towards the same sorry fate as Kingston, Jamaica.

25. Since paedophilic downloadings from the Internet are now criminal, it will not be long before "racist" downloadings go the same way.

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26. William Hague's speech was made to party faithful convened in Harrogate on March 4.

27. Just like old-style socialists, neosocialists are determined to undermine such institutions as the "elitist" universities, the "hidebound" and "sexist" military, the "racist" police and, above all, the "antiquated," "homophobic," and unduly eugenic institution of the Christian family.

28. At the time of writing, Aborigine politicians in Australia have outraged feminists by saying that women's allegations of rape are sometimes fabricated (*Sydney Morning Herald*, June 20, 2001). Aboriginal magistrate Patricia O'Shane attacked fellow female Aboriginal leaders Lowitja O'Donohue and Evelyn Scott, describing them as "bleeding-heart, bleating middle-class feminists" who had themselves done nothing to combat violence against women in their communities. Ms O'Shane has a reputation for realism, having done more than other Aboriginal leaders to expose the genuinely high level of abusiveness show by Aborigine men to their women and children. (An Aboriginal Women's Task Force recently reported "a young three-year-old child that had been pack-raped"—*Sydney Morning Herald* editorial, June 23, 2001.)

29. At the time of writing, a leading Egyptian feminist is on trial in Cairo for apostasy. Critics are demanding she be forcibly divorced from her husband because of her critical remarks about Islam.

30. The proclivities of human mothers towards infanticide of unwanted or unhealthy babies are set out in Sarah Blaffer Hrdy's *Mother Nature* (London : Chatto & Windus, 1999).

31. Lynn's recent books *Dysgenics* and *Eugenics* were published by Praeger, a mail order house.

32. See "AFRICAN IQ OF 84—AND THAT'S IN UNIVERSITY STUDENTS!" in *McDougall NewsLetter*, February 16, 1999 [http://www.crispian.demon.co.uk/McDNLArch6b.htm].

33. One recent study found that, for genetic reasons, the African body manufactures more of the enzyme CYP3A5 (*Nature Genetics* 27 [2001], 383-391). Members of the CYP3A family are known to inactivate half of all drugs, including HIV protease inhibitors, immune suppressing agents and anti-cancer chemicals; thus Africans will sometimes require different medical treatments from whites.

34. See *Nature*, October 15, 1998 (News & Views) or *McDougall NewsLetter*, November 3, 1998 [http://www.crispian.demon.co.uk/McDNLArch5b.htm].

35. See *Science*, June 1, 2001 (Random Samples)

36. If only Christianity had been able to hang on till scientists had to resort to the "Big Bang" theory—which looks compatible enough with the Book of Genesis—it might have been salvageable, especially because its own primary concern with the state of the human heart is readily reconciled with modern psychoanalytic, psychometric and sociobiological concerns as to the deep truths about human nature and its possible improvement.

37. *Neofamilies* were first advocated in the *McDougall NewsLetter* 27 (July 1999). A comparable proposal to "re-invent family life" and go "beyond the nuclear family" was put forward by Helen Wilkinson in *New Statesman*, August 9, 1999.

38. The article "Get Real About Race!," in the UK hip-hop music magazine ***downlow***, offers a popularly written advocacy of polygyny for black men (and perhaps others) and a more general proposal of high-commitment but self-chosen marital contracts. The great Christian theologians Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Melanchthon all tolerated polygamy to varying degrees; the Bible's greatest hymn to real love is the Song of Songs, written by a polygamist for a single woman he was courting; one of Christ's parables concerned ten virgins all waiting for a bridegroom to come; and in England bigamy was only made a criminal offence in the seventeenth century (http://polygamy.com/Reviews/Multiple-Marriage.htm). Polygyny was first

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urged on the West using empirical considerations by G. J. Ravisini, *Die anthropologische Bedeutung der Polygamie*, (Vienna: Instituts-Ravasini), 1930—see http://www.polyamory.org/Howard/sociology.html. The West's most sustained practice of polygamy has been by America's Mormons—see Malise Ruthven, "The Mormons' Progress," *The Wilson Quarterly* 15: 2, Spring 1991.

39. Enoch had particularly drawn the Chaplain's attention to the following lines in his *First Poems* (published 1988):

And since our parting is decreed
By laws we cannot break,
The severed tissues long will bleed
And long the wound will ache.

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The English Patient

A look at Britain in the grip of self-loathing

Derek Turner

The Britain that Enoch Powell addressed in April 1968 was a much freer and more self-confident place than it is today. There were signs of impending trouble, but it was still recognizably the civilized, gentle country that had defeated the Nazis (even if the Empire had slipped away). As Tennyson says: "So sad, so fresh, the days that are no more."

Prominent amongst looming social difficulties was "the color problem" or "Negro question" (as it was then termed unblushingly). In 1939, the non-white population of Britain was only 30,000, most of whom were recent arrivals. But by 1948, thanks to the Labour government's ill-considered British Nationality Act,[1] large-scale immigration had commenced, first from the Caribbean and then from the Indian subcontinent, fuelled by economic depression or upheaval at home and a real or perceived labor shortage in Britain (did Britain really need so many bus conductors?). This large-scale movement of peoples has continued to the present day, with even ostensibly Conservative governments presiding over large influxes, such as when the Ugandan Asians were admitted en masse in the mid-1970s by Edward Heath's government. Both main parties are to blame; as one modern historian has noted: "It was not a policy but a complete lack of one which best explains the phenomenon [of mass immigration]."[2]

Accurate figures about immigration are notoriously difficult to obtain, both because classification categories are constantly changing and because politicians twist the figures to suit themselves. But by 1971, there were approximately one million "New Commonwealth" residents. The 1991 census (the most recent figures available) indicated that the non-white population was 3,018,000, approximating to 5.5 percent of the population.[3] Today, the figure is estimated at 4,000,000, of whom about half, and the majority of adults, were born outside the United Kingdom.[4] Some forecasts predict that London, Birmingham, and Leicester will have non-white majorities by 2010, and that whites will be in the minority nationwide by 2100. Accordingly, race relations are among the most pressing of today's social issues, psychologically affecting every area of life and physically affecting many parts of the country.

One of the most succinct descriptions of the problem and its causes appeared recently in an American magazine: "Through the folly, arrogance and sentimentality of their well-insulated ruling class, and by their own inattention, deference, disorganization and reluctance to appear unkind, the English have given up large tracts of their country to foreigners, whom they dislike and who dislike them right back."[5]

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Tory Seers and Tory Myopia

But it could have been otherwise, had enough people listened to Powell—and if he had been prepared to organise extra-Parliamentary opposition to mass immigration.

Powell was not the first, nor the only, Conservative to think about such gloomy topics. Although large-scale immigration really began under his governments, Winston Churchill himself had said that he was vehemently opposed to "the magpie society"[6]—an opinion that was echoed by his eponymous grandson, then also an MP, in May 1994. Lord Salisbury warned repeatedly of the dangers of mass immigration. In 1958, the public-spirited Tory MP Cyril Osborne famously burst into tears when the Conservative Party's influential 1922 Committee of MPs refused to say anything about immigration, despite his impassioned pleas. And over the years there have been many others who have combined shrewd knowledge of human nature with a profound concern for their country—Sir Patrick Wall, Sir Ronald Bell, Sir Keith Joseph, Sir George Young, Harvey Proctor, Alan Clark, Nicholas Budgen, Lord Tebbit, Lawrence Robertson, and Gerald Howarth. Even Kenneth Clarke, now one of the Tory Left's standard-bearers, co-authored a pamphlet in 1968 that called for a moratorium on further immigration as well as English language tests and health checks for putative immigrants.[7] Beyond the Conservative Party, concern was manifested in the National Front, which came very close to being a major political force in the late 1970s, until its voters were lured away by Margaret Thatcher in 1979. She had made a speech saying that she understood why people felt they were being "swamped," the implication being that the Conservatives would do something substantive to slow immigration (they did not).

But virtually everyone on the Left and more myopic Conservatives thought that Powell was suffering from what one prominent Conservative called "an excess of logic," and exclaimed "That sort of thing will never happen here!" This kind of wishful thinking has persisted to this day. Other Conservatives had private misgivings, but were afraid to speak out.

In 1968, the then very recent crimes of the German National Socialists had discredited the whole idea of even talking about race, let alone discriminating on grounds of race, and the opinion-forming classes, caught up in a spasm of chiliastic optimism, found any discussion of race to be at best irrelevant, at worst positively abhorrent.[8] The *Times* said that Powell's speech was "evil," while Labour politician Tony Benn compared Wolverhampton to Belsen. Edward Heath, then leader of the Conservative Party, promptly sacked Powell from his position of Shadow Defense Spokesman.

This speech put him beyond the political pale, and abruptly ended any possibility of further political advancement. As a left-wing British newspaper put it: "The speech that made him also destroyed him…the more popular he became the more unacceptable he became to the political elite."[9]

There is no doubt that he could have led effective opposition to large-scale immigration from outside parliament, had he chosen to do so. Within two weeks of his speech, he had received 120,000 supportive letters, and London's dockers and meat porters had marched in his support. But he was unwilling to relinquish his position in

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the Commons. He once described how he had fallen under the spell of the House of Commons as a new MP: "The only thing worth having is to be a member of this place and remain a member of this place." Something of this infatuation always remained with him, to Britain's detriment.

Margaret Thatcher may have misled working-class voters in 1979, but at least she mentioned the topic. By contrast, in the 1997 election, her successor John Major forbade even his cabinet ministers to discuss the issue at all. His successor as Conservative leader, William Hague, seemed oblivious to the facts that multiculturalism and large-scale, poorly controlled immigration are not only bad for his party but bad for the country—although he did call for faster treatment of asylum claims and removal of failed applicants, and did criticize the Macpherson Report. He too seems to actually believe that "diversity" within a nation is a strength rather than a weakness. Hague attended with great fanfare the Notting Hill Carnival, the black street party held every August (he called the often violent and always crime-ridden Carnival "Britain's greatest cultural event"). When Tory peer Lord Tebbit criticized Hague's statement, he was told rudely "to play with us or get off the team." Speaking at a reception hosted by the powerful Commission for Racial Equality[10] at the 2000 Conservative conference, Hague said: "I want to see Asian and black MPs in Conservative cabinets and I look forward to the day when Britain has a black Prime Minister." He also signed the CRE's "Leadership Challenge," which obliged him to take personal responsibility for ensuring that the Party is free from discrimination. But none of this obsequiousness did any good, with his political opponents smearing him as "mad, bad and dangerous."

One can only hope that the next Tory leader, whoever he is, will not play the Left's unwinnable game, but the precedents are not reassuring. If he also chooses to dodge the issue, then perhaps another party will have to appear to plug the gap.

The Townend Affair

The most recent Conservative to dip his toe into the race-realist waters was John Townend, then Conservative MP for Yorkshire East (he retired at the election). On March 16, 2001, he made a wide-ranging speech to a constituency meeting, during which he said: "Our homogeneous Anglo-Saxon society has been seriously undermined by the massive immigration, particularly Commonwealth immigration, that has taken place since the War…I believe Enoch Powell was right in his pessimistic forecast…many come from violent societies without our traditions of freedom, free speech, tolerance and the rule of law and inevitably crime is already beginning to rise in the areas where they are…we will sink under the weight of numbers and our country as we know it will be destroyed."[11] While "homogeneous Anglo-Saxon society" might have been an over-simplification, the audience loved it.

The same could not be said of the media, which had a collective fit. The leftwing press, naturally, screeched about "Tory racism" while the rightwing press offered only patchy support. In the *Sunday Telegraph*, columnist A. N. Wilson wrote that Townend was an "silly old fool" and that his views were "ungenerous and unpleasant."[12] Writing in the *Spectator*, former Tory MP Matthew Parris said that Townend had "idiotic and

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nasty opinions." In the same issue, Bruce Anderson described him as "a nasty piece of work."[13] With friends like these, one can see why he felt increasingly isolated.

His sense of isolation must have been compounded by William Hague, who said immediately that he "totally repudiated" Townend's "offensive" comments. Initially, he refused to remove the party whip from Townend, but later ordered him to keep quiet on pain of expulsion. Lord Taylor of Warwick, a black barrister made a Tory peer by John Major (after he had lost a safe Conservative seat in the 1992 election) said that he would resign from the Party if Townend were not disciplined. The Conservative foreign affairs spokesman, Francis Maude, even denied that Britain had ever been homogeneous.[14] Support was offered by Tory peer Lord Tebbit, Christopher Gill (another retiring Tory MP), and by Laurence Robertson, MP for Tewkesbury, who admitted that "cramming" different races together caused tension—although Robertson later withdrew his remarks on pain of having the Conservative whip withdrawn. Sixteen Conservative parliamentary candidates also expressed support for him, or at least for his freedom to hold such views. Conservative Central Office admitted that its telephone lines had been "inundated" with messages of support for Townend.

But it was not enough. On May 1, Townend caved in, and apologized for any "ill-chosen words" that he might have used. There was a final flurry of interest in him when he told a local newspaper that he regretted having made his apology, and promised to "speak out" after the election.[15] We have yet to see if he will keep his promise.

Labour and Race

In 1948, 11 Labour MPs wrote to Prime Minister Clement Attlee warning that "an influx of coloured people domiciled here is likely to impair the harmony, strength and cohesion of our public and social life."[16] But such views are now virtually non-existent among Labour's ranks. Today's new left likes large-scale immigration because it augments their natural constituencies and further dilutes the sense of patriotism that makes them feel so uncomfortable. Tony Blair's first government was egregiously grovelling towards real or perceived ethnic minority aspirations, and no doubt his second will prove just the same.

In 1997, when Labour came to power for the first time in eighteen years, one of the first things they did was to abolish the so-called "primary purpose rule," which inadequate measure the Tories had introduced to cut the numbers of people who went through false marriages to obtain citizenship. Then in February 1999 appeared the Macpherson Report, a study commissioned by then Home Secretary Jack Straw into the 1993 murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence. Macpherson concluded that the police were biased against black people because of "institutional racism," and that this was why they had failed to find Stephen's murderers.[17]

Predictably, Macpherson legitimized attacks on all institutions and professions—so far, the fire brigade, teachers, the armed services, doctors, nurses, the arts, accountants, and the legal profession have all come under fire. The chorus of mea culpa has become deafening. In July 1999, the Archbishop of Canterbury said that the Church of England was "institutionally racist," intoning, "We cannot afford to rest, either as a

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church or as a society, until we have confronted racism at its deepest level—in our nation, in the structures of our church, in the ordained ministry, in congregation life."

Occasionally, there are delicious ironies, such as when the Parliamentary Labour Party was accused of institutional racism, or when the famously left-wing BBC was described as "hideously white" by its own director general. An employment tribunal recently dubbed solicitors' professional body, the Law Society, racist and sexist just a few years after it ditched its former chairman for being too politically incorrect, and just a month or two after it co-sponsored a report into "racism."[18] Among examples of this Law Society racism was the use of the word "lebensraum" and the expression "hands were going to be chopped off."[19]

In October 1999, Tony Blair made a bombastic speech to the Labour Party conference, in which he blamed "the forces of conservatism allied with racism" for the world's ills, from General Pinochet's excesses to the murder of Stephen Lawrence. This remarkable speech encapsulated neatly Labour's view of the world, and set the tone for the 2001 election campaign, during which Labour energies were concentrated on trying to demonstrate that the Conservatives were "extreme" for such policies as wishing to retain the pound and asking probing questions of would-be "asylum-seekers."[20]

The Parekh Report

After Macpherson came Parekh. In February 1998, Jack Straw had created a 24-member body called the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, and promised to take its conclusions "very seriously." The deliberations—if that be the appropriate word—were published in October 2000, in a report which became known as the Parekh Report, after the chairman of the Commission, Lord Parekh, a far leftist of Indian extraction.

The report stated that "Britishness, as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations…it is widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness is racially coded." The polite, British way of dealing with racial and cultural differences—to ignore them— was itself denounced as "deep-seated antagonism to racial and cultural differences." The report's authors lamented that "the idea of a multicultural post-nation remains an empty promise," until all British people were forced to confront their internal racism and British history was re-thought or even "jettisoned." Parekh made over one hundred recommendations, including that Britain should be formally declared a multicultural society, that full appeal rights for asylum seekers against deportation should be granted, that educational authorities should be compelled to keep detailed statistics on ethnicity, that there should be an all-encompassing Equality Act and political parties should have an ethnic "audit" of their members—although most of these have not been put into effect, yet at any rate.

The report occasioned a great deal of hostile press coverage, and Straw distanced himself for tactical reasons, saying that the report was "sub-Marxist" and that he "strongly parted company" with some of the conclusions. One of the commission's members, a millionaire businesswoman, later said at a press conference: "It would have been great if Prince Charles had been told to marry someone black. Imagine what message would

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have been sent out." The Royal Family, she added, is "a symbol of our unmeritocratic tendency and, of course, they're all white. It is part of a rather unattractive hierarchy."

Lunatic Asylum Policies

Although the Tories were lax on asylum seekers (in 1996 there were 30,000 asylum seekers), since Labour came to power the backlog of asylum applications has increased to the present figure of 75,000 (20 percent of all EU asylum applications). This is partly due to clerical incompetence, but is mostly attributable to a lack of political will. The result is that an estimated 150,000 "asylum seekers" whose appeals have all failed are still in the country, and this is certainly an underestimate. Labour's few attempts to clamp down on "asylum seekers" have been inadequate—they say that even with extra expenditure of £600 million, by 2002 it will only be possible to remove about 30,000 of these people every year. These 150,000 are now effectively illegal immigrants—and these are only the illegal immigrants who have claimed asylum. Presently, only about 12 failed asylum seekers are deported each month. As a Kosovan refugee told the *Daily Telegraph*, "Tony Blair is better for us because he helps us come into this country."[21]

Attempts are now being made to fine hauliers and ferry operators who inadvertently transport illegal immigrants, fuelled by outrage at the death of fifty-eight Chinese immigrants who smothered in a Dutch truck when the driver closed the air vents to prevent his cargo being detected by customs officials. This conveniently allows the government to be seen to be doing something about the problem, while not having to do the dirty work themselves. Illegal immigration is reckoned to net criminal gangs £13 billion a year.

While illegal immigration is increasing, Labour ministers and polemicists—most recently David Blunkett—have been calling for more legal immigrants to bolster the welfare state and provide labour for the IT industry. A UN study has said that Britain will need to admit over one million immigrants per year until 2050, in order to sustain her present potential support ratio (the proportion of the population aged between 15 and 64) and the government seems to go along with this reasoning.[22] The European Union has also just announced that it plans to make it easier for foreign workers to migrate and take jobs legally within the Union.[23] One good example of how foreign workers are moving in to fill gaps is shown in nursing: the number of foreign nurses registering to work in the UK is about to overtake the total of new British nurses, with most applicants coming from the Philippines, India, Nigeria, and South Africa.[24]

There is more breast-beating and reverse racism to come during Labour's second term. The Prime Minister's personal policy unit has just announced the "biggest ever inquiry into discrimination against Britain's ethnic minorities in health, education and the workplace."[25] Blair personally approved switching between £20m[26] and £30m[27] in lottery revenues to fund black and Asian projects, while £623,000 has been earmarked to encourage applications from other black and Asian projects. The grants include £5m for a new art and photo gallery for the Association of Black Photographers, £5m for a new Asian arts centre in Southampton, £2.8m for a Chinese arts centre in Manchester, £2.7m for a Afro-Caribbean / Asian "performance space" in Nottingham, £1.5m for new

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buildings for the Academy of South Sian performing Arts in Bradford, and £1m for the Stephen Lawrence Technocentre in London, which is designed to help members of ethnic minorities get jobs in architecture and design.[28]

EU Cannot Be Serious

The next legislative delight comes courtesy of the European Union. Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam deals with discrimination of various kinds, including racial. The UK will be compelled to comply with it by July 2003. Although it must first be passed by the Westminster parliament, this is likely to be a formality. It will make illegal all forms of racial discrimination in employment, training, education, access to social services and health care, and access to goods or services, including housing. The European Parliament has earmarked 100 million Euros over the next six years to be spent across the fifteen member states to implement Article 13.[29] No doubt national governments will also be contributing vast sums of their respective taxpayers' money.

Riots of Colour

The chief manifestation of racial ill will and misunderstanding—and often the only thing that will make the chattering classes even think about race at all—is race rioting. The indigenous people naturally resent the forced interposition of aliens into "their" territory, while the immigrants themselves sense that they are unwelcome, and resent being patronized by middle-class "anti-racists." Add to this generic unease the irresponsible rhetoric of leftists and the existence of a small but nasty minority of hooligans who are less interested in politics than in having a fight, and it is little wonder that there are race riots virtually every year.

Britain's first post war riots took place in Notting Hill in west London in 1958, when black youths clashed with white "teddy boys." The disturbances were also the opening shots in an undeclared racial war of attrition that has been playing itself out in British inner cities ever since. For policemen, words like Brixton, Toxteth, Handsworth, and Broadwater Farm carry a special meaning. It was during the Broadwater Farm riots of 1985 that PC Keith Blakelock was hacked to death with machetes, to which the then local Labour MP responded: "The police got a bloody good hiding!" As I write these words, the headlines are full of reports of the latest race riots in Bradford, Burnley, Leeds, and Oldham.

In the case of Oldham,[30] the riots were followed by impressive general election results for a small party called the British National Party (BNP) in the two Oldham seats.[31] The prospect of such diabolical figures possibly gaining a couple of seats in next May's council elections has thrown the left into a blind panic. A high-powered delegation of local worthies, including the three local Labour MPs, was sent to London to address the "root causes"—only for it to be criticized for being all-white (another nice example of how revolutions devour their own). Incidentally, it is also darkly amusing to record that the Bradford Labour Club was set alight during the disturbances there, and the local Labourites had to be rescued by firemen, after their political playmates had blocked the door with a burning car.

The excuses for race riots are becoming ever less plausible and the proposed "solutions" more ludicrous and expensive. So far, scapegoats for the latest spate of

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riots have included the Tories, "far-right extremists" (although the BNP only stood candidates in Oldham because riots had already taken place there), the local newspaper, the police, bad examples from the white underclass, and "Western society," a liberal local councillor who publicized inconvenient facts about disparities in local authority funding, local teachers and, inevitably, "social deprivation"—everything but the flawed policy of large scale immigration combined with aggressive multiculturalism. Proposed "remedies" include organizing sports tournaments and adventure courses.[32]

The presence of large numbers of women police officers, the lowering of the old physical fitness standards for males (done both to boost recruitment, and to attract more Asian applicants, who tend to be shorter), and the necessity to avoid being seen as "heavy-handed" means that it will become increasingly difficult for the police to control future riots, of which no doubt there will be many more.

MURDER WILL OUT

Enoch Powell once said that all political careers end in failure. But although he certainly failed to provide leadership at a crucial moment, at least he spoke out when no one else would, and also gave the restrictionist cause some intellectual credibility. Our racial problems have worsened despite his intervention. Perhaps not even he would have been able to foresee the myriad stresses and strains and the sheer angst caused by the presence and moral super-equality of such large numbers of unassimilated, perhaps even unassimilable, immigrants. There will be many more Stephen Lawrences and many more Rupert Everetts (the fifteen-year-old London boy killed by Asian youths in London) thanks to the stupidity and short-sightedness of a few politicians, journalists and TV script writers, who seem to believe that all human beings are interchangeable, infinitely malleable consumers. Yet perhaps it would have been even worse had he not spoken at all.

Just as the shoddy buildings of the 1960s are crumbling, so are the liberal platitudes, which underlie left-wing social policy (or lack of policy). But the generation now in power is unlikely to realise the error of its ways. There are widening cracks in the multicultural edifice, but there are still vast numbers of influential people who will do anything to avoid discussing this topic sensibly. For now the unvarnished truth—that there is a growing racial problem in England which shows all the signs of becoming as intractable as the problems of Northern Ireland—is just too dreadful for our present rulers and intellectuals to contemplate. Yet murder will out and, as one Conservative prospective parliamentary candidate put it in May: "I have but one consolation: the silence will not last forever."[33]

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ENDNOTES

1. By replacing the concept of common allegiance to the crown with separate citizenships for Commonwealth countries and the status of "Commonwealth citizen" with rights equivalent

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to British subjects, the British Nationality Act effectively gave eight hundred million Commonwealth citizens the right to reside in Britain.

2. Andrew Roberts, *Eminent Churchillians* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994).

3. This was almost certainly an underestimate; recent immigrants are much less likely to fill in census forms and of course there is no way of counting illegal immigrants.

4. Oxford University demographer David Coleman, *Spectator*, January 6, 2001.

5. John Derbyshire, *National Review*, May 31, 2001.

6. Roberts, *op cit*.

7. Referred to in James Barr, *The Bow Group* (London: Politico's, 2001).

8. Peter Brimelow has memorably said that current US immigration policy is "Hitler's revenge" on America (*Alien Nation*, [New York: Random House, 1995]).

9. Denis Kavanagh, *Independent*, February 9, 1998.

10. The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) was set up under the 1976 Race Relations Act. Although nominally independent, it receives its funding from the Home Office. It administers over one hundred Racial Equality Councils or similar bodies around the country. It has statutory powers to advise or assist persons complaining about discrimination or harassment, to investigate companies and organizations alleged to be guilty of racism (and can then compel organizations found guilty to change their practices), and to take action against legally discriminatory advertisements or companies. Its powers have just been strengthened by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which came into effect in April 2001. Now all major public bodies are obliged to provide "equality of opportunity" and "good race relations." The CRE's former chairman, Lord Ouseley, recently ennobled by Labour, has authored a report into the Bradford riots.

11. Approximately 20 percent of the UK's prison population is non-white (non-whites comprise between 8 and 10 percent of the population).

12. *Sunday Telegraph*, May 6, 2001.

13. *Spectator*, May 5, 2001.

14. It might be mischievously noted that Maude has not been taken entirely seriously by many Tories ever since he, a professed Eurosceptic, signed the Maastricht Treaty on Britain's "behalf."

15. *Yorkshire Post*, May 2, 2001.

16. Roberts, *op cit*.

17. The five defendants—young, white, petty criminals—were easy targets and had no defenders, but despite both a public and a private prosecution and completely hostile media there was just not enough evidence to convict them New Home Secretary David Blunkett is presently discussing the possibility of scrapping the old English legal safeguard of "double jeopardy," which holds that no one can be tried twice for the same crime, so that the five may be tried again. It may be of passing interest to note that one of the five "racists" charged with Lawrence's murder was later implicated in an illegal immigration racket.

18. *Guardian*, July 6, 2001.

19. *Times*, July 10, 2001.

20. As so many asylum seekers are fraudulent, William Hague took to using a simple catchphrase during his general election campaign—"bogus asylum-seekers." This anodyne phrase was it-

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self condemned by Labour politicians and the Commission for Racial Equality as racist. Government spin doctors even circulated a story to the newspapers that the secret service were taking an interest in Conservative politicians' speeches, implying that they were criminal and subversive.

21. *Daily Telegraph*, May 22, 2001.

22. By way of contrast, in 1996 43,500 people were granted citizenship.

23. *Daily Telegraph*, July 12, 2001.

24. *Times*, May 22, 2001.

25. *Independent*, July 5, 2001.

26. *Guardian*, April 30, 2001.

27. *Daily Telegraph*, June 13, 2001.

28. *Daily Telegraph*, ibid.

29. *Daily Telegraph*, July 12, 2001.

30. Pakistanis and Bengalis make up 11 percent of the city's population, projected to be 17 percent in ten years.

31. The British National Party obtained 16.4 percent in the constituency of Oldham West & Royton and 11.21 percent in Oldham East & Saddleworth. They also retained their deposits in several other seats around the country.

32. *Daily Telegraph*, July 11, 2001. But there is at least one faint glimmer of light within Labour ranks—Keighley's Labour MP Ann Cryer has admitted that present immigration policies amount to little more than "importing poverty," and called for English proficiency tests for immigrants (*Yorkshire Post*, July 12, 2001).

33. Simon Pearce, letter, *Daily Telegraph*, May 2, 2001. He was writing in response to the witch-hunt against John Townend.

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Lawrence Dennis and a "Frontier Thesis" for American Capitalism

Keith Stimely

[This paper by the late Keith Stimely (1957-1992) was written in 1986 for a graduate history course in which he was enrolled at Portland State University in Oregon. It has been edited for publication by Samuel Francis, who received a copy of it from a friend of the author in 1987. It has not been previously published but is probably the most thorough study of Lawrence Dennis's political and economic thought yet written. Virtually all editing was for stylistic purposes and not for content; except for a bibliography appropriate for a graduate school paper, nothing Mr. Stimely included has been removed from the original text, and all that has been added are some references in the footnotes to more recent works relevant to Stimely's subject.]

Best known at the height of his writing career in the 1930s as "America's leading fascist" and also as a strenuous opponent of American intervention in World War II, Lawrence Dennis was an economist and political theorist whose writings on the decline of capitalism and its international social and political implications received wide and serious attention in the 1930s and early 1940s. In fact, Dennis was much more than an apologist for fascism or a conservative isolationist, and in some of his ideas he could be viewed as a precursor as well as a contemporary of such better-known thinkers as John Maynard Keynes, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., James Burnham, Max Nomad, Charles A. Beard, and George Orwell. There is something of each of these thinkers in Dennis, and if because they and Dennis all published their ideas at roughly the same time, there arises any question of his intellectual "borrowing"[1] from them, it might be well to point out just who preceded whom.

Dennis's initial formal statement of his ideas in 1932, in his book *Is Capitalism Doomed?*,[2] was almost exactly contemporaneous with Berle's published statements of his concept of propertyless power[3] and Nomad's notion of the inevitable entrenchment of a power-driven bureaucratic elite even in "workers'" movements and societies proclaiming an end to all elitisms.[4] Dennis's book appeared some ten years before Burnham's work arguing for the theory of a new managerial elite replacing old business and even governmental elites,[5] and longer than that before Orwell's depiction of psychological and actual preparation for international conflicts perpetually designed to serve domestic political ends.[6] Dennis published two years before Charles Beard made his case for America's rejection of overseas investments with their inevitable political ties and his prescription for what would amount to

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"regional autarchy" for the nation's economy,[7] and four years before Keynes's final, published formulation, in his "General Theory" of 1936, of his rejection of the supposition of classical economics that the business cycle will always self-correct and his prescription for government stimulation when it does not.[8]

Dennis himself was sufficiently honest in referencing the basic influences on his thought: the historian Frederick Jackson Turner, the sociologists Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels, the philosopher of history Oswald Spengler, the economists Thorstein Veblen and Werner Sombart. Out of his familiarity with these thinkers and his own experiences in the 1920s as a U.S. diplomatic service officer and an international banking functionary, he fashioned by the mid-1930s a synthetic view of economics, politics, society, and history that was striking at least in its sheer brilliance and clarity and which both liberal and conservative commentators of the time recognized as such, whether they agreed with it or not.

Dennis became even more provocative after he began actually prescribing possible political solutions to the problems of depression and war. Although the American and British left initially hailed Dennis as a leading expositor of capitalist senescence,[9] they became increasingly wary of him (though still giving his ideas wide play) when he turned in the mid-thirties to fascism and began to advocate for the United States a corporatist, collectivist state in which business enterprise, though retaining its basic forms and privately owned character, would have been obliged as necessary to knuckle under to the programmatic and channelizing demands of a "folk unity" state. Aside from the "dark" similarities between such a system and regimes of the time in Germany and Italy, this was too little for the left and too much for the right. New Dealers in particular were furious when Dennis blithely stated that trends toward such a political-economic system were already well under way in the Roosevelt regime, even in the absence of such blunt advocacy for them as he was wont to make.[10] Eventually Dr. New Deal himself in the guise of Franklin Roosevelt would have Dennis prosecuted under the Smith Act for "sedition," and the economist joined twenty-nine other assorted non-interventionists, of widely varying political hues and mindsets, in the dock for the "mass sedition trial" of 1944. Dennis was the principal among the defendants in consistently making a fool out of the prosecutor, and after a mistrial caused by the death of the judge, to the accompaniment of increasing skepticism about the whole business even within the pro-administration press, the government dropped its case.[11] By that time establishment opinion-formers had dropped Dennis, whose ideas were deemed beyond the pale. The man who once wrote for the *Nation*, *The New Republic*, *Foreign Affairs*, the *Annals of the American Academy*, *Saturday Review*, and *Current History*, whose speeches and participation in roundtable forums were covered by the *New York Times*, and whose books were given reasoned hearings by such luminaries as Max Lerner, Matthew Josephson, Louis M. Hacker, John Chamberlain, Dwight MacDonald, D.W. Brogan, William L. Langer, Waldemar Gurian, Francis Coker, Norman Thomas, Owen Lattimore, and William Z. Foster, was denied any further access to or treatment in "respectable" forums (or even in the "unrespectable" forums of the left, which reached a vast audience of thoroughly establishment intellectuals) and so had recourse to self-publication for most of the rest of his productive years.[12]

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Dennis spent those years—a good quarter-century—vigorously opposing the cold war and any view of Soviet Russia as carrying a special "sin" that had to be wiped out, just as he had opposed American entry into World War II and any view of the fascist nations as unique repositories of "sin." In both cases his positions arose less from ideological affinities than from his hard-core realism: his caution was against "the bloody futility of frustrating the strong." He also continued to state his view that American capitalism, having lost its essential "dynamic," including its necessary "frontier," could not solve its endemic twentieth century problems—underconsumption and mass unemployment—without recourse to war or "permanent mobilization" for it. Sneering at all "classical," "Austrian," or "monetarist" solutions to capitalist crisis, he proclaimed—as one who had been among America's foremost "pre-Keynes Keynesians"—that Keynesian-style government intervention in some form and to some degree or other was here to stay and was not a bad thing, provided that it focused inward, on the solution of the nation's internal problems, and not outward, to "solution" by foreign war.

Ultimately Dennis believed that "economic laws"—whether those proclaimed by classical economists or Marxists—must and would inevitably follow political mandates, not vice-versa. In a modern age in which traditional capitalism was obsolete, socialism was not at all going to be what its utopian founding theorists had in mind, and the sheer power-wield of elites operating in nationalistic contexts through discreet psychological and cultural appeals was the decisive factor in shaping economic relationships. Toward the end of his life Dennis coined the term "operational"—as opposed to idealistic or wishful—to describe not so much what but how to think correctly about world problems, including economics, and he called himself an "operational thinker."

That he had once called himself a "fascist," however, has informed almost all the approaches to his thought up to the present. Always monumentally unconcerned with what most people, including fellow intellectuals, thought of him, Dennis in the 1930s frankly advocated a variant of a system that then seemed to be "working"—as American capitalism and liberal democracy, unable to pull themselves up out of the Depression, just were not. That the label of "fascist" (which, in its conventional use in America as a term of invective, has gone a long way toward meaning absolutely nothing from meaning absolutely anything) has stuck is in part although by no means exclusively, the fault of Dennis himself. It is a label that has stood as a major roadblock on the way to serious considerations of the full range of his ideas, on their plain merits, from the perspective of history since they were first advanced. "America's No. 1 intellectual fascist," "Brain-truster for the forces of appeasement," "the intellectual leader and principal advisor of the fascist groups"[13]—these were the epithets by which Dennis came to be identified, and is still in large part identified. But even in them there can be seen a nuance that not only applies to but was actually formulated just for him—"intellectual," "brain-truster," "advisor." Even the shrillest critics could not bludgeon Lawrence Dennis into the prefabricated stereotypes as a native-fascist Bundist, Silver Shirt, or Christian Mobilizer. And even in recognizing Dennis as a genuine fascist intellectual, his critics also differentiated him further. Unlike most "philosophers of fascism," who tended to restrict any consideration of economic issues to situational analyses, Dennis

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did not ignore economics in the construction and exposition of his larger, broadly historical, world view. Rather, his appreciation of fascism derived in good part from his initial economic orientation in approaching problems of politics and society, specifically in his critique of capitalist historical development in America.

A summary and analysis of that critique and of Dennis's career are long overdue, as is a critical consideration of some of the historiographical and other scholarly treatments of Dennis that have appeared since the climax of his career. It was just around the time of his retirement from writing around 1970 that a younger generation of scholars began to study his thought and to bring him to the attentions of yet others for whom he was either a completely unknown quantity or just the smart guy of "the 1930s native-fascists." Whereas older considerations of Dennis, coming from old-line liberals, focused on his political fascism, the newer studies, coming after the development of a "New Left" historiography critical of American interventionism abroad and from writers inclined toward or interested in anti-"consensus" intellectual history, have tended to concentrate on his consistency in opposing both American involvement in World War II and in the cold war. There has been no study devoted to his economic views; the most thorough treatments of these have been in reviews of his first three books as they appeared in the span of years between 1932 and 1941. The following purely expository treatment of Dennis's leading economic idea—his "frontier thesis" for American capitalism—makes no claim of thoroughness either in itself or in placing his economic thought within the context of his broader views. It will serve as an introduction to all the basics of these, however.

The Man and a Theme

Dennis was born in 1893 in Atlanta, Georgia, of moderately well-to-do parent.[14] He attended Philips Exeter Academy from 1913 to 1915 and proceeded to Harvard University. His studies interrupted by American entry into the First World War, he volunteered and received his officer's commission through attendance at the novel Plattsburg officer training camps in Plattsburg, New York, in 1915 and 1917 and subsequently served in France as a lieutenant of infantry with a headquarters regiment. For several years after demobilization he wandered around Europe playing foreign exchange markets "on a shoe string," then returned to America to finish his studies at Harvard, graduating in 1920.

Dennis entered the U.S. diplomatic service and worked as American chargé d'affaires in Romania and then Honduras. He was sent to Nicaragua as chargé in 1926 and remained there throughout the Sandino revolution and the American military intervention. It was Dennis who, under State Department orders, sent the cablegram "requesting" the intervention of U.S. Marines in Nicaragua. He never favored the intervention and after publicly criticizing it in June 1927, resigned from the diplomatic service. He went to work in Peru as a representative of the international banking firm of J. & W. Seligman & Co., advising it on Peruvian and other South American loans. In this capacity he came increasingly to be wary of, and finally unalterably opposed to, loans for private or public purposes made without tightly held strings attached or any loans to

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countries whose perpetually unfavorable balances of commodity trade made repayment a dubious proposition. He advised against weighty loans that were in fact made and on which the debtors in fact defaulted. In 1932, two years after resigning from Seligman to retire to his Becket, Massachusetts, farm to pursue a career as writer, lecturer, and investment analyst, he was a prominent witness before the Johnson Committee of the U.S. Senate investigating international lending practices and the default of overseas loans. By that time he was well under way to establishing himself in American intellectual circles as a sharp critic of investment banking practices and of an entire capitalist system which had evidently brought on—and so far could not solve—American and then worldwide depression. Articles in leading journals paved the way for the systematic, in-depth exposition of the viewpoint that he espoused for the rest of his life.

Dennis's career as a thinker in the 1930s and 1940s was roughly divided into three phases, each represented by a book. In *Is Capitalism Doomed?* of 1932 he provided his basic critique of traditional capitalist business enterprise and pointed out the necessity of government planning. Chief among the abuses of private capitalist "leadership" was the grotesque over-extension of credit, internally in agriculture and industry and externally in foreign loans and trade (loans being made only to allow the paying-off of earlier loans, the same process then occurring with these later loans; trade actually being paid for only by the loans of the trader). Not far behind in iniquity was the refusal of capitalists to spend, preferring to hoard, the real incomes that accrued to them while millions were unemployed for want of investment spending. Not yet ready to state what, if anything, could or should take the place of this outdated business order and the liberal-democratic state which allowed it (the two necessarily went hand-in-hand, in his estimation), Dennis contented himself with providing "suggestions of moderation or restraint"—specifically, high taxation on the wealthy (preferably toward job-creating public works projects), high tariffs, and high government spending to keep up employment in a self-sufficient or autarchic national economy—which might prolong and render American capitalism's "dying years" more pleasant. By 1936 and *The Coming American Fascism*[15] Dennis was ready to be even more specific both in diagnosis and prescriptive remedy. With the Depression still unrelieved six years after it had started and three years after inauguration of the Roosevelt "planless" revolution,[16] Dennis foresaw the system's final collapse and offered only the alternatives of fascism or communism to replace it. He frankly favored the former, not only because it seemed to be proven by example in certain countries of Europe, but because the latter alternative would mean a disastrous "wipe-out" of valuable business technicians—as opposed to their co-option and enlistment in national service by a fascist state. Dennis did provide, at length, his description of what "one man's desirable fascism" would be like—but he stressed that any successful fascist movement in America would doubtless not call itself that and in fact would most probably arise in the guise of anti-fascism, perhaps even in the crusading call for a war against fascism.

In *The Dynamics of War and Revolution*[17] of 1940, Dennis particularly explored this last theme as part of an overall treatment linking his ideas to the tempestuous international scene of the time. He predicted eventual American involvement in the European war as the

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only way for American capitalism finally to get out of its Depression, and as representing a desperate effort by the stagnated "Have" plutocrat countries (America and Britain) to stifle the rising *economic* as well as political challenges of the dynamic "Have-not" socialist countries (Germany, Italy, and Russia). His blithe identification of the Hitler and Mussolini regimes with the "socialist" camp tended to cause great upset in communist or other leftist reviewers of the book.

But the liberal states' war to end fascism, with its necessary mobilization of business resources under governmental direction and backed only by government financing, all accompanied by massive doses of governmental propaganda to the democratic herds, would result only in an increasing impingement of "fascist" trends upon the political and business structures of those very states, and even—especially—in winning there could be no return to a laissez-faire whose era had passed. Dennis hoped that the state mobilization of the economy that he saw as inevitable, and which he favored on principle, could be directed inward to reform, public works, and ultimate national economic self-sufficiency. Were it to be directed outward in another big foreign crusade ostensibly to end "sin" in the world, it would probably continue to follow that course so lucrative for keeping up production, maintaining high employment, and staving off deflation, and more "sin" would assuredly be found to crusade and spend against after the dispatch of "original sin." Thus, even before American intervention in the war (right during the Phony War, in fact), and with no real clues as to its outcome or even the final line-up of adversaries, Dennis was hinting at a postwar cold war for America.

He supplemented his book-writing activities of the 1930s and early 1940s with regular contributions to H.L. Mencken's *American Mercury*, where many of the ideas of *The Coming American Fascism* and *The Dynamics of War and Revolution* were originally advanced, lectures and debates, consulting in economics for E.A. Pierce & Co., and editing and writing his own newsletter, *The Weekly Foreign Letter*, which ran from 1938 to 1942. After the "sedition" episode and a lengthy book about it, *A Trial on Trial* (co-authored with lawyer Maximilian St. George), he started another newsletter, *The Appeal to Reason*, which ran for more than twenty years, despite a circulation that never exceeded 500 subscribers (who included former President Herbert Hoover, Senator Burton K. Wheeler, General Robert E. Wood, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Amos Pinchot, Colonel Truman Smith, and Bruce Barton).[18] Dennis also served as an investment advisor to General Wood and made him a lot of money. Dividing his time after the war between his Massachusetts farm and the Harvard Club in New York City, he confined his social life largely to a small circle of friends and colleagues, which included revisionist historians Harry Elmer Barnes, Charles Callan Tansill, and James J. Martin, political scientist Frederick L. Schuman (his neighbor in Massachusetts—and political opposite-number; also his in-law), writer and former "sedition" co-defendant Georqe Sylvester Viereck, and publicist H. Keith Thompson. His last book, *Operational Thinking for Survival*, appeared in 1969. Although the basics of the manuscript had been completed in the late 1950s, the book lay fallow for want of a publisher.[19] In it he hewed to his basic convictions as expressed thirty years before; he claimed vindication by the course of postwar events, made the extended case for "operational" ("or 'rational'") thinking,

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described the futility, waste, and danger of a cold war that was both a result of and a constant prop for moralistic stupidity, and found time to blast neo-classical critics of the "New Economics" of which he had been one of the earliest, if most unusual, exponents. Shortly after the book's appearance, he suffered an incapacitating stroke and remained only sporadically active until his death in 1977.

Dennis's most systematic and developed presentation of his fully matured ideas on the decline of capitalism appeared in *The Dynamics of War and Revolution*. In Part II, "The End of the Capitalist Revolution," consisting of five chapters, he laid out his "autopsy" of the American—in microcosm, the Western world's—capitalist dynamic. Capitalism, Dennis argued, must ever expand or die. The impulse, the driving dynamic, behind expansion is the eternal quest for markets (of need, not just luxury), a quest that is actually a desperate race against the threat of a linear process of overproduction, causing underconsumption, causing cutbacks in production, causing unemployment, causing loss of purchasing power, causing loss of investment incentives—all leading to stagnation and, finally, bust. Busts may be followed by booms *only* when real market expansion takes place. But such expansion can occur only when a perpetual, ever-receding "frontier" is present. The frontier can be a literal, geographical frontier (far from, contiguous to, or even within a nation), or the "frontier of scarcity" provided by a growing consumer population, or the "frontiers" provided by other nations or regions whose markets can be seized without excessive political or military risk. The three centuries of the "Capitalist Revolution," roughly from 1600-1900, satisfied the need of capitalism in all these areas and provided its dynamic power. The discovery of a vast New World provided Europe's literal frontier for expansion of its markets (and its population), as well as sources of materials for production and distribution (mercantile considerations were in fact the single most significant impulse behind the drive for colonization); within that New World, both before and after it was constituted as a new nation, the westward frontier provided the same engine of dynamism for the base population—especially in the lure of free land. All over the globe European imperialisms found markets "for the taking" in lands which could not stand up to European military technics or trading attraction; America also expanded its national and market frontiers through "easy wars of conquest"—against Mexico, against Spain in contests of rival imperialisms, in interventions and "presences" all over its southern watches and even in the far Pacific; the new technics of industrialization and transportation came along at the perfect moment to exploit the situations of these expanding market-frontiers, and all these developments were accompanied by an overall burst in population growth such as the world in its recorded history had never before experienced.

Thus the "Capitalist Revolution" was successful because of specific, historically conditioned reasons. But according to the theoretical apologists for capitalism, the success was not historically conditioned, and there was no reason why it could not continue indefinitely and the revolution remain permanently, even if it were erratic in its equilibrium: busts would always be followed by booms in a self-correcting business cycle. Once stagnation or bust were reached, new consumer demands would before long "force" investment and production to rise again (and thus employment, purchasing power, more investment, and so on). The proponents of classic capitalism were

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continuing to assert this right down through the depths of the 1930s Depression. For Dennis, these rosy theorists were wrong and had been proven wrong by an American (and out of it, a world) economic cataclysm which had not been seen before and after which things would never be the same again. The theorists were basing their prescriptions and predictions on the historical record of the business-cycle through the three hundred years of capitalist dynamism, as if universal or timeless "laws" of business-development could be deduced from that alone. In fact, by their concentration on the "waves" of the business cycle in this limited time-period and historically unique situation they were missing the tide. The great tide was the fact that the "Capitalist Revolution" was finally over because the frontier—all the "frontiers"—existed no more.

The literal American frontier—which had provided the essential stimulus of "the profits of free lands" (both as lure and, crucially, as escape)—ceased to exist about 1890. Linking this in with British imperialism, which had reached its apogee at about the same time ("the frontier was to Americans what the empire was to the British")[20], Dennis held that the processes of expansion and acquisition, not the actual holding, constituted the mechanism that gave capitalism its dynamic; the former fueled capitalist development, the latter inevitably invited stagnation:

> Empire is a process of expansion by conquest, not just the place so acquired.... The socially important fact about an empire is getting it, and, about a frontier, getting rid of it. The two processes amount to the same thing ... so far as empire is concerned, it is the growth, not the existence, the getting, not the keeping, that is historically significant and socially dynamic. A nation grows great by winning an empire. It cannot remain great merely by keeping one. Indeed, once it stops growing it will start decaying .... Mankind is destined to live by toil and struggle, not by absentee ownership.... What we now call capitalism, democracy and Americanism was simply the nineteenth century formula of empire building as it worked in this country. Here the process was often called pioneering; its locus, the frontier.... Now that empire building along the lines of the nineteenth century formula is over, both for the British and ourselves, capitalism and democracy are over as we knew them in that past era.... Unlike the Have-nots, we shall not expand because we are land hungry. Hunger is dynamic. In the twentieth century, unlike the nineteenth, no profit is to be made out of increasing available supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs. Profit making is dynamic. But, to be dynamic it has first to be possible. The conditions creating this possibility are the primary dynamisms of capitalism.[21]

The conditions that imparted success to capitalism were gone with the frontier, and for Dennis the central idea of historian Frederick Jackson Turner, which he quoted approvingly—"The existence of free land, its continuous recession and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development"[22]—explained in particular the character of American economic development, just as the "world frontier" with its "free" (or easily-acquired) land for European nations explained broad capitalist development. But the end of capitalism could also be explained. The end of the literal frontier for America and the capitalist world was paralleled by the end of the industrial

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revolution, the decline in the rate of population growth, and the end of further possibilities of "easy wars of conquest."

The industrial revolution—the effect of technological change—had worn down, and there could be no hope that industrialism or technics could always exist, through evolutionary refinements of better techniques and types of production and more and different appeals to the marketplace, to "reinvigorate" or "save" capitalism when necessary. Industrialism had worn down because it was never a dynamic of itself, but could be dynamic only in the era of the frontier and of rapid population growth. ("Today, so far as stimulating business expansion is concerned, industrial changes are no more dynamic than changing cross ties or steel rails on a railroad.... As for entirely new products, they now tend to replace old products and to result in no net increase in consumption or production.")[23] The essence of the industrial revolution was change specifically within the context of growth or continuous expansion, which means that it could only have been a transient phase whenever and wherever it occurred. This "series of events in time and place" constituted a very real revolution, perfectly following the mercantilist one and necessary to the realization of the overall capitalist one—but it could remain revolutionary only so long as it was expansive.

It might be expansive in perpetuity if "Say's Law"—production as necessarily creating the purchasing power to pay for what is produced—was correct. It was not correct, because its essential corollary, the doctrine of "consumer sovereignty" holding that goods and services are produced for a profit in response to consumer needs and demands, was "100 percent false. Producer demand, not consumer demand, is sovereign." Here Dennis turned on its head one of the fundamental tenets of capitalist theory:

> The producers decide what, when and how much to produce, including the volume of construction and producer goods activity such as new plants, office buildings, etc. In other words, volume and rate of reinvestment of profits and savings determine swings in consumer demand. Producers and investors determine swings in the volume and velocity of the flow of consumer purchasing power. Booms are made by producer and investor optimism and ended by producer and investor pessimism. Consumer needs and desires have no more to do with the up- and downswings than sunspots. When producers decide to curtail production, consumer purchasing power declines and thus arise good reasons to cut production and employment and wages still further. The process is reversed by a change in producer and investor psychology. The producer decisions, as every one knows, are governed mainly by changes in expectations of profit.[24]

The end of the frontier—even just catching sight of the end before it was reached—changed the expectations of the "sovereign producers." That is, it changed their willingness to risk investment. The chief characteristic of American business organization, as it resulted from the industrial revolution taking place in a dynamic frontier-context, was monopoly—about which, incidentally, "there is more hypocrisy ... than any other subject in the whole field of economics."[25] The industrial revolution and the frontier created monopolies in almost every new industry. At the beginning and through the halcyon days of the revolution, the monopolistic entities, existent or in process of formation, were the very ones that were most committed to and enthusiastic about investment and risk, and

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against hoarding or minimal-risk investments or operations. By the end, they were tending to be hoarders or "safe operators" who would expand vertically or horizontally, often both, in organization and control but not in actual new market risk and production—because market frontiers were no longer expanding. This caused gradual stagnation and, when combined with the run of "artificial" expansion of the 1920s, finally Depression. The short-lived boomlets since 1929—those of 1933, of late-1936/early-1937, mid-1938, and late-1939—only provided more evidence that industrial expansion was over as an upholder or as a rescuer of capitalism; they were caused by fears of inflation, not at all by expectations of profits from industrial expansion. Such expectations as could cause real boomlets, not to mention a real end to the Depression, could occur only in a recognized "frontier" situation. Dennis considered at length, and rejected wholesale, the argument ("if it is to be dignified by that name") that even with the end of the geographical frontier and thus of a physically expanding market base, there nevertheless existed and would always exist a limitless "frontier" of unsatisfied human wants and needs and discoveries which would provide all the incentives and opportunities to keep capitalism going. This argument, as "Say's Law" and its corollary, assumed that "consumer desire instead of producer greed" was the dynamic of capitalism. But the key was in fact "producer greed"—and although that might happen to satisfy human wants and needs, even in great volume, in the course of the quest for private gain, such a result was purely an incidental and in no sense a dynamic or causative factor in these processes. As long as supplies of land, labor, and natural resources becoming available for exploitation were rapidly increasing, there was a constant shortage of capital, machinery, housing, transportation facilities and means of subsistence for the workers. This shortage constituted a real industrial frontier. It was a frontier of need, not luxury. Capitalism needs a frontier of scarcity which will keep interest rates high and profit margins wide. It cannot flourish on a frontier of industrial abundance in which interest rates would drop to zero and incentives to private investment would virtually disappear.[26]

One "frontier of scarcity" that was necessary to a successful capitalism was simply the existence of more and more bodies that needed food and goods. This "frontier" might last forever if population increase could be guaranted in perpetuity. It couldn't. Reviewing the census statistics from the first national census in 1790 through that of 1930, Dennis saw that, while the American population increased at dramatic rates throughout the nineteenth century, from roughly the end of the century on the rate of growth (though not simple growth) had been decreasing dramatically. The apogee of population growth, then, had been reached with the passing of the frontier. If the rate continued to decline, and Dennis assumed that it would without significant interruptions,[27] the consequences would be enormous for American capitalism—more so than they already were. For capitalism, here as in all other areas, *needed growth*:

> First among the functions of population growth is that of creating a perpetual scarcity of bare necessities, so necessary for a healthy capitalism or socialism. This scarcity furnishes incentives for the leaders and compulsions for the led. This scarcity now affects only the Have-not countries; hence they alone are

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> dynamic today. Capitalism in America was dynamic while world population increase assured food scarcity. Now that we have food abundance, capitalism is no longer dynamic. Hence the unemployed go hungry because we now lack scarcity. This explanation may sound paradoxical. Well, so is the situation in which farmers languish for buyers of their food and the jobless languish for food.... The nineteenth century way of averting the evil of abundance was to have large families. The twentieth century way, now that we have small families, is to have large-scale unemployment and two world wars in one generation. Given the ideology of democracy and capitalism making thrift a virtue and given the shrinking size of families, it is hard to see any way of coping with abundance other than unemployment and war. And given our culture pattern, it is hard to see how we can operate society without the compulsions of a scarcity which a high birth rate, unemployment or war alone can maintain for us in a sufficient degree under our system.[28]

Capitalism "in its era," a product of peculiar historical circumstances that combined to create a 300-year revolution, was insatiable in its thirst for markets precisely because its new productive and distributive power eventually sated the market's thirst for products. But arrival at the ultimate point of satiation could be and was postponed. The other factor that allowed for this, besides an expanding frontier and an expanding population to settle that frontier, was the expansion of markets through "easy wars of conquest"; these could guarantee the "scarcities of need" required to hold off stagnation or get out of depression. Wars, of course, had always been God's gift to capitalism in stimulating production and soaking up unemployment; they thus provided more immediate benefits as well as their longer-term benefits in creating markets. But there was more to the war-imperative of capitalism than simple economic drives. In fact, "easy wars of conquest" fulfilled the needs not only of private capitalism but of public democracy. Capitalism would not have been what it was without democracy, and vice-versa. American democracy was founded on the twin pillars of a mercantile plutocracy and an agricultural slavocracy. The defeat of the latter in civil war meant only meant its absorption into a new industrial wage-ocracy. This wage-ocracy, called "mass employment," was dependent for its very existence on the expansion of markets—that is, on the reality of frontiers; it naturally made this dependence felt in its political pressures. And the American democratic faith that was instilled into the mass-employed and employers alike was essentially faith in a perpetual land boom. By its national policies of settlement, of incentives for investment, of trade, and of war, the democracy could "keep the faith." The democracy also had its own, more purely political, reasons, most nakedly seen in its war policies, for keeping it. While capitalism needed wars for foreign markets, land-grabs, and immediate productive stimuli, democracy needed wars for a social unity and stability at home that capitalism itself tended to disallow or disrupt:

> In any brief review of the dynamic function of easy wars in the successful rise of capitalism and democracy it would be a serious omission not to call attention to the fact that nationalistic wars tempered the anarchy and contradictions of private competition. Both war and religion necessarily impose collective unity. Their practice unites large numbers of people in interests and feeling. Private

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> competition, on the contrary, must always tend to destroy social unity.... An entire community can practice competition in an orderly way only in war or in competition with an outside community. Thus, in war-time, each warring community operates internally on the basis of cooperation and externally on the basis of competition. In this way there is order within and anarchy without. It is obviously an inevitable condition of any society of sovereign nations that it be characterized by anarchy. Multiple sovereignties are merely a synonym for anarchy. International anarchy is a corollary of national sovereignty. That numerous company of idealists and theorists who profess to wish to substitute in the international sphere the rule of law for the rule of anarchy while at the same time preserving national sovereignty is composed of persons who are either singularly obtuse or intellectually dishonest. Anyone who does not understand that, under the rule of law, there can be but one sovereign, not several, does not understand the meaning either of law or sovereignty.
>
> But, although war has been throughout history a force for anarchy as among nations, it has been a force for social cohesion and order as within nations. Between chronic international anarchy and national order there is no necessary contradiction. The fact is that capitalistic democracies have needed the centripetal force of foreign warfare to offset the centrifugal force of private competition.... Individualism, or the disuniting force of private competition, has made this [traditional] need of foreign war all the greater. The free play of individual or minority group self-interest tends to make any community go to pieces. The counter forces of unification necessary for social order under capitalism have had to be largely generated by the continuous waging of easy and successful foreign wars.[29]

The problem now, in the twentieth century, was that the "easy wars" had gone the way of the frontier land boom and the frontier-filling population boom; their era was over.

With gusto, Dennis presented tabulations of the wars and military interventions of the three great capitalist democracies in the century and a half up to and including the 1920s. His summaries of these tabulations were meant to lend weight to his premises and conclusions—and to make the reader pause upon hearing any such phrase as "the peace-loving democracies." England: "54 wars, lasting 102 years, or 68 per cent of the time." France: "53 wars lasting 99 years, or 66 per cent of the time." America: "In 158 years there was warfare practically all of the time."[30]

The end of the era of "easy wars," which came with the gobbling of the remaining easy marks on the world chessboard, completed the processes ending the "Capitalist Revolution." The four great props of American capitalist democracy had finally all been knocked out: the frontier, industrialism-as-revolution, population growth, easy wars.

Without these props could American capitalist democracy survive? Dennis said that it could not, and he offered four possibilities as to what would happen to it:

(1) It could proceed in the old ways and under the old assumptions, perpetuating stagnation, massive unemployment, utter failure in every economic realm, and finally calling forth anarchistic chaos.

(2) It could succumb to an underclass proletarian revolution led by its own overclass

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of disaffected bourgeois out-elites, wiping out all forms of capitalism, and a lot of capitalists, in instituting the dictatorship of the intellectuals.

(3) It could be subsumed into an overall nationalistic, corporatist, and ethically collectivist state which would assume authoritarian directional control over, though not outright ownership of, much of the business apparatus and engage in necessary redistribution and re-prioritization to end overproduction and unemployment, specifically via massive internal pyramid-building and social projects; this would be "socialism" in fact—whether its proponents or opponents wished to call it "fascism."

(4) It could seek to prolong itself by the expedient "out" of war—which, now that there were no more "easy wars" to be had, would have to be a "hard" war, a really big show, the very staging of which, however, would necessitate to some significant degree the organizational and political steps mentioned in course number three.

Dennis favored the third course for America, but he saw the fourth as most likely. In late 1939 and early 1940, as he wrote, it was beginning to be put into effect. The new style of "hard" war had already been seen in the First World War, which originated in part in the clash of rival capitalist imperialisms. After that war, however, the emergence of revolutionary "socialist" regimes—whether Communist, Fascist, or Nazi—in the nations that walked out of the settlement of the war with status as Have-not countries brought forth a new possibility: that the next big war would not be one of clashing capitalisms, but a gang-up of the capitalist democracies (all in the same Depression boat, after all) against the "socialist" nations. That these "socialist" powers had their own grievances against the post-World War I democratic-imposed order, and were sufficiently dynamic and aggressive to do something about them, ensured that they could be held up to the democratic masses and democratic assemblies as violators of international "order" and "peace," even of "civilization" itself; there would be no lack of "causes" of such a war, or rationales for it. The Have-not powers were dynamic indeed—as only nations unsated could be—and were not just redrawing European (and, in the case of Italy, colonial) borders, but smashing capitalism in Europe: reorganizing whole systems, redistributing wealth and authority, gaining autarchy and taking their nations out of the capitalistic "international systems" of trade and money. All this dynamism was in the name of nationalistic folk unities, "socialisms" in fact whatever the name, which had no further use for the subordination of national wills and destinies to private business or other interests.[31]

This is how Dennis saw the big war-in-the-making as of 1940, when Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini formed a vague (but no less significant for that) "socialist" camp, against which stood the plutocratic capitalist democracies of Europe, with the biggest plutocratic capitalist democracy of all waiting in the wings fairly chafing to get in just as soon as that could be arranged. It would be another crusade, sold to the American herd in its favorite terms of world morality, but really a way for the Old Order at home—the order of a spent capitalism and a desperate democracy—to salvage itself by fighting the new revolution abroad:

> The new revolution everywhere stands for redistribution and reorganization

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> in line with the technological imperatives of the machine age. The cause of the Allies is that of counterrevolution. It upholds the status quo and opposes redistribution according to the indications of need, capacity for efficient utilization of resources and social convenience. It seeks to reverse in Europe the dominant trends, technological and political, of the past century and, more particularly, of the past two or three decades. The democracies have displayed their inability to utilize their resources in a way to end unemployment. But they now propose a crusade in the name of moral absolutes to prevent world-wide redistribution of raw materials and economic opportunities. The real issue before America may be stated as being one of achieving redistribution at home or fighting it abroad. The plutocracy that opposes redistribution at home is all for fighting it abroad. And the underprivileged masses who need redistribution in America are dumb enough to die fighting to prevent it abroad. The probabilities are that we shall have to come to the solution of the domestic problem of distribution through a futile crusade to prevent redistribution abroad. If it so happens, it will prove the final nail in the coffin of democracy in this country. And it should call for a terrible postwar vengeance on those responsible for this great tragedy of the American people.[32]

Regardless of whether they gained victory in the coming crusade or not and regardless of whether the victors took vengeance on the vanquished afterwards, American capitalism and its democracy were going to emerge from the struggle changed. The booms of war, and the war booms, were really the last tolls of the bell for the "Capitalist Revolution," the 300-year product of frontiers that had been reached. The revolution that would follow might come by direction or indirection, be sudden or evolutionary—encompass at once or gradually all the changes in politico-social organization and direction that Dennis, for one, found desirable, or not. But definitely a revolution was in the making, and historians would eventually understand the outcome of this war, like its genesis, as differing profoundly from those of other wars when capitalism was in its prime. The post-capitalist era—no matter that many and even important vestiges of capitalism might remain for a long time yet—had arrived, and it would entail tremendous changes, in the realm of economics specifically, but extending into many other realms as well. It would and could mean, above all, the obliteration of the distinctions between public and private. For Lawrence Dennis, this was not undesirable or dangerous of itself—so long as it amounted to a melding basically in favor of the interests of the public. The specter against which he warned and fought by his words, and after the war saw as happening in fact, was that of this new reality being joined, out of the desperate efforts of capitalist democracy to prolong itself, by obliteration of the distinctions between the national and the international, *and ultimately between war and peace*. Could American capitalism, after a Second World War, really afford real peace? Could it face "honestly"—or, indeed, with any hope of success—such huge postwar problems as deflationary debt reduction, flooding of the available labor market, loss of political unity at home, of a "them" abroad, saturation of the home markets, massive reconversion of industry, and many others? Or would it continue to side-step its endemic problems via the classic "out" of war—even war that was not really war in the old sense (but not peace in any sense either)? A "cold" war would make up what it lacked in com-

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pressed intensity by occasional flashes of action around the globe, a global military spread-eagle in constant preparation for real conflict, a global political and economic presence as excuses for such conflict, and a very long life—perhaps limitlessly long.

Charles A. Beard, sardonically and bitterly describing in 1948 the practical consequences of the Roosevelt-Truman foreign policies as those policies became a "consensus" through the vaunted spirit of "bipartisanship," said that America was now engaged in the pursuit of "perpetual war for perpetual peace."[33] Dennis agreed with that, and would use the phrase (which gained wide currency as the title of a revisionist study of Roosevelt diplomacy) himself occasionally. Had it been up to him to coin it, he might have put it this way: perpetual war to stimulate production, soak up unemployment, create markets, and rally 'round the people. Or, more briefly: perpetual war as substitute for the lost capitalist frontier.

Some Appraisals of Dennis

It took about a decade after World War II for Dennis to be considered once again in intellectual rather than polemical terms relating to the issues of the war. In considering radical political currents in his 1955 book *American Political Thought*,[34] political scientist Alan Pendleton Grimes treated "American Fascism: Lawrence Dennis" as an ideology and its spokesman called forth by the Depression. Grimes focused on Dennis's identification of capitalism with democracy not only in historical parallel but in contemporary reality. Unlike the populist and progressive reformers, who tended to see capitalism (at least the "bad" capitalism practiced by the robber barons and trust spinners and holding-company pyramiders) as conflicting with or even antithetical to democracy, Dennis held that they went hand-in-hand. As an elitist, he wished to smash both, not reform either. In Grimes's view, the major burden of Dennis's fascist criticism actually fell not upon democracy but upon laissez-faire capitalism; democracy was criticized because it permitted the follies of capitalism, of private business leadership. The motivations of this business leadership, being purely selfish and directed toward the satisfaction of greed, were bound to conflict with the normal requirements of social development and order. With the passing of the frontier and opportunities for a kind of social-spiritual growth alongside business growth, the inherent conflict between society and business came out into the open and would have to be resolved one way or another. The era of the frontier, of America's "militant nationalism" that allowed for a mass spiritual and non-commercial, even communitarian, impulse in expansionism to exist alongside mere business greed, had given way to mass atomism in a society now totally dominated by business greed (and made to suffer for business stupidity). Laissez-faire economic liberalism in theory and political democracy as it was put into practice were not equipped to handle the situation; therefore they had to be replaced.

Grimes considers Dennis's critique of capitalist-democratic society to resemble Thomas Hobbes's view of the state of nature: a war of all against all, of parts against parts and the whole. The laissez-faire system by which the state, the supposed guarantor of the public good, did not intervene in these struggles—or intervened occasionally only because some interest group had temporarily succeeded in gaining leverage within

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the state to the disadvantage of other groups—was plainly irrational. Moreover, this state-sanctioned chaos was carried on under an ethical umbrella of the highest fraud and hypocrisy, namely that of the legal system. This system promised "a government of laws and not of men." For Dennis, this notion was pure fiction. Belief in it led to false hopes that "the peoples' will" could ever be expressed through it and ignored the fact that the interpretation and administration of laws, not laws themselves, were what counted. At any time "the law" would and could mean only just what those elites in control of its application wanted it to mean. In America, and throughout American history, the elites in power were generally the capitalists and their partisans; the "independent" judiciary in a government of "separation of powers" was a myth. Also mythical was the notion of "freedom" as existing within the law—freedom, that is, as the natural condition in the absence of governmental restraint. Force and coercion were omnipresent, and it made little difference to those coerced whether force was applied by the government or by the "free" market. If, for instance, a person seeking work found no jobs as a result of decisions by private capitalists, then he was as coerced into unemployment as if there were a law against employment. Grimes quotes Dennis: "The much vaunted freedom of modern capitalism is largely a matter of the freedom of property owners from social responsibility for the consequences of their economic decisions."

Grimes devoted about the last half of his sub-chapter on Dennis to discussing his more purely politico-philosophical ideas on elite rule, outside any economic context. That Grimes began his consideration of Dennis with the capitalist-democratic linkage demonstrates his awareness of the importance of economics in the genesis of his subject's thought. His 1955 treatment represented the first step on the way to taking Dennis as seriously as book reviewers had once done, before the advent of war and "sedition."

Grimes's fellow political scientist David Spitz, in the considerable sub-chapter on Dennis in his *Patterns of Anti-Democratic-Thought*,[35] also took his subject seriously. But Spitz made no mention whatever of the anti-capitalist element in Dennis's political thought and concentrated instead on his general theory of "The Elite as Power." This exclusion is not to be criticized, since Spitz's book deals only with political theory. But his criticisms of Dennis would have been more nearly complete if they had treated the real-world practical underpinnings, as Dennis saw and interpreted them, of that theory. Dennis's views of economics and his economic analysis lay in the category, and to treat Dennis's theory of the elite without discussing his extended critique of a real, historical elite-in-power—America's capitalist elite—is to deny the analysis a significant part of its rationale. Spitz, at any rate and after a lengthy study of Dennis's political theory, rejects it even though he grants the possible truth of its premise, that elites always rule. They may, says Spitz, but Dennis was wrong in supposing that this is necessarily incompatible with democracy, that the elite must always be an irresponsible elite.

For Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., writing in 1960, Lawrence Dennis "brought to the advocacy of fascism powers of intelligence and style which always threatened to bring him (but never quite succeeded) into the main tent." Schlesinger devoted five pages to Dennis in the third volume of his *The Age of Roosevelt*, in a chapter on "The Theology of Ferment" that discusses various radical strirrings and personalities, left and right, thrown into some promi-

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nence during the Depression.[36] After considering the "literary fascists" Seward Collins and Ezra Pound, who were "figures in a sideshow, without significance in American politics," Schlesinger turned to Dennis as the one fascist thinker who did possess real potential significance. Obviously admiring and noting Dennis's *Is Capitalism Doomed?* as a "closely argued" attack on investment banking policies, Schlesinger nevertheless found beneath Dennis's pose of cold realism notes of "romantic desperation,"[37] and he quoted a lengthy statement of Dennis from an unidentified private letter: "I am prepared to take my medicine in the bread line, the foreign legion, or with a pistol shot in the mouth.... I should like nothing better than to be a leader or a follower of a Hitler who would crush and destroy many now in power. It is my turn of fate now to suffer. It may some day be theirs."[38]

Turning to *The Coming American Fascism*, Schlesinger noted the ease with which Dennis assumed that a variety of fascism could come to power and be successful in the United States: big business organization as well as the ingrained docility, standardization, and regimentation of the American people, who were already the world's biggest suckers for advertising, propaganda of all kinds, and press and radio domination, made no other country "better prepared for political and social standardization." As for their traditions of and a supposed passion for "freedom," ninety per cent of the American people had no grasp "whatever" even of what their own ideological system was supposed to be all about. Therefore, according to Dennis, "A fascist dictatorship can be set up by a demagogue in the name of all the catchwords of the present system."[39] Schlesinger went into some detail about the various particulars of Dennis's vision of a fascist America. As to what and who could realize that vision and make the revolution, he considered the importance of Dennis's idea of "the elite." Here Schlesinger noted that Dennis was sometimes vague, sometimes contradictory, about just who constituted the fascist "elite" or, precisely, the latent fascist "out-elite" that desired power.[40] But there was little doubt as to the constitution of the particular societal group or class on whose behalf the elite would be working: the revolutionary dynamic would come from the "frustrated elite of the lower middle classes" who were threatened with being "declassed."[41] Schlesinger took Dennis at his word when the latter said that he harbored no personal political ambitions, but he saw in him (and supposed that Dennis saw in himself) the qualities of a Goebbels, of a very smart brain-trust man who could serve a real fascist demagogue in justifying a revolution:

> His style was clever, glib, and trenchant. His analysis cut through sentimental idealism with healthy effect. He tried to shift attention from words and symbols to the realities of power. His "realistic" writing, for all its flashing and vulgar quality, had an analytic sharpness which made it more arresting than any of the conservative and most of the liberal political thought of the day.[42]

But a truly influential fascist demagogue never developed in America (Huey Long, for whom Dennis expressed admiration as "... smarter than Hitler, but he needs a good braintrust,".[43] might have become one), and Dennis was left to conjure intellectual rationales for an American fascism that existed more in the world of myth and wish. "Goebbels, after all, had a government to transform dreams into reality, and Dennis, only the Harvard Club," Schlesinger wrote.[44] As for the existing reality of American

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fascist activists, who were of the mentality to agree with him without necessarily being able to comprehend him, Dennis had "progressively to lower his sights" in order to reach them. Seeing himself as "the sophisticated spokesman of a revolutionary elite in a technological epoch," Dennis, like Seward Collins, found to his chagrin that the "elite which was to save civilization eventually turned out to be a collection of stumblebums and psychopaths, united primarily by an obsessive fear of an imaginary Jewish conspiracy. What began as an intimation of the apocalypse ended as squalid farce."[45]

In his 1967 memoir *Infidel in the Temple*,[46] journalist and commentator Matthew Josephson reflected for a few pages on his acquaintanceship with Dennis in the 1930s. Josephson was already familiar with Dennis's testimony in the 1932 Senate banking investigations and his arguments in *Is Capitalism Doomed?*, and having heard that Dennis was one of a number of pro-fascist intellectuals who regarded Huey Long as the potential *Duce* of an American fascism, he sought Dennis out in the Harvard Club for an interview, which his memoir largely sticks to recounting. "Trenchant in speech and as vivacious as I had been led to expect," Dennis launched into a candid and freewheeling discussion of his beliefs and their origins. Quoting Dennis (apparently from notes), Josephson lays out some gems of provocation:

> I have a very low opinion of bankers. If only they weren't so smug, so full of their pieties! ... business can't recover; we are going over a cliff into a terrible inflation, in one year.... But Mrs. Roosevelt, Miss Perkins, and the other New Deal advisors look on the U.S.A. as an interesting settlement-house proposition with which intellectual ladies and college professors can divert themselves at the public expense! The New Deal is only a huge muddle—and yet the old trading class, the bankers, the merchants, the politicians, and labor leaders are still in the saddle .... It just can't go on. I tell you, the future is to the extremists .... But here [the communists] haven't a ghost of a chance. The working class—bah! The proletariat rise? Not on your life—it isn't in the beast. The American worker won't even fight for his class. What this country needs is a radical movement that talks American. Our workers not only don't "get" Marx, they can't even *lift* him.[47]

Dennis—as recalled by Josephson—goes on: only the frustrated middle classes will fight for power; the moneyed people, ultimately facing the perceived threat of socialism or communism, will finally come around in support of fascism as the only alternative: "After all, fascism calls for a *nationalist* revolution that leaves property owners in the same social status as before, though it forbids them to do entirely as they please with their property. Then, instead of destroying existent skills as would a communist rising, the corporative state would preserve the elite of experts and managers, the people who understand production and can keep the system running."[48]

As frankly as he advocated fascism, however, Dennis would have no truck with brawling native-fascists of the "shirt"-movement level, nor with religious bigotry or race hatred, in which he was plainly not interested. Rather, he considered his mission as purely one of education and propagandizing to the frustrated middle class out-elite, which will be the real vehicle for American fascism.

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On the subject of Huey Long, Dennis noted that "Long reads my stuff" and had asked his help in writing a book on the redistribution of wealth. As Josephson also recounted, after they had finished their conversation, as Dennis was leaving the Harvard Club, he was accosted by an elderly member who exclaimed, "Yes, we all have to stand together and fight for the liberties won by our forefathers who developed the frontier!" Dennis's polite but brusque reply was, "Remember Mr. ------, the frontier is finished; liberty is a dead issue."[49]

Josephson concluded at the time, and was of the same mind in 1967, that Dennis was brilliant but flawed in his obsession with issues of pure power and manipulation: "An odd and clever fellow was Dennis, but with great gaps on the human side."[50]

Justus D. Doenecke, a historian of American isolationism and right-wing movements, broke the exclusion of Dennis from consideration in scholarly literature with his 1972 article on Dennis as a "cold war revisionist."[51] Interested in how the pre-Pearl Harbor isolationists reacted—in different ways—to the cold war, Doenecke concluded that Dennis was a prime example of an isolationist who was consistent in his opposition to American involvements abroad; only Dennis, through his weekly, *The Appeal to Reason*, "offered a scathing attack upon the entire range of American Cold War policy."[52]

Doenecke gave careful attention to Dennis's economic ideas as central to the development of his later positions. After reviewing the arguments of *Is Capitalism Doomed?*, *The Coming American Fascism*, and *The Dynamics of War and Revolution* as to the rise, fall, and inevitable replacement of capitalism by a collectivist political structure, Doenecke noted the similarity at first glance of these to the Marxist critique of capitalism. Yet "the thrust of Dennis's logic was far from Marxist; there were strong differences."[53] For one, his "socialism" was not at all utopian, and saw no possibility for a truly "classless" society ever: there would always be leaders and led, and contests would only be over which elites would rule, not whether elites would rule. Under "socialism," the proletariat would never rule itself but would have to be led by a managerial elite of technicians and experts.[54] (Doenecke might have noted here Dennis's brand of egalitarianism: his "socialism" would guarantee that anyone with the requisite ability, no matter from what "class," might join this "managerial elite" without traditional economic or social interferences standing in the way.)

Dennis further dissented from Marx and Marxism in rejecting the notions that the entire capitalist old order of business enterprise should be overthrown in violent revolution and that even if a "world socialist" order should entirely and universally displace capitalism, universal peace would result: "socialist" nations would inevitably fight among themselves, just as capitalist nations do. In Dennis's critique of the cold war, which stressed the futility of America's grasp after hegemony in both the world economic marketplace and the marketplace of ideas, Doenecke found an early precursor of "New Left" revisionist historians William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Lloyd C. Gardner. Dennis also anticipated the "Red Fascism" thesis of other historians, noting the ease with which "Everything [the interventionist Establishment] said against Hitler can be repeated against Stalin and Russia."[55]

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The first issue of *The Appeal to Reason* appeared the same week as Churchill's Fulton, Missouri, "iron curtain" speech; right then Dennis was warning that further American intervention in the world, this time to stop communist sin instead of fascist sin, would result only in the spread of communism—and the intensification of the very domestic "statism" that the conservative cold warriors deplored. At a time—Mao Tse-tung's march to power in China— when conservatives were seeing communism as a world monolith directed from Moscow, Dennis predicted that rifts would develop in any concert of communist nations, the most important being in the Far East, where existed "nearly a billion people who could never be made puppets of the Slavs, even though they all turn communist."

Dennis stressed the importance of economic "open door" concerns in the formulation and implementation of the Truman Doctrine, which was designed in part, in the Middle East, to protect Standard Oil interests. Overall, the doctrine served America (which refused to import as much as she exported) as a substitute for the huge foreign loans that Wall Street made in the 1920s in its market-expansion thrusts. "We shall have," wrote Dennis in 1947, "a limitless market for American farm products, manufactures, and cannon fodder."[56]

Doenecke continued with an exposition—taken mainly from issues of *The Appeal to Reason* —of Dennis's lines on the further development of the cold war, the domestic red-hunting hysteria (he was against it, and held that "Any spy dumb enough to get caught by our F.B.I. is a good riddance for the reds"[57]), the emergence of the Third World as a force in global affairs, and the signs of a gradual "convergence" of both the capitalist U.S.A. and communist Russia (both becoming technocratic, managerial welfare states with planned economies and controlled currencies). With the Vietnam debacle, America's time had finally come after a "long and brilliant record of success" in empire-building; it was "the beginning of the end of American intervention and overseas imperialism." Dennis saw his own long record of warnings and observations unfortunately vindicated—by the disastrous turns for America in the world at large.

Dennis's early and ongoing critique of the cold war demonstrated the consistency of his economic thought from its earliest expositions. He saw the cold war as propping up a capitalism that continued to decline; massive foreign aid, a massive and permanent scale of military production, and a space race were the substitutes that American capitalism concocted to replace the lost frontier. The inflation attendant to all this, whether at higher or lower rates, prevented another crash, and all the activity and spending kept unemployment at acceptable levels. And there was no such thing as significant overproduction in a global cold war, with its "limitless" needs for products both commercial—as allures for prospective "allies"—and military, if those allures didn't work. The cold war was therefore functional for America—but at a terrific cost and risk. The professed international moral aims of the struggle would not be achieved, and the survival of civilization or of life itself was what was at stake in the great big game.[58]

Rounding off his treatment, Doenecke remarked on many points of prescience and diagnostic acuity in Dennis's critique. He did criticize other points—notably, Dennis's persistent faith in a managerial elite as fit to replace the old capitalist / democratic politi-

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cians' elite. Dennis's analysis "possessed a double-edged sword. The very bureaucratic elite which, in his eyes, should muffle the crusading ardor of the warriors could also be the repository of the mindless dogmatism he so often mourned in the masses. If anything, he overstressed the reasonableness of the new managerial system ...."[59] Ultimately, Doenecke was interested in Dennis's place in intellectual history, and here he saw Dennis as a man before his time, a prophet still basically unrecognized: "He caught the relationship between frontiers and markets at least twenty years before the 'Wisconsin School' of diplomatic history was born."[60] But Dennis's post-World War II political and intellectual exile may well have contributed to the sharpness of his exposition: cranking out a mimeographed newsletter from his garage, subject to no advertising or editorial or academic pressures whatever, he could say what he pleased. Since that time more people, whether directly influenced by him or not, have been pleased to say it.

Historian Ronald Radosh paralleled much of Doenecke's approach in the first of two chapters devoted to Dennis in his *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism*.[61] (The other "prophets" are Charles A. Beard, Oswald Garrison Villard, Robert A. Taft, and John T. Flynn.) The first chapter covers Dennis as "America's Dissident Fascist" and reviews his 1930s and early 1940s positions and what happened to him during the war for taking them; the treatment of the sedition trial is more thorough than in any others' discussions of Dennis. Noteworthy also in this regard was Radosh's consideration at length of the reaction to Dennis's mature anti-capitalism (as expressed in *The Dynamics of War and Revolution*) by American communist intellectuals, who took him very seriously indeed. These, while arguing that Dennis's prescribed fascism would only amount to reactionary state capitalism and repression of the workers, nevertheless could find a lot of truth in his critique of old-style liberal capitalism and the follies of democracy; Dennis's criticisms were deemed unanswerable by conventional liberalism or conservatism.

Radosh's second chapter on Dennis considers him as "Laissez-Faire Critic of the Cold War." There is a problem with that heading, which comes out in the chapter: Radosh states that Dennis after World War II "returned" to laissez-faire economic theory and developed a "persistent laissez-fairism."[62] The problem with this is that it isn't true—certainly not in the sense of the accepted understanding of laissez-faire, which is apparently just the sense Radosh means. He quotes only one statement (from an issue of *The Appeal to Reason*) directly to justify this statement: Dennis hearkens to an age when "the dissenters, the rebels and the nonconformists" for reasons of "religious or intellectual self-expression, freedom and independence" shared the capitalist dynamic with the men of pure greed. Out of this and a few other statements (where Dennis described the current military-industrial complex, which he was very much against, as "socialist" or "totalitarian socialist"), Radosh tries to build a case that Dennis not only gave up fascism but turned into a classical economic liberal.[63] The truth is that Lawrence Dennis turned into a classical economic liberal about to the same extent that Ludwig von Mises turned into a Marxist. Had Radosh accomplished a thorough reading of *Operational Thinking for Survival*, Dennis's 1969 summa that capped his postwar thinking (Radosh mentions this book only once, in a footnote on the next-to-last page of his

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chapter) he would have thought at least twice about presenting any picture of a "laissez-faire" Dennis. (Particularly he might have absorbed Dennis's appendix chapter, "Is the 'New Economics' a Success or a Failure?," wherein laissez-fairists are politely ridiculed.) Dennis's newsletter statement of admiration for the old-fashioned, small-scale entrepreneurial capitalism of "the dissenters, the rebels and the nonconformists," to which Radosh qives so much weight as signifying an intellectual turn-around, is actually nothing new or remarkable at all in the body of Dennis's thought. Dennis was saying the same sort of thing —about the "spiritual" or non-economic components of economic and other activity during the heyday of the "Capitalist Revolution" in America—when he was pleasing leftists with his early slashing attacks on American business enterprise, and later when he was proclaiming his fascism. Radosh would have done well to consider, as Alan Pendleton Grimes did twenty years earlier, the discreet dichotomy Dennis had always made between "independent" entrepeneurial capitalism and "big" or monopolistic business: the former could be driven by all sorts of motives (such as those Dennis named in the statement quoted by Radosh), the latter was likely to be driven by pure private greed—but in America's frontier era the drives of *both* could and did complement each other, combining to fulfill a broad social purpose in developing and defining the young national consciousness and shaping the nation's physical order of affairs as well. Dennis's point was that *with the passing of the frontier* such a condition no longer held; the social/spiritual dynamism of American "frontier men" pursuing personal or national glory had been replaced by an all-pervasive business dynamism pursuing only bottom-lines. There was no replacement for the frontier, and the era of laissez-faire as socially and nationally utilitarian and beneficial was gone and not going to come back.

Thus Radosh, in stating that Dennis "returned" in his thought to laissez-faire and became a laissez-fairist, not only fundamentally misread Dennis's position (an error he could easily have avoided by examining Dennis's last book) but goes wrong also on the notion of "return" both with respect to Dennis personally (he couldn't "return" to a position he'd never in fact held) and with respect to the larger analysis: Dennis's very point, an abiding one that informed his works from the first to the last, was that to the laissez-faire era for America *there could be no return*.

Radosh similarly misread the statements of Dennis as to the "socialist" character of the American military-industrial economy in the cold war.[64] He seems to take it that here Dennis was criticizing and deploring this "socialism" itself, rather than merely: (a) criticizing the roots and uses of this development in worldwide interventionism, and (b) exposing the fraud and hypocrisy of a system that still claimed it was "free enterprise," but was actually going "socialist" in order to—fight and contain socialism! Dennis had a taste for ironic expression in his writing, often amounting to sarcasm, and one of his favorite argumentative devices in challenging opponents was to measure up and consider their actions, or the results of their policies, not on his but on their own professed terms, finding these wanting on precisely those terms— even antithetical to those terms. This is what he did in treating a cold war American big business and political establishment that boomed its devotion to the American free-enterprise way while doing its

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best, in the cause of a world struggle against opponents of that way, to side-step it at home in enjoyment of a perpetual business-government subsidized partnership. The exposure of hypocrisy and the deploring of its internationalist ends were the points of Dennis's attack on *this* "socialism," which was not an attack on "socialism" or government-business partnership per se, a subtlety which seems to have escaped Radosh.

Radosh therefore fails in his attempt to revise Dennis into a born-again laissez-fairist, a revision that would entail the considerable job of proving that Dennis could throw over a main tenet of decades of his thought rather lightly and apparently without even realizing that he was doing so. It would also entail explaining how it could be that other recent commentators on Dennis, including Justus Doenecke—in Radosh's words, the one who has "led the way in the re-evaluation of Lawrence Dennis"[65] somehow missed this side of their subject entirely.

Yet aside from the failure of its thesis, Radosh's chapter is not bad at all. In fact the thesis, even though appearing in the chapter title, is not really central to much of the presentation, which is the most extensive purely expository discussion yet of Dennis's criticisms of the cold war. Radosh's problem lies just in his too-quick readiness to label Dennis "as" something in familiar ideological terms -- and the problem, in fact, is not peculiar in this book to the treatment of Dennis.[66] At any rate, and in judgments with which there can be no quarrel, Radosh ultimately finds Dennis "our earliest and most consistent critic of the Cold War," and the one who, years before William Appleman Williams,[67] first took the Turnerian "frontier thesis" and applied it to the relationships between politics, ideology, and economics in analyzing America's new activist role in world affairs.

Justus Doenecke wrote in 1972 that "a full-length biography is very much needed" of Lawrence Dennis.[68] In 2001 that is still true, and the really notable thing about the monographical treatments of Dennis that have appeared since 1972, by Doenecke himself and others, is that they remain so few for one who made a considerable intellectual and political impact in his time, reflected in the printed record of that time. Even on the small scale of a monograph, there has been no attempt yet at an equal, synthetic treatment of all of Dennis's lines of thought, toward the end of a unified, summary appraisal; instead there have been treatments devoted to particular areas. His economic thought has tended to be obscured in these treatments. Certainly any biographer of Dennis would have to be well versed in economics and economic history, in order both to understand and to criticize his subject's ideas.

It is indeed past time for a major critique of all those ideas. Dennis covered a great deal of ground in his prolific and variegated career as an intellectual observer of his time, a period of tremendous political, social, and economic disruption and change in this country and the world. His record was a long and interesting one: State Department official in the thick of an early "Third World" revolution, banking official at the onset of economic collapse, Depression critic of capitalism, proponent of fascism, opponent of World War II intervention, key figure in one of the major civil liberties and freedom of speech legal cases of our time, analyst of the cold war and of the "new style" of American big-business / big-government partnership. Nor was his role merely as an observer and critic. His political impact is undeniable, even if it was mainly limited to

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the period of the New Deal and the New Deal's war and even if it was not because of his impact on policy but on what could be called "anti-policy" that he was held up by policy makers and supporters of the New Deal as an adversary against whose potential influence the public had to be warned, and finally as an actual danger who had, if possible, to be silenced by law. It is as just such an "anti-" figure that he is mainly remembered, when he is remembered at all. This is probably appropriate, because Lawrence Dennis never won.

That at least some of what he had to say might nevertheless have warranted serious consideration by policy makers has been a possibility openly admitted by scholars only rather recently. Still, all those who have considered him over the years, whether polemical opponents of the 1930s and '40s or detached scholars of the 1970s and later, have shared an appreciation of him to this degree: America in the twentieth century had no more articulate and challenging an opponent of liberalism, political and economic, than Lawrence Dennis. What makes him all the more intriguing is that his challenge was to liberalism both in its older "classical" form as well as in its modern guise—that is, a challenge to both the alternately reigning conservatism and liberalism of his and our time.

ENDNOTES

1. James Burnham has actually been targeted most conspicuously as one who engaged in heavy "intellectual borrowing"—of the unattributed kind. Political scientist David Spitz has convincingly demonstrated Burnham's intellectual indebtedness to Lawrence Dennis's prior published writings both in key concepts and even phraseology. See David Spitz, *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought* (rev. ed.; New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 300, n. 17, and pp. 308-309, n. 36, the latter presenting a concept-by-concept and page-by-page comparison. Max Nomad in *Aspects of Revolt*, p. 15, n. 3, claimed that Burnham took the idea of the "managerial revolution" from the discussions of turn-of-the-century Polish revolutionist Waclaw Machajski's ideas in Nomad's 1932 *Rebels and Renegades* and 1939 *Apostles of Revolution*; Burnham was "an author who gave no credit to his predecessors. He was a teacher of ethics." Bruno Rizzi and others accused Burnham of having plagiarized from Rizzi's (as "Bruno R.") *La Bureaucratisation du Monde* (Paris: privately published, 1939), a work that figured importantly in the Trotskyite doctrinal controversies of 1939-40, in order to write *The Managerial Revolution*; see Adam Westoby, "Introduction," pp. 23-26, in Bruno Rizzi, *The Bureaucratization of the World* (New York: Free Press, 1985). [See also Samuel Francis, *James Burnham* (London: Claridge Press, 1999), 26-27, for refutation of the charges of plagiarism by Burnham—SF.]

2. Lawrence Dennis, *Is Capitalism Doomed? A Challenge to Economic Leadership* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1932).

3. The most systematic exposition is in Adolf A. Berle, *Power Without Property: A New Development in American Political Economy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1959), but the idea was heralded in Berle's famous work with Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (New York: Macmillan, 1933), and finally refined in *Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969). Dennis and Berle could by no means agree on much other than that control in corporations was rapidly passing from entrepreneur-owners to technician-managers; see Berle's "cheerleader" approach to American business enterprise in *The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954) and *The Ameri-*

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can Economic Republic (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965) and compare with Dennis's "coroner" approach in all his works.

4. Max Nomad, *Rebels and Renegades* (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1968; first published 1932), *Apostles of Revolution* (New York: Collier Books, 1961; first published 1939), *Aspects of Revolt* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1959), and *Political Heretics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963).

5. James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (New York: John Day, 1941) coined a phrase. He provided a summary statement in "The Theory of the Managerial Revolution," *Partisan Review* VIII (1941), pp. 181-97; early surfacings of the theory as it arose out of Burnham's polemical doctrinal battles in the Trotskyite Fourth International were in his "Science and Style: A Reply to Comrade Trotsky" (1940) and "Letter of Resignation of James Burnham from the Workers Party" (1940), both in Leon Trotsky, *In Defense of Marxism* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976). A balanced study of Burnham's entire range of thought is Samuel T. Francis, *Power and History: The Political Thought of James Burnham* (Lanham,.Md.: University Press of America, 1984). For a historical and analytical overview of the business applications of the concept associated with Burnham's name, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

6. George Orwell's *1984* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949) and *Animal Farm* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946) present these contentions in the form of novels. Interesting in the present context is Orwell's view of Burnham, given in "James Burnham and 'The Managerial Revolution'" and "Burnham's View of the Contemporary World Struggle," both in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, eds., *The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell*, Vol. IV: *In Front of Your Nose, 1945-1950* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), pp. 160-81 and 313-26. A brilliant relation of Orwell's war-for-domestic-consumption theme to the real world of the 1950s is Harry Elmer Barnes, "How 'Nineteen Eighty-Four' Trends Threaten American Peace, Freedom, and Prosperity," written in 1953 but published for the first time 27 years later in Barnes, *Revisionism: A Key to Peace, and Other Essays* (San Francisco: Cato Institute, 1980, Cato Paper No. 121), pp. 137-76.

7. Beard's formal statements of these views appeared in two books he wrote in collaboration with George H.E. Smith, *The Idea of National Interest* (New York: Macmillan, 1934) and *The Open Door at Home* (New York: Macmillan, 1934). They resurfaced with vigor in his *Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels* (New York: Macmillan, 1939) and *A Foreign Policy for America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940).

8. Keynes's grand statement, of course, is his *General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (London: Macmillan, 1936), in which he propounded at full length his umbrella-idea of aggregate production. An earlier version of his critique of classical economics is in his pamphlet, *The End of Laissez Faire* (London: Hogarth Press, 1926). The literature on Keynes is vast. Good starting-points are Robert Lekachman, *The Age of Keynes* (New York: Random House, 1966) and, ed., *Keynes' General Theory: Reports of Three Decades* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964).

Historian James J. Martin has remarked that all one has to do to find evidence of very many "Keynesian" ideas floating around American intellectual circles years before the *General Theory* is look at issues of the *Harvard Business Review* of the late 1920s. Keynes's and "Keynesian" influences—if gradual—on theory and policy in the liberal-democratic states have always been recognized; much less treated has been the question of his influence on the fascist states, or the consideration and adoption by them of policies that bore strong similarities in their essences to what we would regard as "Keynesianism." Martin has been responsible for bringing to gen-

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eral public attention the fact that Keynes wrote a special foreword for a translated edition of the *General Theory* which appeared in National Socialist Germany in 1936; see "J.M. Keynes's Famous [sic: this is Martin's dig] Foreword to the 1936 German Edition of the 'General Theory,'" pp. 197-205 in Martin, *Revisionist Viewpoints: Essays in a Dissident Historical Tradition* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, 1971; 1977).

9. Norman Thomas, reviewing Dennis's *Is Capitalism Doomed?* in *World Tomorrow* XV (June, 1932), 186, wrote, "Nowhere have I ever seen a more slashing attack upon the bankers' notion of international finance. From a socialist point of view Mr. Dennis overlooks or seems to overlook factors of great importance, but the factors that he does examine he deals with most trenchantly .... In spite of this criticism I want heartily to recommend Mr. Dennis's book. The convinced socialist will find more ammunition in it than in most radical books." British Marxist John Strachey, referring to the same book in his *The Coming Struggle for Power* (New York: Modern Library, 1935), pp. 158-59, called Dennis "admirably realistic when he is showing the fatal contradictions inherent in large-scale capitalism .... [he] has written a far more penetrating analysis of the crises [of capitalism] than has been achieved by any professional capitalist economist." Dennis wrote a largely favorable review of Strachey's book when it first appeared; see Lawrence Dennis, "A Communistic Strachey," *Nation*, March 8, 1933, pp. 264-65.

10. President Roosevelt, in his January 6, 1941 State of the Union speech to Congress, made a point of mentioning those who not only "with sounding brass" but with "a tinkling bell" preached "the ism of appeasement." The prior month he had unleashed Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes to blast, by name, those constituting the "group of appeasers in the making." Ickes announced in his speech at Columbia University on December 17, 1940, that Lawrence Dennis was "the brains of American Fascism." This drew an acid public reply from Dennis: "The reality in America which comes nearest to Fascism is Mr. Ickes and the reality which comes next nearest is Mr. Roosevelt's third term. I wrote a book about *The Coming American Fascism* and predicted that it would come through a war against Fascism. I have since repeatedly said that Mr. Roosevelt and his New Deal were the only significant Fascist trends in America. I have never belonged to or been connected with any movement or organization of a political character in my entire life." See "'The Ism of Appeasement': Roosevelt Brands Foes of His Foreign Policy," *Life*, January 20, 1941, pp. 26-27, and "M.K. Hart Demands That Ickes Recant; Lawrence Dennis Challenges Right to Attack Appeasers' Character and Motives," *New York Times*, December 19, 1940, 22.

11. Dennis and lawyer Maximilian St. George weighed in against the trial in their *A Trial on Trial: The Great Sedition Trial of 1944* (Chicago: National Civil Rights Committee, 1946), a 503-page autopsy of one of the weirder federal prosecution cases in this country's history. A belated apologia for the trial and final attempt to convict the defendants, this time in the less evidentiarily-stringent court of public opinion, was offered by chief prosecutor 0. John Rogge in *The Official German Report* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961), a most interesting title for a book that was neither "Official" nor "German" nor a "Report." In the meantime Rogge had, a bare five years after his "mass sedition" extravaganza, offered *Our Vanishing Civil Liberties* (New York: Gaer Books, 1949), in which he expressed the most aggrieved and shocked concern over any such thing as governmental character assassination of dissidents and political show-trials for them; at the time he was acting as defense counsel for members of the Communist Party U.S.A. on trial for Smith Act violations. Those who were not overawed with Rogge's record of consistency as an upholder of civil liberties and freedom of speech could and did point to him as epitomizing a new species in American intellectual life: the "totalitarian liberal," who was perfectly capable of doing a 180 ethical flip-flop without any consciousness of

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having ruffled a principle. A particularly glaring flip-flop of the "totalitarian liberals" was from ardent support of (or acquiescence in) World War II efforts to shut up, lock up, or blacklist non-interventionists for whom the labels "seditionist" or "appeaser" were handy general smears, to ardent opposition to Cold War efforts to shut up, lock up, or blacklist accused communists—thus, ironically, making themselves susceptible to McCarthyite charges of "traitor" and "appeaser." An interesting, somewhat gloating, analysis of this phenomenon was provided by historian Harry Elmer Barnes in his booklet *The Chickens of the Interventionist Liberals Have Come Home to Roost: The Bitter Fruits of Globaloney* (privately published, n.p., n.d [1954]). More recently, historian Leo Ribuffo has coined the term "Brown Scare" to suggest that the road to the "Red Scare" of the late 1940s and early 1950s was paved in part by liberals themselves in consequence of their prewar and wartime behavior. See his "Fascists, Nazis, and the American Mind: Perceptions and Preconceptions," *America Quarterly* XXVI, 4 (October 1974), 417-32, and *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depression to the-Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).

12. An idea of the freeze-out of Dennis from establishment channels of discussion after World War II may be had by comparing the lists of reviews of his prewar books with those of his postwar books, in the bibliography at the end of this essay. The *Book Review Index*, the *Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals 1886-1974*, and the *Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Humanities Journals 1802-1974* list a grand total of zero reviews of *A Trial on Trial*, and one review of Dennis' last book, *Operational Thinking for Survival* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, 1969). James J. Martin, the director of Ralph Myles Publisher, has confirmed to this writer that, although some one hundred free review copies of *Operational Thinking* were sent out upon publication, only one review ever appeared —by Dennis's old friend and ideological combatant Frederick L. Schuman, "Reflections of a Pragmatist," *Nation*, December 8, 1969, 641-42.

13. "America's No. 1 ..." and "Brain-truster ...": *Life*, January 20, 1941, 26-27. "The intellectual leader ...": Arthur S. Link and William B. Catton, *American Epoch: A History of the United States, 1921-1945* (4th ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), II, 18.

14. Biographical details are taken from the portrait of Dennis in Maxine Block, ed., *Current Biography 1941* (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1941), pp. 218-20, and from recollections of two of Dennis's long-time friends, H. Keith Thompson and James J. Martin, given in conversations with this writer.

15. Lawrence Dennis, *The Coming American Fascism* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1936).

16. For Dennis's early appraisal of the New Deal as basically directionless, see "The Planless Roosevelt Revolution," *American Mercury* XXXII (May 1934), 1-11.

17. Lawrence Dennis, *The Dynamics of War and Revolution* (New York: Weekly Foreign Letter, 1940), hereafter cited as Dennis, *Dynamics*. This book was scheduled to be published by Dennis's regular publishers, Harper & Brothers, which had already printed it up and begun binding when, with the domestic intellectual repercussions of the fall of France in June 1940, the house got cold feet and backed out. Dennis then bought up the stock and issued the book under the imprint of his newsletter. This writer has seen, by courtesy of James J. Martin, one of the extremely rare copies of the book carrying the original Harper & Brothers imprint on binding and dust-jacket.

18. Justus D. Doenecke, "Lawrence Dennis: Revisionist of the Cold War," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, LV, 4 (Summer 1972), p. 277, n. 11, citing Dennis to Doenecke, January 27, 1971, gives these names as subscribers.

19. The author has, by courtesy of James J. Martin, examined the correspondence file between Dennis and Ralph Myles Publishers, whence this information comes.

20. Dennis, *Dynamics*, 67.

21. *Ibid*., 68-69.

22. *Ibid*., 71, quoting Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago in 1893.

23. Dennis, *Dynamics*, 60.

24. *Ibid*., 64.

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25. *Ibid*., 61. Dennis was at his sardonic best in describing the essence of this hypocrisy: "Now if there is anything an orthodox economist abhors, it is monopoly. The economists spend most of their time trying to prove that monopoly is bad for business and businessmen spend most of their time trying to achieve monopoly or failing in business because they are unsuccessful in achieving it."

26. *Ibid*., 77.

27. Confronted with the post-World War II population boom in America and throughout the world, Dennis would modify his emphasis if not his thesis; *cf*. Dennis, *Dynamics*, ch. 6, esp. pp. 88-101, with *Operational Thinking for Survival*, ch. 7, esp. pp. 47-58. In the former work he had not really considered "Third World" population trends; in the latter he did, and saw this part of the world as gaining in a potentially powerful dynamism from its procreative proclivities—while relative to it, in this respect, America and the West continued to decline.

28. Dennis, *Dynamics*, 94-95.

29. *Ibid*., 122-23.

30. *Ibid*., 104-108.

31. Dennis provided a concise, punchy statement of his view as to the "dynamic" and "revolutionary" qualities of the German-Italian-Russian "socialist" axis in his contribution, "The Party-State and the Elite," pp. 39-41, to the symposium, "Who Owns the Future?" in the *Nation*, January 11, 1941, 36-44; the other contributors were Frederick L. Schuman and Max Lerner. This remarkable trialogue, which holds its interest and remains relevant to the discussion of principles of international relations even today, representod the last time any such dissident "fascist" views as Dennis's would be granted a lengthy hearing in a major American intellectual journal.

32. Dennis, *Dynamics*, 216.

33. Beard used these words in his last conversation with his revisionist colleague Harry Elmer Barnes. See Barnes, ed., *Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: A Critical Examination of the Foreign Policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Its Aftermath* (Caldwell, Id.: Caxton Printers,,1953), p. viii.

34. Alan Pendleton Grimes, *American Political Thought* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1955), 415-28.

35. Spitz, *Patterns of Anti-Democratic Thought*, 88-123.

36. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt*, Vol. III: *The Politics of Upheaval* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), pp. 74-78.

37. *Ibid*., 74. Schlesinger is correct in noting a certain "romantic" element in Dennis's thinking and expression. This cannot obscure, however, Dennis's essential character as an analyst who repeatedly emphasized and demonstrated the rational, cool, realistic, and empirical as ways to approach problems under consideration. He may have "succumbed" to romantic flights on occasion, and his prose was never dull, but considering the body of his work there is little use in disputing the appellation given him by Boston publisher Porter Sargent: "that incorruptible realist." By contrast, the other principal figure of American intellectual fascism, Francis Parker Yockey, 1917-1960, author of *Imperium: The Philosophy of History and Politics* (New York: The Truth Seeker, 1962), was a mystical romantic-of-romantics who tended not to argue a case, as Dennis did, but to state it and dispense with justification. Both men—they apparently never met—were highly intelligent and educated, wrote works of undeniably vast learning, and were greatly influenced by Spengler. But their approaches to the same problems of history and society were markedly different in many key respects. Yockey was certainly the more "typically fascist." A detailed comparison of their approaches would make an interesting study.

38. *Ibid*., 75.

39. *Ibid*., 76.

40. *Ibid*., 76-77.

41. *Ibid*., 77-78.

42. Schlesinger, *Politics of Upheaval*, 78.

43. *Ibid*., 77.

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44. *Ibid*., 78.

45. *Ibid*.

46. Matthew Josephson, *Infidel in the Temple: A Memoir of the Nineteen-Thirties* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 318-24.

47. *Ibid*., 320-21.

48. *Ibid*., 323.

49. *Ibid*., 324.

50. *Ibid*.

51. See Justin D. Doenecke, "Lawrence Dennis: Revisionist of the Cold War," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* LV, 4 (Summer 1972), 275-86, and also two other articles by the same author: "Lawrence Dennis: The Continuity of Isolationism," *Libertarian Analysis* I, 1 (Winter 1970), 38-65, and "The Isolationist as Collectivist: Lawrence Dennis and the Coming of World War II," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* III, 2 (Summer 1979), 191-207. There is also some discussion of Dennis in Doenecke's *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979). That Dennis has been a figure of interest in libertarian intellectual circles is interesting, given that he was, to put it mildly, no libertarian. Such interest appears to derive principally from his record of anti-interventionism in matters of foreign affairs; there may also be something appealing in his basic iconoclasm. [For a more recent libertarian isolationist treatment of Dennis, see Justin Raimondo, "Tale of a 'Seditionist': The Story of Lawrence Dennis," *Chronicles* XXIV (May, 2000), 19-22.—SF]

52. Doenecke, *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 275.

53. *Ibid*., 276.

54. *Ibid*., 276-77.

55. *Ibid*., 277-78.

56. *Ibid*., 278-79.

57. *Ibid*., 283.

58. *Ibid*., 285.

59. *Ibid*., 286.

60. *Ibid*.

61. Ronald Radosh, *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975), 275-322.

62. *Ibid*., 299.

63. *Ibid*., 299-300.

64. See *Ibid*., 300, *e.g*.

65. *Ibid*., p. 281, n. 15.

66. *Ibid*., 283; Radosh's book makes a tremendous contribution toward the explication and understanding of early anti-"consensus" views of the cold war and has deservedly attained the status of a minor classic. But there is something of a "Five Characters in Search of a Thesis" aspect to it—immediately noticeable in the title and sub-title themselves: the prophets were on the "right" and were "conservative" critics. Those designations might apply with little question to Robert A. Taft and John T. Flynn—but to Charles A. Beard, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Lawrence Dennis? The latter three would probably have a chuckle about it, and the last might threaten suit for slander, too.

67. See William Appleman Williams, "The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy," in *History As a Way of Learning* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), pp. 137-57.

68. Justus D. Doenecke, *The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930-1972* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles Publisher, 1972), p. 40.

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The Lost Philosopher



The Best of Anthony M. Ludovici

EDITED BY
JOHN V. DAY

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The Ethnic Gap

What is the Real Message of the 2000 Election?

Richard McCulloch

In recent elections, including the 2000 presidential election, there has been much discussion of the "gender gap," in which men are much more likely to vote for Republicans just as women are much more likely to vote for Democrats. In the 2000 election the gender gap was ten points, with 53% of men and 43% of women voting for Bush, while 42% of men and 54% of women voted for Gore. But there is another voting gap which receives little or no discussion, which can be called the "ethnic gap."

It is taken for granted that certain ethnic groups traditionally bloc vote for the Democratic candidate. For example, blacks and Jews are well known for this practice. It is recognized that they are voting for their ethnic interest, i.e., the interests of their ethnic group as well as the advancement of their own cultural, social or political agenda, which are best served by Democrats. This protocol is accepted as normal, logical, and proper behavior on their part.[1]

Although no definition of bloc voting adequately specifies what percentage of the group's votes must be cast a certain way to constitute a bloc, apparently the percentage must be at least two-to-one (67%) and must also be predictably consistent. In this election Gore received 90% of the black vote and 79% of the Jewish vote. Hispanics are a diverse group, actually an amalgam of several groups, but most are Mexicans, with most of the remainder being Central Americans, and the rest Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and other Latinos. The Hispanic group, with the exception of Cuban-Americans, is often considered to vote as a bloc for Democratic candidates. Nationwide Hispanics voted 62% for Gore and 35% for Bush, who—helped by his fluency in Spanish and a half-Hispanic nephew—made inroads among the more Americanized Mexicans in Texas and won a majority of the Cuban vote in Florida.

Several other ethnic or racial minorities also vote heavily Democratic. For example, Amerindians typically give 70% or more of their votes to Democratic presidential candidates, while Asian (including Asian Indian) and Arab-Americans regularly give them 60% or more of their votes. One wonders what is the *common unifying* principle or policy tying these diverse ethnic groups to Democratic candidates. Do they share common economic or foreign policy interests that the Democrats serve, or is there a widespread understanding that the Democrats best serve the general racial or ethnic interests of non-European Americans?

Voting patterns reveal much of this ethnic solidarity. These patterns are drawn predominantly along ethno-racial lines, which reflect racial or ethnic interests rather than lines of economic, social, cultural or other non-racial interests.

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Ethnicity and the 2000 Presidential Election

So where did Bush get his 49 million votes in the last presidential election?

1.) Blacks, who are 12.5% of the population but were only about 10% of the voters (due to the younger average age of their population and lower voter participation), gave Bush 9% of their 10.1 million votes, or about 900,000 votes.

2.) Hispanics, who are 11% of the population but were only about 7% of the voters (again, due to the younger average age of their population and lower voter participation), gave Bush 35% of their 7.1 million votes, or about 2.5 million votes.[2]

3.) Amerindians, who are 0.5% of the population but were only about 0.3% of the voters, gave Bush about 30% of their 330,000 votes, or about 100,000 votes.

4.) Asians and Asian Indians, who are 4% of the population but were only about 2% of the voters, gave Bush 41% of their 2 million votes, or about 820,000 votes.

5.) Whites, who are 72% of the population but were 80.7% of the voters, gave Bush 54.8% of their 81.5 million votes, or about 44.7 million votes. (It is reported that the mostly white Republican voting base in California had a record low turnout, contrary to the high turnout that was expected, caused by the TV networks' early call of the battleground states of Florida and Michigan for Gore, which prevented Bush from winning a majority of the national popular vote.) Gore received only 42% of the white vote, a 13% ethnic or racial gap larger than the gender gap, and one that has persisted in varying degrees since 1964, when Lyndon Johnson was the last Democratic presidential candidate to win more white votes than his Republican rival.

By way of clarification, as a racial group whites can be classified into the following categories:

1.) Jews, who are 2.5% of the population but were 4% of the voters (due to the older average age of their population and higher voter participation), gave Bush 19% of their 4 million votes, or about 760,000 votes.

2.) Arab-Americans, who are 1.5% of the population but were only about 1.2% of the voters, have historically given a large majority of their votes to Democrats (with the exception of their co-ethnic, defeated Michigan Republican Senator Spencer Abraham). For this reason I estimate they gave Bush about 40% of their 1.2 million votes, or about 480,000 votes.

3.) Southern European and non-Arab Middle Eastern ethnic groups—including Southern Italian, Greek, and various Southern Balkan ethnic groups, as well as Armenians, Turks, and Iranians—who together are about 5% of the population and were about 5.7% of the voters.[3] These ethnic groups have historically supported Democratic candidates, often to the extent of bloc voting. This is still largely true in their ethnic enclaves in the northeastern states and Illinois, as demonstrated in this election, but members of these groups in other areas of the country have increasingly tended to split their vote on non-ethnic lines for both Democratic and Republican candidates. A reasonable estimate is that Bush received about 45% of their vote nationwide, or about 2.57 million of their 5.8 million votes.

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4.) A Northern and Central European (NCE) group, consisting of the "Old Americans" (i.e., WASPs) and those other racially similar groups who have largely assimilated into the "Old American" group and its culture. This includes Irish and Eastern European Catholics, in spite of a considerable amount of separate ethnic identification that has historically allied them with the Democratic Party, especially in their ethnic enclaves. Together, they are about 63% of the population but were about 69.8% of the voters (because of their higher average age and voter participation). Based on the above analysis, they gave Bush about 40.9 million of their 70.5 million votes. This means about 58% of Northern and Central Europeans (NCEs) voted for Bush, and they accounted for 83.4% of the total votes he received.[4]

Let's consider the key ethnic constituencies of the Democratic candidate from the results of the 2000 presidential election. Where did Gore get his 49.2 million votes?

1.) Blacks gave Gore 90% of their 10.1 million votes, or about 9.1 million votes.

2.) Hispanics gave Gore 62% of their 7.1 million votes, or about 4.4 million votes.

3.) Amerindians gave Gore about 70% of their 330,000 votes, or about 230,000 votes.

4.) Asians and Asian Indians gave Gore 55% of their 2 million votes, or about 1.1 million votes.

5.) Whites gave Gore 42% of their 81.5 million votes, or about 34.3 million votes.

Gore's white voters can be divided into the following categories:

1.) Jews gave Gore 79% of their 4 million votes, or about 3.16 million votes.

2.) Arab-Americans gave Gore about 60% of their 1.2 million votes, or about 720,000 votes.

3.) Southern Europeans and Middle Easterners gave Gore about 53% of their vote nationwide, or about 3.07 million of their 5.8 million votes.

4.) Northern and Central Europeans (NCEs) gave Gore about 27.35 million of their 70.5 million votes. This means about 38.8% of NCEs voted for Gore, and they accounted for about 55.6% of the total votes he received.

If this analysis is correct, and Northern and Central Europeans (NCEs) gave Bush 58% of their vote compared to 39% for Gore, it is a matter that merits extensive discussion and examination. This gap of 19% among NCEs in favor of Bush, when compared with the even larger voting gaps among the black, Hispanic, and Jewish ethnic groups in favor of Gore, clearly indicates that the vote was drawn predominantly along ethno-racial lines.

Yet Bush made no explicit appeal to NCE ethno-racial interests. Far from it he is identified with those Republicans, like Bush's chief political strategist Karl Rove and former Republican National Committee chairman Richard Bond, who want to racially neutralize the GOP by "reaching out" to non-NCE minorities to increase their presence in the party.[5] The identification of NCE ethnic interests with the Republican candidate was subtle and implicitly understood, never explicitly mentioned or appealed to or sought. It probably derived largely from the simple comparison of the overwhelmingly

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NCE composition of the Republican party with the far more non-NCE composition of the Democratic party. This created the impression, however subtle or symbolic or even subconscious, that the Republicans were the party for NCE ethno-racial interests. This impression even survived the racially neutralizing efforts by Bush and the Republican leadership to be more racially inclusive in a futile appeal to non-NCE voters, particularly by the showcasing of black Republicans such as Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, and Rep. J.C. Watts. Because of its subtlety and implicitness, and the racial confusion caused by these neutralization efforts, the identification of NCE ethno-racial interests with the Republicans was much less effectively understood than the well-recognized and accepted identification of the Democratic party with black, Jewish, and Hispanic ethnic interests.

Due to NCE demographic decline, in future elections victory for NCE ethnic interests will require even higher proportions of the NCE vote, rising to solid bloc voting levels. To achieve this the appeal to NCE ethnic interests will have to become explicit, well-recognized, and understood. It will, in fact, have to become real and meaningful, not just essentially symbolic and empty of real meaning, like the current identification of NCE interests with Republican candidates. Voting patterns will have to be even more clearly drawn on ethnic lines, reflecting the real divisions of ethnic interests that are currently not recognized, with the voting "ethnic gap" between NCEs and other ethnic groups probably growing larger than it is now. In this election an NCE bloc vote of 72% would have constituted an absolute majority of the 101 million votes cast. If current demographic trends continue, by 2050 NCEs, who are presently 63% of the population and 68% of the eligible voters, will be 43% of the population and 47% of the eligible voters, with 2044 probably being the last election in which NCE voters will constitute a majority of the votes cast.

This of course is part of the long-term plan of the ethnic groups allied with the Democratic Party—to displace the NCE group from its historic majority status by profound demographic changes caused by a combination of non-NCE immigration and high non-NCE birthrates. This goal is defended by the ideology of the "Frankfurt school" of sociology, and is often openly expressed, although frequently with the use of code terms, such as the following quote from Earl Raab of Brandeis University's Institute of Jewish Advocacy, a prominent Jewish social scientist and ethnic activist, from one of his columns in the San Francisco *Jewish Bulletin* in 1993:

> The Census Bureau has just reported that about half of the American population will soon be non-white or non-European. And they will all be American citizens. We have tipped beyond the point where a Nazi-Aryan party will be able to prevail in this country. We [Jews] have been nourishing the American climate of opposition to ethnic bigotry for about half a century. That climate has not yet been perfected, but the heterogeneous nature of our population tends to make it irreversible—and makes our constitutional constraints against bigotry more practical than ever.[6]

If one reads "Nazi-Aryan party" as a code term for any party that openly advocates NCE ethnic interests, and "ethnic bigotry" and "bigotry" as code terms for overtures in support of NCE ethnic interests, the meaning of the above quote as a descrip-

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tion of a process of ethnic competition and conflict resulting in NCE displacement and dispossession becomes clear. But has the U.S. really "tipped beyond the point" where NCE ethnic interests could prevail in an election, and thus where the democratic electoral process is no longer a realistic means to promote those interests? This election indicates that the tipping point has not yet passed in an absolute sense, and that this will not likely occur until around 2044, but that the proportion of the NCE vote required to prevail in an election is growing so large that a degree of NCE ethnic solidarity sufficient to produce a true NCE bloc vote will be needed in the very near future.

As stated above, currently an NCE bloc vote of 72% would constitute an absolute majority of the electorate, but if current demographic trends (i.e., large-scale non-NCE immigration and high non-NCE birthrates) continue, by about 2044 NCEs, who were 70% of the voters in this election, will be reduced to about 50% of the total electorate, requiring an NCE bloc vote of 99.5% to constitute an electoral majority. According to demographic projections, the percentage of the NCE vote required to constitute an electoral majority can be expected to increase by about 2.5% per election cycle for the next 44 years (eleven election cycles) until NCEs become a minority of the electorate. Based on this, it can be calculated that the percentage of the NCE vote required to constitute an electoral majority in 2004 will be about 74.5%, in 2008 about 77%, in 2012 about 79.5% (equal to Jewish bloc voting levels), in 2016 about 82%, in 2020 about 84.5%, in 2024 about 87%, in 2028 about 89.5% (equal to Black bloc voting levels), in 2032 about 92%, in 2036 about 94.5%, in 2040 about 97%, and in 2044 about 99.5%. If all immigration were halted—with high non-NCE birthrates becoming the sole cause of NCE demographic and electoral decline—the rate of decline would be reduced by half, and the timetable doubled to about 80 years.

This analysis indicates that the possibility of creating an NCE voting bloc capable of restoring NCE ethnic interests by electoral means is in a race against time. Politically, the first of these interests is the preservation (or restoration) of the NCE ethnic group's traditional status as a predominant majority of the U.S. population and electorate—and thus its continued possession of the U.S. as its ethno-racial homeland—and its independence or control over its own existence. The anti-NCE coalition understands this, and that is why they promote and support the causes of NCE demographic decline, dispossession and displacement, and even openly celebrate it, as did President Clinton when he expressed his joy that the U.S. would cease to be a majority European nation by 2050, or as Earl Raab does, somewhat gloatingly and somewhat prematurely, as a victory already achieved.

For the NCE ethnic group to achieve bloc voting levels, the various causes and forms of NCE political division should be addressed and reduced as much as possible. In this effort, particular attention should be given to the "gender gap," as this gap almost certainly affects the NCE group to a far greater degree than any other ethnic group. It is most unlikely that anything close to a 10% voting"gender gap" exists among blacks, Jews, Asians or Hispanics. Therefore it should be sadly accepted that the NCE voting "gender gap" is probably 12-14%, which means that if NCEs gave Bush 58% of their total vote it is likely that NCE men gave him 64-65% of their vote while NCE women gave him 51-52%. Among NCE men it could perhaps be argued that borderline

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bloc voting on ethnic lines is already being practiced, although they are very quiet about it, and it is not openly organized or recognized for what it is. If 64% of NCE women could also be brought to vote on the lines of ethnic interests it would probably be enough to win the next several elections, and if NCE ethnic interests were addressed in a meaningful way it could temporarily slow the current rapid decline in the NCE demographic and electoral position, and perhaps even make possible its reversal.

White Ethnic Voters: Ideological Loyalties and Divided Interests

So who are the 39% of Northern and Central Europeans (NCEs) who voted for Gore, and thus on the wrong side of the electoral ethnic gap (i.e., against the interests of their ethno-racial group), and causing the political division within their group - and what can be done to move them to the pro-NCE side of the gap, to the side of NCE ethnic solidarity and unity in support of their ethno-racial interests, to produce a true NCE bloc vote in elections in the near future?

A large number were NCEs with anachronistic or fossilized political loyalties, who haven't gotten the message that things have changed, and the reasons their ancestors supported the Democratic party, whether ideological or ethnic, are no longer valid. They include the following three groups:

1. "*Class warriors*"—The attachment of many "lower income" and "working class" NCEs, including many labor union members, to the Democratic party is an example of anachronistic political loyalties, left over from the class warfare and socialist ideological struggles of the 19th and early 20th centuries, that are no longer relevant or meaningful in terms of either economic or ethnic interest. In the terms of the economic and employment interests of this group, by which it is primarily defined, for the last fifty years there has been very little practical difference between the policies of the Democrats and Republicans. Although the traditional symbolism of the Democratic Party being "the party of the working man" still persists, in practice since the Second World War it has been allied with global capitalist interests and multinational corporations as firmly as the Republicans (as Ralph Nader emphasized as the central point of his third party presidential campaign). The harm done to the American working class of all ethnic groups by huge international trade deficits and the loss of 10 million manufacturing jobs to other countries, institutionalized by such organizations and treaties as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which enjoy the total bipartisan support of the leaderships of both the Democratic and Republican parties, makes the labor policy differences that do exist between the two parties seem trivial by comparison. A Republican leadership that adopted a populist and economic nationalist program could make substantial gains among "working class" NCEs by supporting their economic interests in a much more meaningful way than the current Democratic leadership.

2. "*NCE ethnics*"—The attachment of unassimilated remnants of mostly assimilated NCE ethnic groups such as Irish and Eastern European Catholics to the Democratic Party is another example of anachronistic political loyalties.

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These ethnic groups have long provided the base of support for the Kennedy clan and similar Democratic politicians in the northeast, although the Kennedys and their allies have devoted their political efforts almost solely to promoting non-NCE interests and opposing NCE interests. An openly pro-NCE leadership that made NCE ethno-racial interests the primary issue, raising awareness of their larger ethnic identity and interests while stressing the importance of ethnic loyalty and solidarity, could lead many of these wayward NCEs back to their true ethnic allegiances.

3. *"Blue dog democrats," formerly known as "yellow dog democrats"*—The attachment of politically traditional, die-hard Democratic loyalist Southerners to the Democratic party (the proverbial "yellow dog democrats," who would vote for anyone—including a yellow dog—who ran on the Democratic ticket) is an example of fossilized political loyalties, as the party they support long ago changed, in terms of their ethnic interests, into the very opposite of the party that originally won the support of their ancestors, and the majority of their ethnic group has already recognized this fact and changed their political loyalties in accordance with their ethno-racial interests. The remnants of this group are gradually following the example of the majority of their fellows who have left the Democratic Party, but a Republican leadership that openly expressed and endorsed their traditional ethnic interests could speed their defection from the party of their ethnic opponents.

Moving beyond the anachronistic or fossilized NCE support for the Democrats, the first group to consider is the 12-14% of NCE women, mentioned above, who formed the "gender gap," giving Gore 12-14% more support among NCE women than among NCE men, so that 45-46% of NCE women voted for Gore compared to only 32-33% of NCE men. There are possibly a number of subtle psychological gender differences that contribute to this NCE electoral gender gap, some so subtle that it is difficult to address them, but I believe that most of this gap is probably due to very obvious "women's rights" issues. It is not just a coincidence that the NCE gender gap became significant only after the radicalization of the women's rights movement into the "women's liberation" movement in the 1960s.

For over forty years the political "Left," the ideological core of the Democratic party, from its dominant position in the media and academia, has made concerted efforts to drive a divisive wedge between NCE men and women, and much of this 12-14% NCE gender gap is due to the partial success of these efforts. But of the various "women's rights" issues, the more personal, less ideological, and less gender-divisive issue of abortion rights is the most prominent. Democrats support a woman's right to have an abortion if they choose, while Republicans— under pressure from the GOP's influential "religious right"—adamantly oppose abortion rights, although this opposition is largely symbolic and without practical effect. Some middle-class NCE Republican women support abortion rights but voted for the GOP nominee anyway because they did not really believe that the Republicans would make abortion illegal. Many women, however, really do believe this. In southeast Florida voters were inundated with television ads by Planned Parenthood and other abortion rights groups claiming that Bush would try to make abortion illegal. Several even featured self-described Republican women who said they could not vote for Bush because of this belief.

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It is likely that most of the women who comprise the NCE gender gap (i.e., all but the hard-core radical feminists, who are a "special interest group" that is essentially inseparable from the Democratic party) could be won over by a Republican leadership that clearly represented their ethnic interests and enjoyed the support of the great majority of their men if it recognized their right to control their own reproductive lives. It is also possible that the radical feminists have overplayed their hand and gone too far on some issues on which general NCE support is either very "soft" or actually nonexistent (e.g., placing women in military combat units where, if there is a war, they will be sent into combat—something every known human society has always avoided for obvious sociobiological reasons), making the Democrats vulnerable to further erosion of NCE support if the Republicans actually challenged them.

Another group of NCEs who voted against the interests of their ethnic group, and should be considered, although they are the least likely to be converted to the pro-NCE side, are those who have a "hard" degree of ideological commitment to anti-NCE policies and values, i.e., policies and values that are harmful to NCE ethno-racial interests. Most NCEs, including supporters of both major parties, have a "soft" degree of commitment to these anti-NCE policies and values as part of a normal and subconscious conformism to the dominant or mainstream anti-NCE culture that surrounds them, which includes the notorious cult of "political correctness" in which the pro-NCE side of any issue is always "politically incorrect." This "soft" support for policies that are harmful to their ethnic interests is characterized by a lack of awareness or recognition of those interests, or of the harm being done to them by these policies, i.e., by ignorance and lack of harmful intent. It tends to be a minimal, weak, passive, and grudging support, lacking intensity and passion, superficial rather than deep. But those NCEs with a "hard" commitment to the anti-NCE program and its values are active and enthusiastic in their support, filled with passion and intensity, and are also typically much more aware of the harmful consequences of their program on NCE interests. To the extent that they knowingly accept and support this harm to NCE interests, they have harmful intent. Unfortunately, much if not most of the existing NCE political leadership in both parties probably has a "hard" degree of commitment to anti-NCE policies and values, and virtually all the remainder have a "soft" degree to minimally conform to the dominant culture around them.

Most NCEs with a "hard" ideological commitment to anti-NCE policies and values support the Democratic party. This core group includes the more militant or radical promoters of the feminist and homosexual agendas (Gore received a homosexual bloc vote of 70% compared to 25% for Bush). College campuses furnish very strong havens of anti-NCE teaching and activism (often referred to as "idealism") where pro-NCE ideas are not tolerated and are effectively banned as "politically incorrect."

An Ethnic Agenda for the NCE Racial Majority

What are pro-NCE ideas? Very simply, pro-NCE ideas, values, and beliefs are those that recognize, support, and promote the interests of the NCE ethno-racial group. At present, very few people are aware that the NCE ethno-racial group even has interests, much less what those interests are, as they are not recognized or considered by the

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anti-NCE culture, and thus are not addressed in public discussion or debate, but are ignored, evaded, or denied as if they don't exist, permitting them to be routinely and massively harmed and violated with impunity. Only non-NCE interests are recognized or considered as a legitimate matter of concern, so that opposition to a policy that benefits non-NCEs but harms NCEs is defined not as being pro-NCE but as being against non-NCEs, as NCE interests are not considered to be a legitimate matter of concern. This must be changed. NCE interests, and the effect of programs and policies on those interests, must be recognized and discussed as a legitimate matter for concern, contrary to the current practice that condemns such concern as illegitimate and immoral.

What are the interests of the NCE ethno-racial group? The three most important, in order of their importance, are:

> 1. Its continued existence or preservation.
>
> 2. Its independence, sovereignty, self-determination, self-rule or self-government, or its sole control of its own existence free from domination, interference, or control by other ethno-racial groups.
>
> 3. Its possession of its own territory or homeland where it can be secure in its continued existence and independence, where it will not be displaced, replaced, or dispossessed by other ethno-racial groups, and where it can govern itself free from domination or influence by other groups.[7]

Given the fact that few people consider the fundamental importance of these primary objectives for their own ethnic survival, most of the pro-NCE political activity that does occur is focused on secondary NCE interests which, although less important than those listed above, are interrelated. Most common are the various efforts to end or reverse the more blatant anti-NCE policies of the dominant anti-NCE coalition, such as "affirmative action" programs (i.e., anti-NCE discrimination) and immigration, which is reducing the traditional NCE majority to a declining minority suffering territorial dispossession by an invasion of non-NCE immigrants. These efforts have consistently enjoyed overwhelming bloc levels of support among NCE voters, but their wishes have been frustrated and denied by the political and judicial maneuverings of the anti-NCE power structure, which have nullified the will of NCE voters, and made them essentially powerless with regard to control over specific issues.

The reassertion of NCE popular sovereignty, of control by the people over specific policies, would require greater NCE unity and solidarity than presently exists. There would be a synergistic effect, or mutually strengthening combined effect, in the interaction between the increasing legitimacy of a pro-NCE position and an increasing degree of NCE unity and solidarity in a single openly pro-NCE party. The more one increased, the more the other would benefit and also tend to increase. A divided NCE electorate, as has traditionally been the case, prevents NCE interests from being recognized or considered as legitimate or important matters of concern. Thus a pro-NCE position on an issue is commonly defined as being "anti-" non-NCE rather than simply pro-NCE, since only the non-NCE interests are recognized as legitimate "issues." All the while

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NCE interests are ignored as if they do not exist, so that in effect NCEs have no interests that are recognized as valid or legitimate, and addressed or considered, in the present political culture. A united NCE electorate, in control of a major openly pro-NCE party, could re-assert its sovereignty and rehabilitate the too much and too long maligned, violated, and harmed interests of their own ethno-racial group, restoring them to their central position.

How can the Republican party be transformed into a true NCE political party that actively supports the ethnic and racial interests of their own voter-base? According to "social identity" theory a pro-NCE political party can be expected to develop as a natural reaction to the growing dominance of the anti-NCE coalition and its policies. Given the preponderance of NCE support for the Republicans, it can be assumed that a strong NCE identification with the GOP already exists, making it the clear favorite to develop into the party of and for NCEs and their interests. As Kevin MacDonald explains in *The Culture of Critique*:

> The prediction, both on theoretical grounds and on the basis of social identity research, is that as other groups become increasingly powerful and salient in a multicultural society, the European-derived peoples of the United States will become increasingly unified; among these peoples, contemporary divisive influences, such as issues related to gender and sexual orientation, social class differences, or religious differences, will be increasingly perceived as unimportant. Eventually these groups will develop a united front and a collectivist political orientation vis-a-vis the other ethnic groups. Other groups will be expelled if possible or partitions will be created...[8]

The task of transforming the Republican party into the party of and for NCEs and their interests will not be accomplished by its current leadership. Quite the opposite—GOP officials can be expected to vigorously oppose it. So it must be accomplished by other organized groups from within and outside of the party with the goal of attracting NCEs into the party to increase its identification among the ranks of their own racial-ethnic group.

Over the last decade or so the "moderates" who are the current leadership of the Republican party have frequently stressed the necessity of moving their party away from its symbolic identification with NCE ethnic interests in order to attract the growing numbers of ethnic minority voters. This is obviously an effort to close the ethnic gap by racially neutralizing the Republican party, preventing it from developing into an openly pro-NCE party that actually serves, promotes, and identifies with its own ethnic base the way the Democratic party has catered to the interests of ethnic minorities.

The last thing the anti-NCE coalition wants, and fears the most, is the development of a major pro-NCE political party at this stage of the game when it could still make a difference. The big question is whether the GOP could be changed into a truly pro-NCE party, or whether a third party effort is the only realistic option. Increased awareness among NCEs of the electoral gap—in and of itself—could actually increase NCE ethnic consciousness and cause the gap to grow as the GOP is identified, at least symbolically at first, with NCE interests and receives increased NCE support, while the Democrats are explicitly identified as opposed to NCE interests and lose NCE support. Currently,

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NCE concerns and interests are not addressed or considered, but are ignored or denied. As a ethnic group, NCEs remain voiceless and defenseless even though other ethnic interests are sought after by both political parties. A major political party that represented, advocated, and defended legitimate NCE rights and interests would radically change this situation.

This would be a disaster for the anti-NCE establishment, which attempts to prevent it by racially neutralizing the Republican party by "broadening its base" to make it more inclusive and "racially diverse," claiming that the support of the growing non-NCE groups is necessary for the GOP's survival, i.e., claiming if the party is to be saved it must be racially neutralized and moved away from its identification with the declining NCE ethnic group and moved toward the rising non-NCE ethnic groups. Opposition to this move is described as "undercurrents that threaten the party." But a political party is not important in itself, nor is its survival, or whatever threatens it. *What is important in itself is a people, whether they be called a race or an ethnic group. It is their survival that is important, and whatever threatens their survival that should be a matter of concern. The concern of NCEs should not be with saving the GOP or any other political party, but with saving their ethno-racial group. A political party is only a means to serve a people's interests, they are not a means to serve the interests of a political party*. So the GOP, if it fails to develop into a truly pro-NCE party, is expendable, and should then be abandoned by NCEs in favor of a party that serves their ethnic interests. But for the present, as the ethnic gap shows, there is still a possibility that the GOP could be transformed into a truly pro-NCE political vehicle. Again, this is what the anti-NCE coalition, as they look upon the electoral ethnic gap, fears the most, and what a pro-NCE coalition should see as its best hope.

The present GOP leadership, in accord with the anti-NCE policies and goals of the anti-NCE coalition, is making concerted efforts to prevent their party from advancing an agenda that promotes the interests of the party's racial base. Former Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich is reported to have told black Democratic congressman Jesse Jackson Jr. that if the Republican party could gain an additional 5% of the black vote (i.e., increase its normal share of the black vote from 10% to 15%) it would "be in power for a millennium." This statement highlights the anti-NCE bias of the Republican leadership as well as the low quality of their logic and strategic thinking. A 5% shift in the black vote would gain them only 500,000 votes, while a 5% shift in the NCE vote—which is much "softer" in its loyalty to the Democrats and thus easier to shift—would gain the GOP 3.5 million votes. Yet would Gingrich say that a 5% shift in the NCE vote to the GOP would keep it in power for a millennium? He would not, and not because it would not be true (as his even more incorrect statement about the black vote shows), but because he is not nearly as interested in increasing the Republican party's share of the NCE vote as its share of the black vote in order to make it more racially diverse and thus racially neutral rather than ethnically homogeneous.

The efforts to racially neutralize the Republican party involve minimizing, denying, ignoring, or evading its identification with its own ethnic base. This political strategy has been largely ineffective in winning significantly increased support from non-

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NCE voters, but it has probably been very effective in confusing potential NCE supporters, including many of the almost 50% of eligible NCE voters who do not vote. It is likely that it has alienated far more potential NCE supporters, causing many of them to not vote at all, than it has gained non-NCE supporters.

This is not surprising. The ethno-racial interests of the two groups are mutually incompatible and irreconcilable. No party can serve both, and no party tries to serve both. Both parties serve the interests of the non-NCE ethnic groups against the interests of the NCE ethnic group. As the ethnic gap in voting patterns reveals, the Republican party enjoys increased support from NCE voters to the degree that it is perceived to be more favorable, or less unfavorable, to NCE interests compared to the Democratic party. The electoral ethnic gap essentially reflects the perceived gap between the Republicans and Democrats with regard to NCE interests. The greater this perceived "NCE interests gap" grows—and becomes more obvious—the greater the electoral ethnic gap will also tend to grow. The more it is reduced the more the electoral gap will also tend to be reduced. This is the goal of the current power structure, including the current leadership of the GOP—to prevent the creation of a major pro-NCE political vehicle by reducing or even eliminating the electoral ethnic gap between the two major parties. But the rank and file of the Republican party and the NCE electorate still persist in their own disorganized, uncoordinated, and largely unconscious efforts to transform the GOP into a de facto pro-NCE party. One can speculate about the causes of this behavior, but it has so far frustrated and prevented the efforts of the current leadership to eliminate NCE ethno-racial interests and identification as a political force that impedes and threatens their plans.

It should also be considered that a simple majority of NCE electoral support for a party with openly pro-NCE interests, even though not sufficient for an electoral victory, would be sufficient to constitute a moral victory for NCE interests, compelling the public recognition and consideration of NCE interests, and morally discrediting the anti-NCE policies of the current political leadership of both major parties. In this sense, even some degree of electoral decline in a transformed GOP would be worthwhile if the party promoted an openly pro-NCE position.

Conclusion

To conclude, in the 2000 election the most important predictor of who voted for Gore and who voted for Bush was not income level, educational level, gender, or socio-economic class, but ethno-racial classification. In the 1992 election Clinton supporters trumpeted the slogan, "It's the economy, stupid." Actually the real message of every election since 1968, including the 2000 and 1992 elections, is that the primary issue is *race*. It is race that primarily divides the electorate and is the most important determinant of voting patterns, although this fact is largely ignored, evaded, or denied.[9] To acknowledge it would most likely increase it by making NCEs more consciously aware of *what they seem to recognize subconsciously*, reducing the level of racial confusion that impedes NCE political unity, which is not what the ruling anti-NCE coalition wants.

The long-predicted political Balkanization of the U.S. along ethno-racial lines is already a long-established fact for the major non-NCE ethnic groups. Some of this

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ethnic division is presently concealed by regional, cultural, and religious differences. Only the creation of an NCE voting bloc is needed to complete it. NCEs have lagged behind in this process of ethnic competition largely because they have been unaware of it. They have not known, never realized, that they were in a fight, in an ethnic struggle, with the ultimate stakes being nothing less than the continued existence or preservation of their ethno-racial group.

ENDNOTES

1. Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 85.

2. According to an independent analysis by Steve Sailer, national correspondent for United Press International, the total Mexican-American vote in the 2000 presidential election is 3.0%, while the remainder of the non-Mexican Hispanic vote is 2.3%.

3. According to Wilmot Robertson in *The Dispossessed Majority* (1981 edition, Cape Canaveral, FL: Howard Allen, p.64) in 1980 these ethnic groups numbered 10.4 million, or about 4.6% of a then total U.S. population of 226.5 million. They included 7 million Southern Italians (distinguished from the approximately 1.8 million Northern Italians, who are mostly Central European in racial type), 1.4 million Greeks, and 2 million others—including about 400,000 Armenians, 230,000 South Balkan ethnics (Albanians, Romanians, and Bulgars) and 1.37 million non-Arabic "Middle Easterners" (including Turks, Iranians, and Afghans). The estimated increase in these groups to 13.5 million in the year 2000, or about 5% of a total U.S. population of about 270 million, is based primarily on Middle Eastern and South Balkan increases through immigration. Some members of the Southern European ethnic groups are physically within the Northern and Central European (NCE) racial range.

4. The NCE group is not limited to persons of "pure" NCE racial ancestry. It includes persons of partly non-NCE origin whose NCE ancestry is sufficiently dominant that they are physically within the NCE racial range and are racially and culturally identified, both by themselves and others, with the NCE group.

5. The futility of these efforts is underscored in a recent report by the Center for Immigration Studies, "Impossible Dream or Distant Reality?: Republican Efforts to Attract Latino Voters" by James G. Gimpel and Karen Kaufman (August 2001). See http://www.cis.org/articles/2001/back901.html for full report. In a recent *Washington Post* article Richard Bond claims that "we've taken white guys about as far as that group can go. We are in need of diversity, women, Latino, African American, Asian. The degree to which Bush and congressional Republicans can ground the notion of compassionate conservatism to appeal to women, Latinos, African Americans and Asians, that is where the future of the Republican Party is." See "Census a Clarion Call for Democrats, GOP," Thomas B. Edsall, *The Washington Post*, July 8, 2001.

6. See Kevin MacDonald, *Culture of Critique*, pp. 194-195 and pp. 246-247; and Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation* (New York: Random House), 1995, pp.118-119.

7. These are the vital ethnic interests that peoples have fought to protect throughout history—the "freedom" in the classic national sense fought for by the Greeks at Marathon and Salamis, by the Germans at Teutoberger Wald, by the Franks led by Charles Martel at Tours, by the Scots led by William Wallace at Stirling Bridge (his dying word in the film *Braveheart*), and even by the Americans on the many battlefields of the "War of Independence." These are the national interests—the interests of the "patria"—as opposed to individual interests, that patriots have fought to defend. (The U.S. has broken from this patriotic tradition in its claims to have fought most of its wars primarily to defend individual liberty and individual interests

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rather than to protect national freedom and national interests.)

8. Kevin MacDonald, *The Culture of Critique*, Praeger 1998, p. 323.

9. See Michael Barone, *The Almanac of American Politics 2002*, Washington, DC: National Journal Group Inc., 2001, pp. 27-28. In the introduction to the latest edition of his political almanac, veteran political analyst Michael Barone puts the 2000 election into perspective and claims that the results represent a political trend that has sharply divided the nation into almost equal halves—what he refers to as the "49% nation." Although Barone cites several factors that contribute to this divide, he tends to minimize the factor of race and suggests that religion is the major dividing point in the American electorate. His case seems less than air-tight. He mentions the fact that certain religious groups either voted for Bush or Gore, but prefaces this point by noting that it was a majority of *white* Protestants and Catholics who voted for Bush rather than Gore. Whether "observant"or "moralistic"or "agnostic" or "secular," the racial division among the electorate remains no matter how many ways Barone massages the figures.

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False Leaders and Popular Delusions

Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus
Rick Perlstein
New York: Hill and Wang, 2001
$30.00

xvi + 671 pp.

Reviewed by Curt Roberts

The postwar American right and the original New York Mets had much in common. They were both denigrated in the media and trounced by their opponents. The one-sided electoral defeats experienced by Robert Taft, Douglas MacArthur, and Barry Goldwater evoke comparisons with the 5.04 collective ERA of 1962 Mets' pitchers. Similarly, the 120 losses suffered by those Mets were the baseball equivalent of the 44 states carried by LBJ in the 1964 presidential election. The ignominy and ridicule that today accompanies the name of "Marvelous" Marv Throneberry is not quite equal to that attached to Senator Joseph McCarthy, but the deeds of both men will long live in public infamy—undeservedly so in the case of at least one of them.

But the comparison can be pushed only so far. A mere seven years after their founding and immediate floundering, the New York Mets won the World Series. The postwar American right, on the other hand, never won anything.

Of course, a large, self-congratulatory literature has grown up over the years among conservatives, positing that the Goldwater presidential campaign of 1964 was really the first step of a right- wing "revolution" that culminated to some degree in the victory of Richard Nixon and finally achieved total triumph when Ronald Reagan became president.

This is the perspective advanced by Rick Perlstein in *Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus*. The "storm" is conservatism victorious, and "consensus" refers to the liberal hegemony that preceded it. Surprisingly, the book ends abruptly after relating the story of Goldwater's electoral disaster. It tells us repeatedly that the cause of this defeat was that, even in the Republican Party, an overwhelming majority opposed the Arizonan. Perlstein argues that Goldwater's nomination was the result of primary campaign manager F. Clifton White's strategy of taking control of the Republican Party apparatus in those states where delegate selection was not based on popular votes. This strategy allowed the unpopular Goldwater's capture of a majority of the delegates but did little to change the fact that most Americans rejected him.

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In the end, these two analyses seem inherently contradictory. If the Goldwaterites won the nomination without popular support and were thus appropriately thrashed in the general election, then why or how did this yield the "unmaking of the American consensus"? In *Before the Storm* we are never told.

Goldwater and the "Movement" Frenzy

In the past half century the American right has launched several attempts to halt and, hopefully, reverse the leftist tidal wave that has covered America since 1932. Of these, perhaps the greatest frenzy was generated by the 1964 Goldwater campaign for president.

It is difficult to convey to those who weren't there the fervor that launched and maintained the Goldwater campaign. This was a truly grass roots movement. Perlstein documents the quasi-religious passion of the devoted army of little people across the country who consistently donated small amounts and volunteered long hours for the Draft Goldwater and Goldwater for President efforts. In the end, though, his words don't do justice to the compelling grandeur of the crusade and its apocalyptic sense that this was a movement to save the nation.

A hint of that fervor may be found in Perlstein's description of the rage that Goldwater delegates and supporters unleashed on their prime nemesis in 1964, Nelson Rockefeller, when he attempted to speak at the Republican convention. The New York governor rose to defend an amendment to the party platform condemning "extremism," citing as examples the Communist Party and the John Birch Society. Rockefeller's talk, scheduled for five minutes, lasted close to half an hour, as the Goldwaterites booed and chanted, "We want Barry!" To those supporting Goldwater, his liberal opponents weren't like-minded, good citizens engaging in the pleasant diversion of politics. They were enemies intent on evil. (We will identify the nature of this evil a bit later on.)

In researching the sources of the Goldwater movement, Perlstein has made an interesting contribution to the history of postwar conservatism by locating one of its streams in the efforts of Clarence Manion, former dean of Notre Dame Law School, to draft, first Governor Orvall Faubus of Arkansas (who earned national fame by his perfunctory opposition to the bayonet-led enrollment of blacks at Little Rock High School) and later Barry Goldwater as presidential candidates. On the other hand, he plays down the role of the intellectual rightists associated with *National Review*. The likes of James Burnham, Richard Weaver, Russell Kirk, and, of course, their patron and follower, William F. Buckley Jr., are given little importance. Similarly, scant attention is paid to the so-called "radical right" of the John Birch Society, the Conservative Society of America, the Christian Crusade, and kindred groups.

Although it seems that Perlstein is on to something with his research into Manion's efforts, it was, in fact, the *NR* and Birch Society crowds that supplied the theoretical framework and the foot soldier commitment that allowed Goldwaterism to carry the day at the San Francisco Cow Palace in July of '64. It was a movement of deep commitment, both to ideas and practical action.

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Although in many ways different from its prewar ancestor (primarily in its acceptance of a crusading internationalism in order to defeat "World Communism"), the postwar right had largely inherited the support base of that movement. Actually, as Perlstein carefully documents, it enlarged the old Middle America / America Firsters ranks by adding to them the Dixiecrat South and some segments of the anti-communist Catholic ethnics of the North. What did this coalition have in common?

Perlstein offers no understanding of the real intellectual and cultural sources that fueled Goldwaterism, but, as the book makes abundantly clear, neither did Goldwater himself nor those with whom he chose to associate grasp the yearnings of those they "led." We will return to those sources eventually. For the moment let us examine the reality of Goldwater and his campaign as uncovered by Perlstein.

Among the constant themes of *Before the Storm* are that Barry Goldwater had no interest in running for president, that he believed from the start that he would lose, and that he had little affection for those committed conservatives who laid the intellectual and practical groundwork for his nomination. He ran a lackluster, defensive, and vague campaign that never attempted to articulate any alternative vision to that of liberal orthodoxy.

Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of his nomination in San Francisco, he quickly fired F. Clifton White and cold-shouldered the movement's intellectuals, including *National Review's* editor, Buckley, and his brother-in-law, L. Brent Bozell. The latter decision was particularly galling since Bozell was the real author of Goldwater's *The Conscience of a Conservative*, the book (initially financed by Manion) that really launched Goldwaterism as a national movement.

What emerges from Perlstein with dismal regularity is how little enthusiasm Goldwater had for both the very notion of launching a primary campaign and the grim business of seeing it through to presidential victory. He was given to frequent, off-the-cuff, public musings which, when the press questioned him about them, would always lead to confused modifications and outright retractions. The candidate seemed incapable of coherently expressing what were purportedly his most deeply held beliefs. Thus, a singular opportunity to present the 1950s conservative vision to America was lost. Perlstein makes clear that Barry Goldwater was emotionally and intellectually unsuited to lead a rightist counter-revolution or even so much as the Republican Party presidential bid.

Nevertheless, there is an even more disquieting truth that runs throughout *Before the Storm*. Goldwater himself had little grasp of the basic principles of the movement he supposedly led. The main themes of '50s conservatism—dismantling the welfare state, restoring the Constitution, pursuing victory over communism—were never seriously proposed, described, or defended in the campaign.

In fact, the fear of expressing conservatism was almost a leitmotif from beginning to end of the Goldwater presidential bid. Yet, as watered down as the campaign became, it was never enough for the left. Leftist Republicans throughout the primary campaign and even after the nomination vilified the Arizonan and refused to endorse him. The Democrats subjected him to more demonization than any presidential candidate before or since. Their joint efforts, supported as usual by the major media and

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Hollywood stars, were all dedicated to casting Goldwater and his supporters beyond the pale. Once again we must ask, why the passion? Why did the left hate Goldwaterism so?

Thus, our previously asked question now intensifies: How did '50s conservatism, so despised by the media and masses, and left unarticulated by Goldwater, come to triumph four years later under Nixon and later Reagan?

The answer is that, in fact, Goldwaterism, the politics advocated in Bozell's *Conscience* and the early *National Review* and *American Opinion*, never triumphed at all. It was simply forgotten.

By the time the Republican Party had finished its convention, Goldwater as the real leader of an alternative politics was long since gone. Unfortunately for him, his enemies were only dimly aware of this. Thus, they continued his vilification.

Tragically, the grassroots Goldwaterites never grasped this truth either. Their hero had feet of clay. Unlike the "Jim Bowie" of '50s television, he was neither "bold, courageous," nor "a mighty adventuresome man." He was not their great counter-revolutionary general.

The conservatism of Nixon and Reagan no longer made any pretense of advocating the old *National Review* vision. Their victories made no impact on the welfare state, constitutional abuse, the restoration of state's rights, or the implementation of a foreign policy intent on rolling back the Iron Curtain. (Of course, communism in Eastern Europe did collapse shortly after Reagan but assuredly not as the result of any "victory over Communism" that his administration designed.)

The thesis that the conservatism of *The Conscience* and *NR* somehow won can be substantiated only if one has no idea what the rightism of the fifties actually stood for. It is parroted by those who simply support the "conservative" name regardless of what it might stand for in any given moment. It has more to do with loose semantics and team advocacy than with anything of substance.

By 1966, Bozell himself had tired of the farce. He left the world of truncated *NR* conservatism to found *Triumph*, a lucid, hard-hitting, Catholic, and counter-revolutionary journal that eventually found its theoretical roots outside the parameters of Enlightenment social and political thought. In its ten years of existence the Bozell-edited periodical took from *National Review* most of its talented and serious Catholic writers.

Triumph's view of the "conservative mainstream" was best spelled out in a landmark article that Bozell wrote in 1969, "Letter to Yourselves."

He asked that the American right do what it has always been unwilling to do—take a long look in mirror. "On every front that your program has confronted secular liberalism's you have been beaten. Consider (against the background of one of Nixon's press conferences) your campaigns against big government, against Keynesian economics, against compulsory welfare; your defense of state's rights and the constitutional prerogatives of Congress; your struggle for a vigorous anti-Soviet foreign policy; your once passionate stand for the nation's flag and its honor. Is there a single issue that secular liberals have had to yield to secular conservatives?"

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Bozell posited that conservatives and their movement had lost "energy, which is a function of will, which is a function of conviction."

In fact, the only enthusiasm that *National Review* showed during the 1968 campaign was devoted to the excommunication of Governor George Wallace from "movement" ranks. This was a task at which the journal labored long and hard throughout the year, enlisting the likes of Congressman John Ashbrook and finally Goldwater himself as the authors of articles condemning the Alabaman. In the former's view, Wallace was, due to his advocacy of "enforced segregation," to be regarded as "separated decisively from the conservative position." Goldwater declared that a vote for Wallace was not "going anywhere but right down a rat-hole."

We will return to the snarling ferocity of *NR*'s and Goldwater's rejection of Wallace later. Suffice it to say that in the fifties the journal had found "enforced segregation" a reasonable approach and had now not only jettisoned but demonized its own former position. This was yet another proof of Bozell's thesis that '50s conservatism had ceased to exist on the American political scene (and even among those who originally espoused it).

If *Triumph* absorbed the religious soul of *National Review*, then the journal's patriotic soul went to Belmont, Massachusetts, and the John Birch Society. The minds and skills of the likes of E. Merrill Root, Medford Evans, and Revilo Oliver would now be relegated to the pages of *American Opinion*.

It was from those circles that thoughts similar to Bozell's emerged in Oliver's *American Mercury* 1969 essay, "After Fifty Years."

"For half a century, generation after generation, large numbers of Americans have worked hard and sometimes desperately to avert the subversion and capture of their nation. And they have failed—utterly .... The net result is total failure."

The failure of '50s conservatism to restore the Old Republic had to be acknowledged. "It is, I know, sad and painful that we have lost so much that we cherished and loved. But we cannot undo the past by wishing and pretending."

The True Soul of Post-War Conservatism

The theoretical wellsprings of '50s conservatism were diverse. There was much talk in the movement's reflective arenas of Christianity, Western civilization, and limited, republican government as envisioned by America's founders.

On matters of race, there was little said explicitly. The general claim was that the federal government's involvement in the "civil rights" turbulence was "unconstitutional and impractical." Birchers saw it all as a communist or "Insider" conspiracy. The question of whether school and "public accommodations" integration, universal voting rights, and the like were good or not was generally ignored. The real threats were "big government" and "communism."

Yet the notion of a "Decline of the West" was also a prominent part of the old *NR* rightism. Generally, discussion of this concept centered on the gradual defeat of traditional religion and racial and cultural identity and the concurrent destruction of the assorted institutions that incarnated these loyalties. Thus, both the essences (religions,

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races, cultures) and their incarnated political and social forms were defeated and the civilization died.

Given the diversity of Western lands and their assorted political and historical traditions, the institutional incarnations of Western loyalties may vary widely. Thus, the right in one country may stand for monarchy, while in others, it supports republican forms. As the struggles of the centuries unfold, there are those who, unable to extricate themselves from the limitations of time and place, come to idealize the institutional forms of Western man to a degree that is self-defeating.

Thus, in America we find constitutionalists and in Great Britain monarchists who see the preservation and defense of certain political forms as of greater significance than the survival of their own people or their deepest religious commitments or both. Yet in America, the Constitution now functions—and several of its amendments were specifically framed—so as to destroy the identity of the nation and render its ancestral religious faiths irrelevant. In the "mother country" it is precisely the monarchy that has embraced religious pluralism (perhaps the reigning sovereign should now be titled "Defender of the Faiths"?) and multi-racialism, abandoned its own people around the world (Kenya, Rhodesia, South Africa, etc.), and supported whatever trendy perversion is currently in vogue.

Yet, despite these evident truths, many well-meaning people, whose core instincts proclaim that faith and identity are the most important of loyalties, will nonetheless provide crucial support for political movements that cast political forms as the highest of human values.

At times, political movements that are truly devoted to faith or peoplehood will express themselves in language that conceals their real aspirations but is properly understood by supporters. For example, the George Wallace presidential campaigns spoke about state's rights, the Constitution, anti-communism, freedom of association, law and order, and the like. Yet, the movement's supporters and opponents saw Wallaceism as essentially an attempt by American whites to assert and protect their existence as a distinct people. In the case of the Wallace campaign and (despite the ailing governor's later apologies), it is probable that Wallace and his supporters correctly understood each other.

Reliance on such oblique language was not necessarily a conscious desire to escape detection by Big Brother's radar system. Often people are so locked into forms that they are unaware they are really battling over larger issues and can be mobilized only through appeals to the forms. For example, right-wing opposition to the New Deal and the Roosevelt revolution was often expressed in constitutional or economic terms, while the struggle against FDR's interventionist internationalism was phrased as a desire to steer free of foreign wars.

Yet at root the struggle was between the old American elite and its replacement by a coalition of a different segment of the population. Of course, those of older American stock, free of cosmopolitan influences, were more apt to value, for example, the Constitution as it was intended, but this was not the root of the struggle. It was indeed the intense emotions that on both sides attended that struggle—for power as well as for

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deep cultural, religious, and racial expression—that animated the passions of the Goldwaterites at the Cow Palace in 1964 against the evil Rockefeller and his allies and the hatred that the new elite and its spokesmen in the media spat at Goldwater and his followers throughout the campaign.

It is not that political ideas do not or should not matter. They are often the symbolic clothing in which the simple question of which people is to triumph is hidden.

Moreover, a movement motivated by faith or blood identity is apt to fight longer and harder than a mere commitment to political forms. For example, African and American blacks, possessing a powerful and primary racial loyalty, have learned to express themselves in terms of political and economic justice. This helps to defeat their white opponents while allowing them to seize power and control.

A particularly good illustration of the use of forms to protect group identity is Jewish advocacy of pluralism and diversity in European lands coupled with vigorous defense of Israel's right to be a faith / identity-based state. Clearly, the former advocacy is simply a means to advance and protect Jewish group interests in gentile societies rather than a sincere embrace of liberal philosophy.

For those committed first and foremost to faith or identity there is always a need to examine the reality of political enthusiasms. Are the mass followings of a passionate political movement reading the symbols of its leaders correctly? Or, is there some strange disconnect? Are the people inspired by what they perceive as a movement's identity or essence only to be disappointed after having lent money, time, and energy to misunderstood leaders and causes? The most recent example of this was the repeated candidacies of Pat Buchanan. These failed escapades were fueled by a grassroots sentiment that white, Christian America was being replaced by a multi-racial, crusading secularism. In the end it became depressingly clear that Buchanan had reversed the priorities of what really inspired his supporters. In place of white racial identity, traditional Christianity, and populist economics, he offered a great deal of the last mentioned, a bit of the second, and virtually nothing of the first.

A Lesson from the Past

Barry Goldwater, as becomes clear from reading Perlstein, was little concerned with the religious, racial, or cultural underpinnings of the "rugged individualism" that led him to espouse (and, generally, when questioned, disavow) radical libertarianism in *The Conscience of a Conservative*. The notion that a given religion, culture, or race was the ultimate and perhaps only source and soil receptive to individualism and republicanism seems never to have crossed his mind. In later years, this barren, secular, identityless politics became vividly clear in Goldwater's embrace of homosexual "rights" and legalized abortion and his feverish denunciations of the Christian Right.

In the area of "civil rights," Goldwater always stated that he was personally in favor of integrated schools, public facilities, and employment. Even in *The Conscience* he (or rather Bozell speaking for him) had written, "I happen to believe that it *is* both wise and just for Negro children to attend the same schools as whites and that to deny this right carries with it strong implications of inferiority." What he opposed was the

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government's unconstitutional efforts to enforce these morally desirable ends. Thus, we now understand that the Arizonan's feverish attacks on Wallace in 1968 were completely consistent.

Yet despite these sentiments, which the senator never hid from the public, he became the darling of white Americans who feared "the rising tide of color."

Is this an effective strategy for those who seek to defend white people? Are white or Christian interests best served by supporting those who have no real sympathy with those causes but by coincidence happen to have views that support those interests on some issues?

Reading Perlstein, this old Goldwater enthusiast had one recurring sentiment: What a foolish waste of time and effort that was! The campaign that William Loeb of the *Manchester Union Leader* described in early 1964 as a "holy crusade against those who have stolen the birthright of America" was anything but.

It is irrelevant for our purposes whether one's primary cause is faith or identity, Bozell or Oliver. American conservatism of the fifties was a principled movement that sought to protect the traditional faiths and identities of white Christian Americans by summoning the citizens to a defense of a particular set of political and economic forms. If it had a real flaw, it was that it eventually came to confuse the forms with the faiths and identities themselves, committed itself to the defense of the former, and conveniently forgot the latter.

Today three things are clear: (1) Barry Goldwater was never the proper leader for that movement; (2) the movement has been dead for decades; and (3) because of its failure and the success of its enemies, Christian civilization and the white race are today in deep peril.

In Revilo Oliver's words—more than 30 years ago—"American Conservatism is finished, and its remaining adherents are, whether they like it or not, merely ghosts wandering, mazed, in the daylight."

Yet, it is not only a political movement that has died. It is America. Again Oliver: "The American tradition was a fair and indeed noble one, and it still has the power to awaken nostalgia for a world that no living man has himself experienced, but for practical purposes, it now has only a literary and historical significance."

The particular forms of constitutional republicanism are dead. Whether the faith and race that gave birth to them will survive remains to be seen. The Goldwater caper was the last, flawed gasp of American whites and Christians to reassert themselves via the symbols of their old order. It had as much impact against the forces arrayed against it as did Rocky and Bullwinkle on Borris and Natasha—with one significant difference: at least Moose and Squirrel were serious combatants.

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THE CHRISTIAN QUESTION

The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity:
A Sociohistorical Approach to Religious Transformation
James C. Russell
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994
$19.95 US

xiv + 258 pp.

Reviewed by Samuel Francis

Oswald Spengler wrote many years ago, "Christian theology is the grandmother of Bolshevism." What he meant was that Christianity's endorsement of such ideas as universalism, egalitarianism, peace, world brotherhood, and universal altruism helped establish and legitimize the ethics and politics invoked by socialists and communists. Socialists and communists don't always agree, however, which is why another German scholar, Karl Marx, pronounced that religion is in fact a conservatizing force, the opiate of the masses, the drug that prevents the workers of the world from rebelling against their class enemies.

Both of these Teutonic heavyweights might have profited from reading James C. Russell's *The Germanization of Early Medieval Christianity*, since it speaks, at least indirectly, to the tension between their different views of Christianity, differences that continue to be reflected in political and ideological disputes on the European and American right today. The main question in the controversy is this: Is Christianity a force that supports or opposes the efforts of the right to defend the European-American way of life? Christians on the right argue that their religious commitments are central to Western civilization, while pagans and secularists on the right (especially in Europe) argue, with Spengler, that Christianity undermines the West by pushing a universalism that rejects race, class, family, and even nation.

Mr. Russell, who holds a doctorate in historical theology from Fordham University and teaches at Saint Peter's College, does not quite answer the question, but his immensely learned and closely reasoned book does suggest an answer. His thesis is that early Christianity flourished in the decadent, deracinated, and alienated world of late antiquity precisely because it was able to appeal to various oppressed or dissatisfied sectors of the population—slaves, urbanized proletarians, women, intellectuals, frustrated aristocrats, and the odd idealist repelled by the pathological materialism, brutality, and banality of the age.

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But when Christian missionaries tried to appeal to the Germanic invaders by invoking the universalism, pacifism, and egalitarianism that had attracted the alienated inhabitants of the empire, they failed. That was because the Germans practiced a folk religion that reflected ethnic homogeneity, social hierarchy, military glory and heroism, and "standards of ethical conduct ... derived from a sociobiological drive for group survival through ingroup altruism." Germanic religion and society were "world-accepting," while Hellenic Christianity was "world-rejecting," reflecting the influence of Oriental religions and ethics. By "Germans," it should be noted, Mr. Russell does not mean modern residents of Germany but rather "the Gothic, Frankish, Saxon, Burgundian, Alamannic, Suevic, and Vandal peoples, but also... the Viking peoples of Scandinavia and the Anglo-Saxon peoples of Britain." With the exception of the Celts and the Slavs, "Germans" thus means almost the same thing as "European" itself.

Given the contradictions between the Christian ethics and world-view and those of the Indo-European culture of the Germanic peoples, the only tactic Christians could use was one of appearing to adopt Germanic values and claiming that Christian values were really compatible with them. The bulk of Mr. Russell's scholarship shows how this process of accommodation took place in the course of about four centuries. The saints and Christ Himself were depicted as Germanic warrior heroes; both festivals and locations sacred in ancient Germanic cults were quietly taken over by the Christians as their own; and words and concepts with religious meanings and connotations were subtly redefined in terms of the new religion. Yet the final result was not that the Germans were converted to the Christianity they had originally encountered, but rather that that form of Christianity was "Germanized," coming to adopt many of the same Indo-European folk values that the old pagan religion had celebrated.

Mr. Russell thus suggests, as noted above, a resolution of the debate over Christian universalism. The early Christianity that the Germans encountered contained a good many universalist tendencies, adapted and reinforced by the disintegrating social fabric and deracinated peoples of the late empire. But thanks to Germanization, those elements were soon suppressed or muted and what we know as the historical Christianity of the medieval era offered a religion, ethic, and world-view that supported what we today know as "conservative values"—social hierarchy, loyalty to tribe and place (blood and soil), world-acceptance rather than world-rejection, and an ethic that values heroism and military sacrifice. In being "Germanized," Christianity was essentially reinvented as the dynamic faith that animated European civilization for a thousand years and more.

Mr. Russell's answer to the question about Christianity is that Christianity is both the grandmother of Bolshevism (in its early universalist, non-Western form) and a pillar of social stabilization and order (through the values and world-view imported into it through contact with the ancient barbarians). Throughout most of its history, the latter has prevailed, but today, as Mr. Russell argues in the last pages of his work, the enemies of the European (Germanic) heritage—what he calls "the Euro-Christian religiocultural fusion"—have begun to triumph within Christian ranks. "Opposition to this fusion, especially as it might interfere with notions of universalism and ecumenism,

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was expressed in several of the documents of the Second Vatican Council," and he sees the same kind of opposition to the early medieval Germanic influence in the various reform movements in church history, including the Protestant Reformation, which always demand a return to the "primitive church"—i.e., pre-Germanic Christianity. It is precisely this rejection of the European heritage that may have driven many Christians of European background out of Christianity altogether and into alternative forms of paganism that positively affirm their racial and cultural roots.

Whatever primitive Christianity or true Christianity or historical Christianity may or may not have believed and taught, what is indisputably happening today is the deliberate extirpation from Christianity of the European heritage by its enemies within the churches. The institutional Christianity that flourishes today is no longer the same religion as that practiced by Charlemagne and his successors, and it can no longer support the civilization they formed. Indeed, organized Christianity today is the enemy of the West and the race that created it.

Mr. Russell has produced a deeply learned book that assimilates history and theology, sociology and comparative religion, and even sociobiology and genetics within its pages. Moreover, it is an important book that addresses a highly controversial and philosophically and culturally significant issue that few others will address at all.

Samuel Francis, Ph.D., is Assistant and Book Editor of ***The Occidental Quarterly****.*

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NUMBERS COUNT

A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility and the Politics of National Identity
Michael S. Teitelbaum & Jay Winter
New York: Hill and Wang, 1998
$26.00

290 pp.

Reviewed by Nelson Rosit

Michael Teitelbaum, co-author of *A Question of Numbers*, knows the score. He has taught demography at two prestigious universities, has written several books on the subject, and was co-chairman of the 1996 U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. He knows that over the last thirty-five years a "radical, in some ways unprecedented" demographic change has occurred in the developed world (i.e. Western nations). A sharp decline in fertility of white populations has coincided with the arrival of large numbers of non-white guest workers, immigrants, and asylum seekers. Teitelbaum, along with co-author and historian Jay Winter, is apprehensive about these developments. Not that he necessarily sees a problem with falling white birthrates and massive non-white immigration. No, it is the potential for a white backlash that seems to worry him the most. With scholarly detachment the authors assert that it is not the numbers themselves that can cause problems, rather it is the incorrect interpretation of these numbers by opportunistic demagogues that can lead to social disruption.

Despite the authors' liberal bias, *A Question of Numbers* addresses several important issues and provides some much needed information (though ironically, few numbers). The first two thirds of the book consists of chapters on individual countries. This format shows that, despite national variations, the motif of *low fertility* and *high immigration* runs throughout the Western world. Yes, impoverished Russia is plagued by widespread illegal immigration, and formerly fecund Italy has one of the lowest birthrates in the world. The chapter on Romania tells the startling story of how the newly installed Ceausescu government, worried by the country's low birthrate, outlawed most contraceptives and severely limited abortions. The result: "In 1966-67 Romania experienced what is surely the greatest fertility increase in a large population in recorded history—

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100% in one year, from 1.80 to 3.66." It would seem that even low fertility populations have the potential for dramatically increasing their birthrate, though few would find Romania's old communist dictatorship an attractive model to emulate.

Among the telling points the book makes is on the role of global capitalism's insatiable demand for more and cheaper labor in promoting immigration. The *gastarbeiter* in Germany and the migrant farm workers in America are examples. While conceding capitalism's tremendous potential for stimulating material development, this economic system is able to bend and mold every cultural value and social institution to its own needs. In this reviewer's opinion its role in precipitating the present demographic disaster needs to be explored further.

Another issue discussed is the so-called direct link between the "Holocaust" (the authors explain why the term is inappropriate), the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, and the large number of asylum seekers in Western countries today. The UN convention has seriously limited the freedom of action of supposedly sovereign nation signatories in dealing with these uninvited guests.

Why has the feared political challenge to ethnic change not taken place? The authors touch briefly on the career of Enoch Powell, a Conservative MP who, beginning in 1968, spoke out against large scale immigration to Britain. [See the articles elsewhere in this issue by Turner and Brand—editor.] Powell was shunned by his party because the Conservatives "were unwilling to tolerate a populist campaign from their right-wing." The party "had no tolerance for extremist views or for the divisions they would bring." To put it another way, the Conservatives lacked the intestinal fortitude to conserve their own ethnic heritage.

In the United States a majority of the electorate wants immigration restricted, yet the political establishment, both left and right, favors large scale immigration.

The American New Right has taken up themes of what we might term "conservative libertarianism" and "cornucopianism," according to which government action to impede any of the forces of the free market (including migration) is suspect. American liberalism on the other hand—with a deep preoccupation with American racial conflicts—is heavily influenced by the ideologies of civil libertarianism and civil rights.

In other words, the American political spectrum runs from right-wing liberalism to left-wing liberalism. A classic example of this was the 1984 presidential election which pitted the right-wing liberal, Ronald Reagan, against the left-wing liberal, Walter Mondale. Along with limited ideological choice, U.S. politics is increasingly dominated by special interests. "We can see, then, that the American political system has recently been more responsive to the groups desiring increased immigration than to the wishes of broader, yet less organized groups of citizens who want to reduce it."

Surely the demographic revolution which began during the last third of the twentieth century will be ***the*** domestic and foreign policy issue confronting the West in the twenty first century. Several factors insure this. Although massive numbers of Third World people are on the move today the potential numbers in the future are far great still. The gap in birthrate and economic development between the richest and poorest

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countries is widening. Many African countries have a lower per capita income today than in 1980. And, the authors point out, even in developing countries that are doing relatively well there will be a lag of decades, even longer, between the beginning of sustained economic development and a reduction in fertility. In addition, history has shown that governmental action using the carrot, rather than Ceausescu's stick, has failed to significantly raise the birthrates in Western nations.

Throughout the book the authors reiterate how politically combustible these demographic developments are. In the foreword they write of "problematic" and "sensitive" issues. In chapter two they note the "political explosiveness of population questions" in Europe. In the chapter on Britain they warn of "the potential for severe political and social conflict," while in America majority vs. minority "conflict is bound to intensify." Given how gingerly they handle the issue of demographic change, it is not surprising that Teitelbaum and Winter are hesitant to make population projections and speculate about future developments. However, in the conclusion they do make a couple of tentative predictions:

> The most plausible future level of fertility in industrial countries is moderately below replacement.... While we can predict that international migration will increase we cannot guess the actual magnitude of it.

They go on to write that:

> [g]iven the political volatility of the issue, long-term projections about the future ethnic or linguistic composition of national populations are conjectural at best. Commentators need to exercise more than the usual reserve... in this difficult, politically explosive area of speculation.

It is in keeping with the authors' primary concern of containing a white backlash that they refuse to posit future demographic scenarios. However, between the lines they imply that with continued below-replacement birthrates and increased non-white immigration the future existence of white nations is in doubt. But do not say it too loudly. You might upset the "silent majority."

In their introduction the authors promise a "dispassionate, knowledgable discussion" of demographic change. They were only half truthful. They can discuss the prospect of radical ethnic change within Western nations dispassionately. However, the possibility of white citizens defending their national and ethnic identity seems to fill Teitelbaum and Winter with dread.

Nelson Rosit is a graduate student in history at the University of North Dakota.

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THE PERILS OF 'HYPERDEMOCRACY'

The Trouble with Democracy: A Citizen Speaks Out
William D. Gairdner
Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 2001
$50 Canadian; $35 U.S.

534 pp.

Reviewed by Mark Wegierski

As a businessman, former Olympic athlete, and humanities scholar with a Ph.D. in English Literature from Stanford University, William D. Gairdner (born in 1940) is the best-selling author of *The Trouble with Canada: A Citizen Speaks Out* (1990). His previous books include *The War against the Family* (1992) and *On Higher Ground: Reclaiming a Civil Society* (1996), a collection of his columns that originally appeared throughout 1995 in *The Edmonton Journal* newspaper. (Gairdner has subsequently given up a regular newspaper column and devotes his time to other projects.) He is also the editor of *After Liberalism: Essays in Search of Freedom, Virtue, and Order* (1998) and coeditor of *Canada's Founding Debates* (1999), which consists mostly of succinct extracts from the various political debates occurring around the time of Confederation (1867) in Canada.

Gairdner is one of Canada's leading contemporary social conservatives, and one of the more eloquent paleoconservative theorists in North America. His latest book, *The Trouble with Democracy* is the capstone of decades of painstaking intellectual effort. Gairdner takes the reader on a bold and daring journey through virtually all of world-history—examining its diverse meanings and ways of life—as interpreted through his own, very intense, social-conservative theoretical framework.

In this book, Gairdner closely examines the term "democracy"—that cliché of current-day political debate. He begins by looking at the roots of democracy in ancient Athens and Rome. In both those societies, democracy was exercised only by a small percentage of the population, and with various restrictions that would make it seem extremely "undemocratic" by today's standards. A large proportion of the population were slaves. The height of Athenian democracy was very brief, and the Roman Republic ended seemingly at the zenith of its success in uniting the Mediterranean world, when the emperors seized control.

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Although the founding of the American Republic is often considered a revival of democracy, Gairdner shows that neither America nor Canada was, until comparatively recently, enamored of unrestricted democracy. The United States embraced a republicanism that was suspicious of the excesses of mass-democracy, while Canada looked to the British parliamentary model to rein in what were seen as the often dangerous passions of the mob. Only in recent times has the exercise "of the will of the people" been conceptually identified by most American and Canadian conservatives with a "democratic conservatism" that reacted against juridical, bureaucratic, and interest-group impositions.

According to Gairdner, there were a number of diverse strands of development—such as the ancient gnostic heresies, the Christian millenarian impulse, and Romanticism—that eventually pushed the West in the direction of contemporary progressive "hyper-democracy." Gnosticism contributed the notion of a select elite united by "special insight" (i.e., the enlightened group "in the know"), as well as the idea of "the authentic self within"—rather than the orthodox Christian view of an imperfect human being with God's authority above mortals. Gairdner argues, following conservative theorist Eric Voegelin, that gnosticism has been a shadow-outlook almost continually present in Western history.

The Christian millenarian impulse, unlike most established forms of Christianity, wanted to bring about the Kingdom of God on Earth—usually by whatever means necessary. One of the main bridges between Christian millenarianism and dreams of political revolution was the Puritan revolutionaries of Cromwell's ascendancy (which occurred in the aftermath of the English Civil War and the execution of King Charles I in 1649), especially the Diggers, Ranters, and Levelers. The Gnostic and Christian millenarian strands were eventually secularized into radicalideologies like Marxism, which called for "total transformation" led by a "vanguard"—regardless of any human and social costs. For Gairdner, Romanticism is typified by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau believed in the primacy of emotion over reason; that human beings are inherently good, but corrupted by imperfect social structures; and postulated a democratic General Will, that lent itself to being interpreted in a "totalitarian" fashion. According to Gairdner, the result of Romanticism was a belief in the primacy of the environment in determining human behavior—and that, if only there were massive social transformation, the human person would emerge as naturally good and harmoniously living with his fellows. Romanticism also removed blame and responsibility for wrongdoing from the individual person, placing it instead upon society or generalized social forces, which meant, in theory at least, that no one was accountable for his or her actions. Romanticism buttressed the utopian longings for "total transformation" that was capable of bringing about "Heaven on Earth." This fanciful desire for a utopian existence, rather than living by a more realistic and modest outlook, has been termed "immanentizing the eschaton" by conservative theorist Eric Voegelin.

According to Gairdner, the blood-soaked twentieth century is characterized by struggles between ideologies that all claimed to be democratic. One of Gairdner's arguments seems rather paradoxical, namely that both Soviet Communism and Nazism could be viewed as the *culmination*, rather than a repudiation, of "total democracy."

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The original example was the Jacobins of the French Revolution, who unleashed the Reign of Terror, executing King Louis XVI and his wife, Marie Antoinette (and tormenting the royal son to death), as well as massacring aristocrats, priests, and those peasants of the Vendée and other parts of France who had chosen to cling to their ancestral loyalties to God and king. Prefiguring twentieth century extremisms, the Jacobins introduced a ridiculous new calendar, and tried to create a new "rational religion," compelling the populace of Paris to worship the Goddess Reason in the defiled Notre Dame Cathedral.

Today, the West and most of the world is awash in "hyperdemocracy," which Gairdner identifies as "Democracy against Community: Attacking Society from Below." In his second-to-last chapter, which is on "the politics of sex," Gairdner argues that, as political correctness diminishes genuine freedom of speech, sexual freedom increases. He writes:

> [A] sexually liberated citizenry will do the work of atomizing its own society, and... a mass of autonomous individuals newly obedient to correct political behavior can be made to emerge by itself (p. 443.)

According to Gairdner, abortion rights are the touchstone of the current-day political and sexual order—and the moral equivalent of slavery in ancient societies, which consigned a certain proportion of the population to non-personhood. Because of widespread abortion and breakdown of traditional sexual norms, many Western societies are failing to maintain their population at replacement levels. Another modern form of slavery is the abject enslavement of the individual to his or her passions. However, Gairdner perceives another type of slavery in the present-day West: "tax-slavery" (e.g., high taxes), as well as the "debt-slavery" of future generations (because of chronic deficit-spending by governments).

Gairdner expresses a hope for "organic democracy"—which would be more imbued with moral norms, and with greater public spiritedness. He argues pointedly that there can be no true sense of community without moral judgment and exclusion. In an "organic democracy," the intermediary institutions of family and civil society would be enhanced against the current-day bureaucratic leviathan state, and against "amoral individualism." Following well-known conservative thinkers like Edmund Burke, Gairdner claims that, if we do not exercise moral self-control at the individual and family level, we will likely become controlled by an increasingly tyrannical, overarching, behemoth state.

The book would probably make for highly infuriating reading for almost everyone within the main currents of the prevailing political spectrum. However, some conservative theorists might also strenuously object to Gairdner's portrayal of Romanticism. Some have argued that Romanticism—especially on the European continent—was a *conservative* response to the basically liberal Enlightenment. In Britain, if one looks at figures like Percy Bysshe Shelley, Romanticism can be seen as more clearly radical. However, it also had a conservative side in persons like Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Robert Southey. Some would argue that by criticizing Romanticism and figures like C. G. Jung, Gairdner is actually cutting current-day society off from some of the redemptive possibilities and sources from whence a possible future revival might arise. While Gairdner's critique of Romanticism fits well into the overall arguments he has made,

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rather different interpretations of Romanticism by conservative theorists are certainly possible—for example, in Paul Gottfried's *Conservative Millenarians: The Romantic Experience in Bavaria.*

Some conservative theorists might also object to Gairdner's too-close identification of conservatism with orthodox Christianity, the anti-abortion movement, and sexual Puritanism. They might place more hope in a revival of more secular identifications with patriotism and localism. One wonders if a resurgence of national or local identity, or a revival of Christian religion, are more likely, in Western countries today. Some conservative theorists are suspicious of current-day Christianity's ultra-universalism, which exists both among Protestants and Catholics. However, most conservative theorists would acknowledge—unlike some right-wing radicals—that such ultra-universalism (which most real conservatives must find hurtful to their respective national and local traditions) certainly appeared to be far less prominent in most Christian denominations before the 1960s.

Gairdner's is a highly complex, often breathtakingly refreshing and seemingly radical work—"radical" in the best sense. He seeks to overturn the conventional wisdom of the contemporary period, and pursues the truth no matter what uncomfortable conclusions Gairdner may encounter. His writing often reaches a prophetic tone, especially when describing, in near-apocalyptic terms, the dystopic aspects of the declining West. Gairdner is boldly exploring what the real "pre-modern" or most consistently conservative outlook could consist of. Unfortunately, the few political theorists who are capable of fully understanding Gairdner's elaborate arguments are almost certainly going to vehemently reject them; whereas the socially conservative common person to whom the book's arguments would probably appeal is likely to be highly confused. Gairdner attempts a magisterial summing up of the meanings and significance of Western and world history. Although many are likely to disagree with him, he is to be commended for his audacious endeavor, in an age so often given to picayune arguments and trivial debates.

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